News analysis and commentary from Phillip Carter -- now located at http://www.intel-dump.com

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Stick a fork in me -- I'm done. With law school that is. Next stop: the dreaded BarBri study course, and the even more hideous California bar exam.
posted by Phillip Carter at 15:49

 
The flap over medals and ribbons

I needed a break from studying, so I decided to write over the brewing brouhaha over Sen. John Kerry's medals -- and whether there's any salient difference between medals and ribbons for the purposes of understanding his actions in 1971. The answer -- I think this much ado about nothing. Here's why:

1. What is a ribbon? Quite literally, a "ribbon" is the piece of fabric which suspends a military medal from the fastening device. This depiction of the Silver Star shows what the complete set looks like. Every medal has a ribbon which accompanies it. For the most part, they all conform to the style of the Silver Star, with the notable exception of the Congressional Medal of Honor, which is worn around the neck. The Army's regulation on the subject has this to say:

The term "awards" is an all-inclusive term covering any decoration, medal, badge, ribbon, or appurtenance bestowed on an individual or unit. The term "awards" is used throughout this chapter. The term "ribbon" is an all-inclusive term covering that portion of the suspension ribbon of a service medal or decoration that is worn instead of the service medal or decoration. The ribbon is made in the form of a ribbon bar, 1 3/8 inches long by 3/8 inches wide. The term "ribbon" is used throughout this chapter, and it includes service and training ribbons.

The wearing of ribbons in lieu of medals evolved over time to facilitate the wearing of decorations into combat by soldiers who didn't want their medals to be clanking around on the battlefield. Today, American soldiers do not wear their decorations into battle -- they fight in battle dress uniforms with sewn-on patches for rank, unit, and other designations.

2. What's the difference between a medal and a ribbon? Generally, ribbons are worn in lieu of medals on the military uniform. Medals are usually worn in formal situations, such as black-tie events. On certain uniforms, such as the Army mess dress uniform, miniature medals are actually worn. However, on the standard dress uniform (roughly analogous to a business suit), you will see military personnel wearing their ribbons on a daily basis. Look at any picture of generals testifying before Congress -- they'll be wearing their ribbons. The ribbon itself is a rectangular version of the ribbon that is used to suspend the medal in full medal form (see this chart for a picture of what ribbons look like). Ribbons are worn together in rows, using a ribbon holding device that pins to the uniform. Ribbons are worn in order of precedence, i.e. Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, etc.

3. Do all medals have ribbons, and do all ribbons have medals? No. Some awards, like the Army's Overseas Service Ribbon, do not have a medal. These are typically less important awards or service awards. Generally, ribbons without medals are so designated in their title, e.g. the difference between National Defense Service Medal vs. Overseas Service Ribbon. All medals do have a ribbon which accompanies them, but all ribbons do not have medals.

4. Are medals unique? The medals that you have actually pinned on you have sentimental value, and some medals (like the Medal of Honor) cannot be purchased. But generally speaking, medals and ribbons are something you can get at the PX or from a military supply store. Ribbons fray over time, and they have to be replaced. Also, some soldiers opt for a "stay brite" version of medals that don't need polishing, and these can only be purchased at the PX. It is correct to say that store-bought medals are "my medals" even though they're not the ones originally given. Once you're awarded a medal, it's yours. Of course, a protest might have more symbolic meaning if it consists of throwing one's own original medals, but given the ease with which replacements are procured, I think this is an unimportant difference.

So, to sum up: Does it matter that John Kerry threw ribbons instead of medals? Not really -- they're functionally interchangeable. Both represent the decoration he received. Does it matter that he threw someone else's decorations, or store-bought decorations? Slightly, although this is mostly a sentimental issue. Original medals are sometimes engraved with the recipient's name, and they have personal value to some people. (I, for one, have little attachment to my original medals, but that's probably because they're peacetime awards.) Do military personnel use the terms "ribbons", "medals", and "awards" interchangeably? Yes -- each word has a specific definition, but I've heard them used interchangeably.

And if you want a humorous version of this -- see this mock PowerPoint briefing on John Kerry's military record over at Slate. Very funny.

posted by Phillip Carter at 11:46

 
Finals week: Barring some unbelievably huge news story, Intel Dump will be silent until Thursday when I take my last law school exam. Please come back then.

However, I will be on NPR's Day to Day show today (Tuesday) with Alex Chadwick, discussing my Slate article "Hollow Force" and the effect of the Iraq mission on U.S. military readiness. The segment aired on NPR affiliates today, and also available on NPR's website.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:08

 
Enemy combatant? Deborah Sontag has a long biographical piece in Sunday's New York Times on Jose Padilla, the alleged "enemy combatant" whose case will reach the U.S. Supreme Court this week along with that of Yaser Hamdi. Also, for an interesting discussion of the Padilla case and the Constitution's treason clause, see the new weblog "Mere Dicta" by Boalt Hall law student Mike Anderson.
posted by Phillip Carter at 10:19

 
Notes from the Los Angeles Times Festival of Books

I decided to take a break today from studying for finals to attend the L.A. Times Festival of Books, an annual event held in spring on the UCLA campus that brings together hundreds of authors with thousands of avid book readers like me. I specifically came today for a panel discussion titled "The Seduction of War", which included:

- Leo Braudy, author of From Chivalry to Terrorism : War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity
- Chris Hedges, author of War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning and What Every Person Should Know About War
- James Hillman, author of A Terrible Love of War
- Anthony Swofford, former Marine and author of Jarhead
- Samantha Power (moderator), author of A Problem From Hell (a 2003 Pulitzer Prize winner)

The panel discussed a variety of topics relating to the narratives of war, but focused on why this narrative is so important and interesting to us as readers. Leo Braudy, a humanities professor at USC, emphasized the role of masculinity and rites of passage in his discussing, arguing that we seek out war stories to learn more about this critical stage in life. Chris Hedges spoke quite eloquently on the awesome brutality of war, and its addiction for readers and journalists alike. Mr. Hedges also discussed the role that ideology and "civil religion" plays in the creation of war myths, and how the perpetuation of these myths is an important part of the war narrative. Mr. Hillman discussed the connection between religion and war. And Tony Swofford, the only member of the panel to see war in uniform, talked about the importance of this narrative in a society where few Americans see war personally. Samantha Power acted mostly as moderator, except for a brief introduction discussing the changes in warfare and the war narrative over time, but I imagine that if she could've talked, she would've discussed the human costs of war as felt by the civilians who often die in war.

All in all, I thought it was a brilliant discussion. Mr. Hedges' comments struck me as particularly insightful, if not tinged by the cynicism of witnessing so much brutality as a veteran war correspondent. The panel discussion was taped by CSPAN2, and I think (hope) transcripts and/or achieved video segments will be available of this event.

Post Script: Tony Swofford mentioned a new initiative by the National Endowment for the Arts which will help develop the war narratives of soldiers who saw the action first-hand, and the Washington Post had a report this week on it. The goal is to create a richer fabric of literature and history describing American men and women at war.

The National Endowment for the Arts will announce a program today to change that, to encourage troops returning from Iraq (and Afghanistan as well) to write about their experiences in wartime. "Operation Homecoming," which will be unveiled at a news conference at the Women in Military Service for America Memorial in Arlington, will make some of this country's most prominent authors available to servicemen and -women, for workshops and lectures intended to help them express and record what they have seen and felt in combat. The program is part oral history project, part literary talent search, and part a writing-as-therapy program for troops, particularly those in Iraq, who have been under extraordinary stress in America's first protracted and messy war since Vietnam.

The 16 writers who have agreed to participate by visiting military bases include Tobias Wolff, Tom Clancy, Victor Davis Hanson and McKay Jenkins. In addition, 10 other writers, including Shelby Foote and Richard Wilbur, have contributed reminiscences and readings to a compact disc and Web site the Endowment has produced.

* * *
"These are not voices we would easily hear, otherwise," says Dana Gioia, chairman of the NEA. They haven't been heard for a number of reasons, most important of which is that America's military men and women are preoccupied with fighting. Gioia also notes that one spur to the project is the realization that much of what is being said and recorded about the war is happening through e-mail, a medium that is more ephemeral than the letters and journals that captured the grit of military life in earlier conflicts.

"We want to connect with people when their stories are still fresh," says Jon Parrish Peede, one of the NEA's project directors for "Operation Homecoming." Peede compares the project to the artistic endeavors of the Depression-era Work Projects Administration. The NEA effort is a similar attempt to connect, artistically, with the broader American public during a time of national anxiety.

The goal of the project, beyond providing an emotional and expressive outlet for military personnel and their families, and getting the basic eyewitness facts of history down on paper, is to add to a long tradition of war literature. That tradition encompasses everything from the first great classic of Western literature, Homer's "Iliad," to the vast and ongoing production of new military memoirs, histories and novels that make up a healthy percentage of the American publishing industry.

Very interesting... I have a feeling that this project will produce some amazing writing. I hope that the literature this project produces contributes to the American war narrative, and enriches the minds of millions of Americans.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:03

 
Another Gitmo case hits a rough spot

Lawyers for Airman Ahmad Halabi have filed pre-trial motions with the military court hearing his case to compel the government to provide more coherent positions to support its case, according to the Washington Post. A team of military and civilian lawyers is representing Airman Halabi, who's charged with various espionage-related counts, including the mishandling of classified information. However, defense lawyers are challenging the basis for these charges.

The complaint came in 40 pages of legal papers filed last week in the court-martial of Airman Ahmad I. Halabi. His attorneys said investigators have repeatedly changed their reasoning about why the translations of letters from detainees to their families that Halabi possessed were considered classified.

"Halabi remains in jail and has been in pre-trial confinement for nine months, and still the government does not have a consolidated, consistent or intelligible position on the classification of information" in the case, Halabi's attorneys wrote. "Each time the defense points out the flaws in the classification logic, a different reason for classification of information is created or invented."

Analysis: This case is different than that of Captain James Yee, the Gitmo chaplain first accused of espionage and then released without any adverse action. But, we can see some common themes. The first is the sloppy designation of classified information at Guantanamo, which may reveal something larger about the information security systems there, or the penchant for oversecurity in connection with the Gitmo mission. Second, we can see a tendency on the part of the government to exaggerate its charges initially, at least in the press, in order to paint a picture of a really bad guy. That's ironic, because prosecutors typically try to downplay expectations so as not to set the bar too high. And third, we have zealous attorneys for the defense, led by civilian attorney Donald Rehkopf, an expert in military law. My gut feeling on this case is starting to change; I think the Air Force prosecution is in for a world of hurt unless it starts to tighten its shot group. No military judge is going to let this prosecutorial conduct stand for long. More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:23

 
Update on the Witmer sisters: A couple of weeks ago, we all shared in the grief of the Witmer family, who tragically lost their daughter Michelle to combat in Iraq. The question arose -- can the Witmer sister stay home under current Army policy as surviving siblings? The answer is yes, if they decide to. Yesterday, the New York Times reported that the sisters had requested (and received) 15 additional days to make their decision. I suspect they're torn between loyalty to their family and the intense bonds to the other soldiers in their unit, and that this is a really hard decision to make.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:08

 
Pledge break: I really appreciate the generosity of all those readers who have given to my site so far. With your help, I have been able to purchase a domain name (www.intel-dump.com), server space (I plan to move after finals), and a laptop to replace the dinosaur I was using that kept crashing at the least opportune times. However, I am also trying to raise money to support my writing and reporting through the summer, while I study for the California bar exam. If you have not donated thus far, and value Intel Dump as a news source, please consider making a small donation. If this site is worth what a daily newspaper is to you, please consider a $1 donation. If it's more like a magazine, then perhaps you can donate $5. If you value this site's analysis and commentary like that of a magazine subscription, please consider a $20 or $25 donation.

Thank you again for your support. I have plans to make this site even more valuable with news feeds, an archive of documents, and a better layout that allows me to include graphics and photos. Please stay tuned for those changes.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:01

 
Some thoughts on the photos of America's fallen warriors

I should say up front that I'm deeply conflicted over the issue of whether the U.S. government should allow media coverage of returning American caskets, or whether the news media should seek such coverage at all. As many of you know, this issue hit the front pages this week in a big way. First, the Seattle Times printed a front-page photo taken by a contract employee in Kuwait of 20 flag-draped caskets on a cargo aircraft. Then, the Air Force inadvertently released 350 photos from Dover Air Force Base to a private citizen who had made a FOIA request. Now, the Los Angeles Times, New York Times and Washington Post all have major stories on the incident. My hometown paper even chose to run a front-page photo of these flag-draped caskets today, along with this story:

Pictures of flag-draped coffins filling aircraft cargo bays and being unloaded by white-gloved soldiers were obtained by Russ Kick, a 1st Amendment activist in Tucson who won their release by filing a Freedom of Information Act request.

Air Force officials initially denied the request but relented last week and sent him more than 350 pictures of Iraq war dead arriving at the military's largest mortuary at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.

The unexpected posting of the photos on the Internet caught the Pentagon by surprise and provoked a ripple of media attention to pictures the government had been trying to suppress. Several major newspapers planned to publish the newly released photos on their front pages today.

* * *
The Pentagon's insistence that the images should remain censored also came one day after two military contract employees in Kuwait were fired for taking pictures of flag-draped coffins there and sending one to the Seattle Times, which published it Sunday.

Maytag Aircraft Corp. said that it had fired Tami Silicio, 50, and her husband, David Landry, because they "violated Department of Defense and company policies by working together" to take and publish the photograph, company President William L. Silva said in a news release Thursday.

The picture shows several workers inside a cargo plane parked at Kuwait International Airport securing 20 flag-draped coffins for the trip to Dover. Silicio, who took the picture, told the newspaper that she hoped it would portray the care and devotion with which civilian and military crews treat the remains of fallen troops.

* * *
Government and military leaders acknowledge that such images carry power and can sway public opinion.

In 1999, the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, said a decision to use military force was based in part on whether it would pass "the Dover test," as the public witnessed the images of the war dead arriving home.

However, at a news briefing Thursday, Molino said the policy was not driven by concerns of public opinion.

"It's a policy that reflects what the families have told us they would like by way of the treatment of remains of the loved ones who have made that sacrifice," Molino said.

My thoughts echo those of Josh Marshall on this subject. Like me, he is conflicted over the publication of these photos, because of the ends to which partisans will use these images: "For many opponents of the war there is an unmistakable interest in getting these photographs before the public in order to weaken support for the war. There's no getting around that." I think this accurately sums up the motivation of many who would like to publish these images. Historically, images of casualties have been exploited by pro- and anti-war movements. While the casualty story is a legitimate part of the discourse over Iraq, I think these images may come to dominate and anesthetize the American public, and in the long run, that might defeat any meaningful discourse over the substantive issues at play. I also think that military families have a right to resent the use of these images, by anyone, because that seems like

However, there's also a part of me that says "Wait a minute -- who do these images really belong to?" Technically speaking, because the photos are taken on Air Force property of Air Force property, they belong to the military. But I learned as a new lieutenant that we (the military) hold the lives of our soldiers and our equipment in sacred trust, and that we are entrusted with these things by the people of the United States. That is especially true of soldiers, who after all, are America's sons and daughters. The images of flag-draped caskets belong to the American public just as their living comrades do. I believe the American public has a stake in seeing these images, because ultimately, it is the American public which produced these young men and women.

On balance, I lean towards letting the images be made public. Why? Because I think that these caskets, draped as they are with American flags and no individually-identifying markings, are important symbols of our national sacrifice in this war. The Pentagon already publishes releases about each servicemember's death, and the major newspapers often run "faces of the fallen" features listing these casualties by name -- often with a photo or short obituary. I don't think these images go much further than those disclosures, except that they show a powerful symbol of the cost of war. In a time when compulsory service does not exist, and many Americans don't feel the personal sacrifice of war, I think it's important to remind the public of the most basic cost of war. These images belong to the American people, just as these soldiers do -- in my opinion, the public deserves to see them.
posted by Phillip Carter at 19:11

 
Has Iraq created a 'hollow force'?

Slate just published my article looking at this issue, and the challenges facing the U.S. military should it decide to reinforce its units currently fighting in Iraq. A variety of logistical and infrastructural obstacles in the path of any reinforcement effort, and they are compounded by budget problems now beginning to seriously affect the Army. The ultimate conclusion? That the war in Iraq has stretched America's military to its limit, and that we have sacrificed our ability to do other things in the world militarily for as long as this mission lasts.

There is some irony in this. Heading into the 2000 election, then-candidate George W. Bush blasted the Clinton administration's 1990s deployments to places like Bosnia and Kosovo, saying they depleted our military's readiness. "Our military is low on parts, pay and morale. If called on by the commander in chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to report, 'Not ready for duty, sir,' " said then-Gov. Bush, referring to the readiness of the 10th Mountain and 3rd Infantry divisions after their respective deployments to the Balkans. Today, the same criticism is being leveled at the Bush administration, except that Iraq is having a much worse effect on military readiness than the Balkans deployments ever did.

The administration responds to this criticism by saying that Sept. 11 changed everything and that military force was necessary in Afghanistan and Iraq to respond to the new threat from terrorism. This riposte has merit, but it misses the essence of the new global security environment. Dangerous and unknown threats do exist, therefore the U.S. military must be ready to act on a moment's notice in ways and places that can't fully be predicted. By tying the military down in Iraq to the point where it can barely manage to reinforce itself, the Bush administration has hurt America's ability to respond militarily in the post-Sept. 11 world.

It's too late to back out of Iraq. The real issue today is how to beat the insurgency without eviscerating the American military to do it. If winning the war will take more troops, then we must send them. Reconciling the need to win in Iraq with the need to sustain military readiness will be hard. It probably means we need to increase the size of the active military and adjust the mixture of active and reserve forces to put more "nation-building" troops like military police and civil affairs personnel on active duty. The Pentagon also needs to adjust its 2005 budget, shifting money from futuristic procurement programs to current operations such as reconstituting the pre-po fleets. And America needs to invest more in its reserves so they're ready to back up the active force when the military is stretched like it is today. Ultimately, we must win in Iraq. But we cannot afford to focus so single-mindedly on that mission that we neglect our ability to meet other military threats in the post-Sept. 11 world.

posted by Phillip Carter at 16:05

 
Former NFL player killed in Afghanistan

"He proudly walked away from a career in football to a greater calling, which was to protect and defend our country. Pat represents those who have and will make the ultimate sacrifice for our freedom. I am overwhelmed with a sense of sorrow, but I also feel a tremendous feeling of pride for him and his service." - Arizona Cardinals coach Dave McGinnis

* * *
He had been playing under a three year, $3.6 million contract. The Army reportedly paid him about $19,000 plus benefits.

The Washington Post reports that Army SPC Patrick D. Tillman -- formerly a player with the Arizona Cardinals, now a member of the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment -- was killed in action while hunting down Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. The Rangers were engaged in Operation Mountain Storm, which kicked off last month and has thus far involved thousands of American soldiers in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and his top henchmen. Details are not being released yet about the circumstances of SPC Tillman's death. But we already know the larger circumstances of his service. He was a man who walked away from an amazing career in professional sports to pursue a higher calling of service to his nation. In volunteering for the Rangers, he chose to join one of the most elite military units in the world, and to push himself farther and harder in the service of his nation. The news of this death is tragic, as is the news of any soldier's death. But we should honor these choices, and hope that others follow in the altruistic footsteps of SPC Tillman.

Update: The Los Angeles Times has good coverage of this story in Saturday's paper, including an excellent essay from sports columnist Bill Plaschke titled "The True Meaning of Sacrifice". With the NFL draft looming over this weekend, Plaschke writes:

Today in New York, amid the smell of money and the tingle of fame, the NFL will hold its annual draft of young men who will use their extraordinary physical gifts to play a game.

One can hardly imagine any of them forsaking their futures and using those gifts on behalf of their country.

Yet that was Pat Tillman, former safety for the Arizona Cardinals, dead in Afghanistan at 27, alive forever in our vision of what is best about America.

For Tillman, the important interceptions weren't made on a football field, but the front lines.

For Tillman, the real tackles weren't the ones made to inspire your team, but to secure our neighborhoods.

For Tillman, the only guaranteed contract was one you sign with your flag.

This weekend, athletes everywhere will stand at attention, apparently listening, as the national anthem is played at sporting events.

Remember Pat Tillman as the one of the few in the last 50 years who actually listened.

Plaschke ends his column with a call to immediately induct Tillman into the NFL Pro Football Hall of Fame. I confess ignorance as to the rules of that institution, however, I can't think of a better tribute.
posted by Phillip Carter at 10:10

 
Admin note: Intel Dump will slow down over the next week to allow me to study for my last law school finals. I'll try to post notes on big stories I'm tracking (the 4th Circuit decision in U.S. v. Moussaoui, the release of photos depicting the coffins of dead American soldiers; the death of Army Ranger and NFL player Pat Tillman in Afghanistan, and others). But finals will have my primary attention until next Thursday.
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:47

 
Welcome home, Ironhorse: The 4th Infantry Division officially came home today to Fort Hood, Texas, with a formal ceremony honoring the division's soldiers. The division also honored the 79 4ID soldiers who gave their lives in Iraq. During its service in Iraq, 4ID had responsibility for a large swath of territory north of Baghdad, including the notorious "Sunni Triangle". Its soldiers conducted thousands of patrols, raids and convoys in support of the security and reconstruction efforts. The 1st "Raider" Brigade (my old unit) also earned notoriety for the raid which captured Saddam Hussein in December 2003.

The 4th Infantry Division's soldiers will now get some much-needed rest and time to reconstitute their units; many will rotate to other installations, and many will leave the Army altogether. The current state of affairs in Iraq makes it look like 4ID will be sent into the breach once again, but hopefully not too soon for the soldiers and their families.
posted by Phillip Carter at 18:45

 
Good news for extended troops

Balancing the dual imperatives of mission accomplishment and soldier welfare is never easy. However, a report in Stars & Stripes today indicates that the Army's top general in Europe may have drawn a bead on exactly how to do this for the families of the soldiers whose tours have been extended by 3-4 months in Iraq.

“We will cut through the red tape, we will modify the regulations, we will change policies — all as necessary to support you during the upcoming months,” Gen. B.B. Bell said in a written statement.

Bell’s tour comes in the wake of the extension to 1st Armored Division’s hitch in Iraq, which had been slated to end next month.

“In the very near term, I will lead a team of our most experienced support personnel to many of your communities to hear from you personally,” Bell said in his statement, promising, “we will not let you down.”

Citing security concerns, USAREUR spokesman Michael Tolzmann refused to say which U.S. military installations in Germany Bell would visit or when the general would be making his appearances.

Asked for possible examples of the kind of red tape-cutting Bell is anticipating, Tolzmann said such rule-bending “would include ... implementing changes to operating hours at [Child Development Centers] or other post facilities as a result of soldiers being deployed and families showing a need for change.”

Whatever is needed, Bell said, he and his staff will make sure it gets done.

“I have directly committed the entire United States Army Europe team to your help and assistance during this period of extended service for your soldiers,” Bell said.

This is the kind of good news story that I like to see. Extending the guys in Iraq was a hard thing to do, but probably the right thing to do. I'm glad that some smart officers had a plan ready to help families cope with the extended separation. Hopefully this makes a difference for these people. And who knows? Doing right by these families may pay big dividends down the road in terms of reenlistment and soldier performance. If you take care of the family, the family will take care of the soldier. And as a storied general said many years ago, soldiers aren't in the Army -- soldiers are the Army.
posted by Phillip Carter at 12:14

 
Comparing the junior officer evals of Bush and Kerry

At the risk of being labeled a partisan hack, I decided to compare the evaluation reports from the military records of President George Bush and Sen. John Kerry. Bottom line up front: I found significant differences between the character of the two sets of documents. I feel somewhat qualified to judge these reports, having been a junior military officer subject to similar evaluation schemes. While it's true that these senior officer observations are more than 30 years old, I believe they reveal important details of these men's character, at a time when these men were asked to lead by example and perform our nation's most sacred duty. Therefore, I think it's relevant to today's debate, and I am glad to see the Kerry campaign releasing these records for comparison to those of the president.

The New York Times reports this morning on the contents of Sen. Kerry's military records, which his campaign has put online. The general theme of these records is that young Sen. Kerry was an outstanding officer, even taking into account the glowing language that's typical of officer evaluation reports. Here is are a couple of illustrative excerpts from his fitness reports:

From his evaluation as an Ensign on the USS Gridley:

"A top notch officer in every measurable trait. Intelligent, mature and rich in educational background and experience, ENS KERRY is one of the finest young officers I have ever met and without question one of the most promising. ... He is an alert and active original thinker with great potential to the Navy. He eagerly accepts and actively seeks out tasks of greater responsibility. He is recommended for accelerated promotion."

Comment: There are a couple of things that leap out from this text. First, ENS Kerry was a good officer, and that's clear from this language which goes beyond the praise used in all such reports. Second, he chafed a little bit at the Navy bureaucracy and culture. The comment about his educational background indicates that he was different than his peers. The comment about being an "active original thinker" who "eagerly... seeks out tasks" indicates that he took a lot of initiative, and probably did some edgy things as a young officer. I think that's the mark of a good junior officer, because you're supposed to take risks on behalf of your troops at that age. And a final note about Ensign Kerry's pedigree. Officers in the military generally don't have his background, then or now. It says something that he wasn't ostracized or singled out as effete or aristocratic because of his upscale background. These reports show that for the most part, he was one of the guys.

From a second FITREP on the USS Gridley:

"His enthusiasm for the navy and his work is contagious, and his men are ardent supporters of him. His division's morale is one of the best on the ship due to his dynamic leadership. He is a polished diplomat at ease in distinguished company and shows great promise for future assignment as an aide or on a foreign diplomatic post."

Comment: Again, we see the indication that he's somehow different than his peers -- more educated, more refined, more diplomatic. The Navy has always been the most genteel service, and it has always had a mini-diplomatic corps within its ranks, so it's not surprising to see those lines on this FITREP. However, the first part of this comment is striking. There are lots of things you can praise about an officer -- technical competence, physical ability, tactical genius, intelligence, etc. To praise his leadership, and to cite his troops' morale in support of that praise, is one of the greatest compliments you can give an officer.

From two FITREPs for LTJG Kerry while assigned to Coastal Division Eleven:

"In a combat environment often requiring independent, decisive action LTJG Kerry was unsurpassed. ... LTJG Kerry emerges as the acknowledged leader in his peer group."

* * *
"LTJG KERRY was assigned to this division for only a short time but during that time exhibited all of the traits desired of an officer in a combat environment. He frequently exhibited a high sense of imagination and judgement (sic) in planning operations against the enemy in the Mekong Delta. ..."

Comment: There is more in here about his specific combat exploits, but these two quotes bookend those comments and make the most general observations about LTJG Kerry's character. Again, we see an indication of his leadership ability, which his commanders felt was far above average in comparison to his peers. We also see comment on his performance in combat, which is qualitatively different than performance in peacetime or on a ship that doesn't see direct-fire combat. And again, we get the sense that he chafed against his bosses, based on the comment about "imagination".

From a FITREP for services as an aide to an admiral:

"LTJG Kerry is one of the finest young officers with whom I have served in a long naval career. His combat record prior to becoming my personal aide speaks for itself and is testimony to his competence and courage at sea. As my personal aide he could not have been more effective. ... This young man is detached at his own request to run for high public office to whit the Congress of the United States. The detachment of this officer will be a definite loss to the service. He is the dedicated type that we should retain and it is hoped that he will be of further perhaps earlier greater service to his country, which is his aim in life at this time."

Comment: You an expect a certain amount of praise from an admiral for his aide, but again, such praise would normally be for things like his efficacy, efficiency, and so forth. This is high praise indeed for an officer on his way out the door, and it says a lot that a senior naval officer would be so effusive. Sen. Kerry appears to be the type of young officer the military desperately needed to retain after Vietnam.

In contrast, President Bush's released military record (see this site, and the Boston Globe's site too.) does not contain the detailed evaluation reports found on Sen. Kerry's website. (I looked on the president's campaign website but could not find a more complete repository of military records.) I think this is due to poor recordkeeping by the TX Air National Guard, as well as a desire to not release these documents. In addition, then-LT Bush was a pilot, not a leader of airmen, so his evaluation reports are likely to be more sparse anyway. Nonetheless, I think Pres. Bush's records deserve to be compared side-by-side to those of young Sen. Kerry. The Washington Post provides these excerpts from Pres. Bush's evaluations:

A 1971 evaluation described Bush as "an exceptionally fine young officer" with "sound judgment" who "is mature beyond his age and experience level." Bush "is a natural leader but he is also a good follower of military discipline," it said. A 1970 letter recommending him for a promotion from second to first lieutenant called him "a dynamic outstanding young officer" who "clearly stands out as a top notch fighter interceptor pilot." Bush, it said, "is a tenacious competitor and an aggressive pilot."

Comment: Like Sen. Kerry's evaluation reports, this one is actually pretty good. It's doesn't contain the same detail or concrete indicators of performance. But I think much of that owes to the difference in their types of service. Pres. Bush was only being evaluated for one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer -- there just wasn't that much to observe. Moreover, Pres. Bush's assignment was to fly and perform limited additional duties, not to lead sailors in a division or swift boat unit. Thus, there were no unit actions for him to be accountable for. (Military leaders are always evaluted on the accomplishments -- good or bad -- of the troops they lead.)

An article at FreeRepublic.Com also provides an excerpt from a press release touting Pres. Bush's flying ability:

The younger Bush fulfilled two years of active duty and completed pilot training in June 1970. During that time and in the two years that followed, Bush flew the F-102, an interceptor jet equipped with heat-seeking missiles that could shoot down enemy planes. His commanding officers and peers regarded Bush as a competent pilot and enthusiastic Guard member. In March 1970, the Texas Air National Guard issued a press release trumpeting his performance: "Lt. Bush recently became the first Houston pilot to be trained by the 147th [Fighter Group] and to solo in the F-102... Lt. Bush said his father was just as excited and enthusiastic about his solo flight as he was." In Bush's evaluation for the period May 1, 1971 through April 30, 1972, then-Colonel Bobby Hodges, his commanding officer, stated, "I have personally observed his participation, and without exception, his performance has been noteworthy."

Comment: This praise is a little fainter, although it's still there. Of course, press releases have little value as evaluative documents, but it does say something that the TX Air National Guard would choose to showcase this officer instead of his peers.

Analysis: In summary, the evaluations of John Kerry clearly stand over those of George Bush. However, I think much of the disparity owes to the difference between the two men's military service. Had Pres. Bush served more time on active duty, or in combat, we would have a more complete record on which to judge his service as a junior military officer. A lot of people don't think this service matters, but I do. It reveals important details of these individual's character at an important moment in their lives. And as I wrote in the Chicago Tribune, it matters for other reasons too:

President Bush's 30-year-old service record from the Air National Guard is relevant because it shows us something about his willingness to share the same hardships as the soldiers he now commands today from the White House. The issue has never been whether he was guilty of desertion or being AWOL--two slanderous charges leveled without regard for the facts. The real issue has always been the character of his service, and whether it was good enough to set the example for America's 1.4 million citizens in uniform.

* * *
... these issues boil down to the president's willingness and ability to set the example for the military he now leads as commander in chief. Cumulatively, questions about then-Lt. Bush's drill attendance, evaluation reports, flight status and early discharge add up to questions about the character of his service in the National Guard. Bush did receive an honorable discharge, but such a document is the lowest common denominator of military performance--it takes a lot of bad behavior to earn anything other than an honorable discharge. The American public deserves to know the full truth about the president's military record. It's relevant to his character, and it's relevant to whether he's fit to lead today's military by example.

The great thing about our system is that it lets you be the judge of these men when you vote in November. Every American will come to his or her own conclusion on this issue, and will decide which man is better fit to serve as America's commander-in-chief. For what it's worth, I still haven't made up my mind, and probably won't before November.

Update: Kevin Drum points us towards one key difference in the military records of each man, with respect to their desire for service overseas. (Nice job on the Photoshop and web design, too, by the way.)

For what it's worth, I think this reveals something quite striking about the sense of noblesse oblige within each man upon their graduation from Yale and entry into a life of privilege. Ironically, I see great parallels between the choice of young John Kerry and the choice of young George Herbert Walker Bush (aka Bush 41, the current president's father). Both men, with an eye on their future, made a choice to seek dangerous duty overseas in the service of their nation. I wish that more of America's elite graduating today would follow in these men's footsteps by serving their country in uniform, or in other ways such as the Foreign Service and Peace Corps. Service to country is a fundamental duty of citizenship, and it is one that I respect regardless of political affiliation.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:23

 
Who pays the cost of chaos in Iraq? - Part II

The New York Times brings us a report in tomorrow's paper that essentially corroborates reporting earlier this week by the Washington Post about the effect of violence in Iraq on reconstruction. In a nutshell, the deteriorating security situation is causing private contractors to stop their work -- whether it's drilling wells, running convoys, building schools, or delivering supplies. The latest casualties of war, according to the Times, are General Electric and Siemens.

The insurgency in Iraq has driven two major contractors, General Electric and Siemens, to suspend most of their operations there, raising new doubts about the American-led effort to rebuild the country as hostilities continue.

Spokesmen for the contractors declined to discuss their operations in Iraq, citing security concerns, but the shutdowns were confirmed by officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, the Coalition Provisional Authority and other companies working directly with G.E. and Siemens in Iraq.

"Between the G.E. lockdown and the inability to get materials moved up the major supply routes, about everything is being affected in one way or another," said Jim Hicks, a senior adviser for electricity at the provisional authority.

* * *
The Coalition Provisional Authority regards the rehabilitation of the Iraq's water, sewage, transportation, oil and electrical infrastructure as a linchpin in the effort to create a functioning democracy and convince Iraqis of America's good will.

A spokeswoman for the authority said discussions involving security issues with General Electric had led to an agreement that could result in a resumption of operations. The spokeswoman said Siemens and the authority were "working out their differences," but she said she had no information about whether the company would resume work.

* * *
Two companies with much larger contracts in Iraq, Bechtel and Halliburton, said they had curtailed travel by their employees but were not considering halting their work or pulling out of the country.

* * *
A major private security provider in Iraq with access to intelligence information said that Halliburton had "been slowed down in terms of the number of routes and convoys they can run" and said the firm was having a difficult time hiring truck drivers to work in Iraq. He estimated that the overall number of Halliburton convoys was down by 35 percent.

Analysis: Once again, the takeaway point is this: increased violence by the insurgents has a direct and inexorable effect on reconstruction, particularly when reconstruction is done mostly by unarmed (and lightly secured) contractors whose concern for their own welfare outweighs any altruistic desire to rebuild Iraq (and rightly so -- these aren't suicide contracts). The U.S. must set the conditions for reconstruction by securing the nation of Iraq. The only viable way to do that is with well-calibrated force -- sometimes a velvet glove; sometimes an iron fist. No meaningful reconstruction will take place until the security situation is fixed. And it should go without saying that the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June will be a very precarious thing indeed if security is not restored before then.

One note on contractors in Iraq. They really break down into three categories. The first and largest category are the reconstruction contractors -- the folks like Halliburton and GE and others who have been called in to do the heavy logistics work of rebuilding Iraq. These contractors are generally no different than logistics or engineering firms in the states, except that they're working overseas. Generally, these contractors are unarmed. The second main category includes the armed private military contractors like those from Blackwater Consulting, whose missions range from personal protective details to security for reconstruction sites to more clandestine activities. And the third category, which is really hard to measure, includes host-nation contractors. U.S. contracting officers on the ground in Iraq have contracted for a long list of services from basic labor to truck driving from Iraqi citizens; American contractors have also subcontracted a number of functions to Iraqis. The challenges and issues are different for each type of contractors.

This story applies most to the first category -- the large contingents of unarmed logistical and engineering professionals in Iraq to rebuild infrastructure and other areas. They are particularly vulnerable because they carry no organic security and no organic weapons, unlike soldiers. And I'm not surprised one bit to see their work affected so severely by the violence in Iraq.
posted by Phillip Carter at 22:25

 
More military overstretch problems surface
Do looming reserve personnel problems mean we should bring back the draft?

A pair of articles in the Baltimore Sun and Dallas Morning News makes an old point with new evidence: that the war in Iraq has stretched the American military to a point it hasn't seen for at least a generation. The issue presented by both article is the extent to which America's military reserves have been tapped for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the long-term effects of this operation on the reserves' retention of personnel. To date, the reserves (and active force) have done okay at retention, largely thanks to "stop loss" policies and generous reenlistment bonuses. However, that may be about to change, according to the Sun:

With the Reserves and the National Guard filling an ever-busier role in military forces already stretched to the limit, re-enlistment decisions have become a worrisome issue for the Pentagon, especially because the 90-day waiting period has begun expiring for many citizen soldiers who were part of the first lengthy deployments to Iraq.

"This is going to be a real crunch time," said Al Schilf, a spokesman for the Army Reserve. "This is the longest that Reserve soldiers have been deployed, and we have to be realistic. We have torn them away from their employers and their families for a year, so the next few months are going to be very telling."

Even before now, the Army Reserve was falling short of re-enlistment goals. For the past 18 months, ending March 31, re-enlistment ran about 7 percent behind the Army's stated goal - 1,507 soldiers fewer than the target of 21,243.

Recruiting efforts have helped compensate for some of the shortfall. In signing up new soldiers, the Army Reserve has exceeded its goal for every year since 2000, although the goals have been steadily decreasing - from a target of 41,961 recruits in 2000 to only 21,000 for the current year.

For the National Guard - the other force of "part-time soldiers" pressed into full-time deployments - the opposite trends are in play. Re-enlistment is up, but recruiting is slumping.

Analysis: If there is to be a personnel exodus from the reserves, it will not appear in one giant surge at one moment in time. That's because each soldier's enlistment ends at a different time, and the choices to leave the service will be made on an individual basis by these soldiers when their time is up. Many will likely stay, because they want the benefits or they have high morale from doing a good job in Iraq. But the trends point to a growing number of soldiers who decline reenlistment. We may now be able to finally see this indicator truthfully, because of the end of the 90-day "stop loss" waiting period. During deployment and for 90 days after their return, these soldiers were barred from getting out -- even if their enlistments were up. Now that this period has been lifted, we will see soldiers making their own decision on this subject, without the constraint of an Army-wide policy.

For what it's worth, I think the reserves can weather this crisis. Although 360,000 reservists have been called up since 9/11 for service at home and abroad, the numbers so far indicate that the majority of these reservists will stay in uniform. There are certainly crises in some units and some specialties. It probably wouldn't hurt to shift some units (e.g. Civil Affairs, MP, logistics) to the active force, and it wouldn't hurt to convert more old guard forces to those areas to create a reserve expeditionary nation-building capability. The reserves also stand to benefit a great deal from active-duty personnel problems, because many of the active soldiers who get out will join the reserves, bringing their expertise and experience with them.

However, the reserves will take some time to rebuild themselves after Iraq. One strategic cost of the war can be expressed in terms of an opportunity cost. By taking on this mission, we have sacrificed the readiness of our reserves to respond to a crisis at home or abroad for a period of time -- the deployment, plus the time necessary to rebuild and reconstitute. That may be three years, or five years, or even longer -- it's not clear. Of course, you have benefits too, like the amount of combat experience in today's active and reserve force. However, the reserves will not be ready for war for a while, and that creates a strategic risk for the United States over the next few years.

Some political leaders, including Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE), are expressing doubts about the military's ability to weather this storm. And to fix the problem, they are saying that we should consider the option of a national draft, both to fill the force and to spread the burden of military service more equitably. I don't think the first reason is necessarily true; I think the military can fill its force structure with (re)enlistment incentives and other means. There are also tremendous startup costs associated with a conscription system, not to mention its quality or professionalism issues.

However, the second reason proferred by Sen. Hagel and Sen. Biden deserves some mention. Ours is a volunteer force, but not all Americans volunteer in equal numbers. It is certainly true, as military sociologist Charles Moskos has noted, that today's military reflects the nation's working class and middle class more than any other. I think America's elites ought to do more than they're doing -- paying a disproportionate share of income taxes does not relieve the upper class of its other duties to the nation. Despite the obvious appeal of a conscription system for this purpose, I still oppose it. Our experience in Vietnam showed us how the wealthy will manipulate a conscription system to avoid service with draft deferments and other means; there's no reason to think they won't do the same thing this time. The rich and powerful will always have means to avoid service.

I think it would be better to avoid the Draconian option of a draft, and instead to pursue other incentive systems that will encourage military service by elites. Towards this end, I would invest millions in ROTC scholarships, targeted at elite colleges and universities. (Today's ROTC scholarships often "cap out", making them less valuable for students enrolled at expensive private schools.) I would also develop enlistment and officer-service options that appeal to college students, such as reserve options to serve during the summers and short-term enlistments. Will these things bring in more elites? Probably, though not in massive numbers. But I think that's okay, because even a slightly higher level of elite participation in the military will have a big marginal effect on the discourse among elites about military service and American national security policy.

Update I: The AP reports on Friday that the Army has met its reenlistment target for the first half of FY2004. I think this is largely the result of strong reenlistment incentives, and initiatives at the unit level to get soldiers to re-up. But it counsels against the initiation of a draft.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:57

 
Oral argument in the Gitmo case: Slate's Dahlia Lithwick has a roundup of what happened today in the consolidated cases of Al-Odah v. United States and Rasul v. Bush -- collectively, the Guantanamo Bay jurisdiction cases. From her dispatch, available both in Slate and on NPR, it appears that the court fumbled around on the issue without either side scoring significant points. My guess is that we'll get a muddled decision based largely on jurisdictional grounds, and nothing earth shattering. The monumental decision will likely be handed down in next week's cases -- Hamdi and Padilla -- involving U.S. citizens designated as enemy combatants.

For more on oral argument, see Jess Bravin's report on the argument in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required), Linda Greenhouse's coverage in the New York Times, Charles Lane's story in the Washington Post, and David Savage's article in tomorrow's LA Times.

The consensus of these five reports is that the justices appear skeptical of the Bush Administration's all-or-nothing stance in the Guantanamo case. So far, the administration has maintained that there ought to be no right of habeas corpus -- and by extension, no role for the courts -- in the case of the Guantanamo detainees. There is good law to support this position, but it raises eyebrows among a lot of legal scholars and political leaders at home and abroad. We'll see where the Court goes with this one.
posted by Phillip Carter at 16:44

 
Iraqis establish tribunal for Saddam: The AP reports that the Iraqi Governing Council has set up an entity to try former dictator Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants according to Iraqi law and a statute passed late last year. So far, it looks like this tribunal will focus on the crimes committed by Hussein against his own people, rather than those against the Kuwaitis or Iranians, which is basically what I predicted last year. It will be very interesting to see how this tribunal unfolds. I also think there will be a very complex and interesting interaction between this trial and the security situation on the ground in Iraq. More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:39

 
Special Forces general to speak on counterinsurgency at UCLA: If you're in Los Angeles and have some time tomorrow, you may want to attend a lecture by U.S. Army Major General Geoffrey Lambert at UCLA's Anderson School at 3:30 p.m. MG Lambert commands the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and he will speak on "a new and fundamentally different approach to planning modern warfare--a paradigm shift that not only provides more options for the U.S. military, but also results in wars being designed backwards to forwards where humanitarian relief and compassion are critical to success." It sounds like it will be an amazing lecture from one of the Army's leading warrior-intellectuals.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:10

 
Oregon Guardsman combat story disputed

CPL Dana Beaudine, the Oregon National Guardsman who claimed he was mistreated by his employer after returning from combat in Iraq, apparently lied to the Seattle Times about the story. After running the story, The Times received a flurry of e-mails from officers and NCOs in the soldier's unit, effectively quashing his entire story. The Army even cancelled his Purple Heart recommendation, after finding that his wounds were not the result of hostile action. Suffice to say, I've got a bad taste in my mouth for staking some of my personal credibility on this guy's story. (Thanks to Mudville for passing this story along.)

In fact, no one from his unit contacted by The Times could corroborate Beaudine's story.

"You have been fooled," Command Sgt. Maj. Gerald Schleining Jr. wrote in an e-mail to The Times from Kuwait after the story was published. "Beaudine was never injured in armed conflict. He has never been to Basrah or Iraq for that matter."

Capt. John Robinson, who said he was Beaudine's commander in C Company of the 1st Battalion, 162nd Infantry Regiment, also disputed Beaudine's account.

"This is a disgrace to all those who have legitimately received injuries or died in the combat actions since the first day of the war," Robinson said.

Beaudine, who was honorably discharged in February, insists his story is true.

Analysis: I don't think this necessarily changes the legal analysis of what happened in this case. CPL Beaudine was mobilized and put on active duty. He came back under somewhat nefarious circumstances, and subsequently claimed mistreatment at the hands of his employer. He filed a complaint with the Labor Department, and that agency's investigators found misconduct by his employer. And he may have a legally cognizable claim in federal court if his employer decides not to settle. So, this is still a case of bad corporate behavior under the USERRA; the victim just isn't as honorable of a person as originally reported. Still, a correction to the record is in order, and I regret taking such a hard stand on this guy's behalf in light of his apparent fabrications.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:06

 
President Bush promotes the Patriot Act's renewal

President Bush has launched a public campaign to press the public -- and by extension, Congress -- to renew key provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) which are set to expire at the end of 2005. The AP reports that he spoke yesterday in Pennsylvania, and that he will speak today in Buffalo, New York, on the subject. The choice of Buffalo is no accident -- it was where the "Lackawanna Six" were prosecuted for providing material support to terrorism (all six pled guilty). Here's what the President's been saying on the road:

After September the 11th, we took another vital step to fight terror, and that's what I want to talk about today. I want to talk about the Patriot Act. It's a law that I signed into law. It's a law that was overwhelmingly passed in the House and the Senate. It's a law that is making America safer. It's an important piece of legislation.

First, before September the 11th, law enforcement, intelligence, and national security officials were prevented by legal and bureaucratic restrictions from sharing critical information with each other, and with state and local police departments.

We had -- one group of the FBI knows something, but they couldn't talk to the other group in the FBI -- because of law and bureaucratic interpretation. You cannot fight the war on terror unless all bodies of your government at the federal, state, and local level are capable of sharing intelligence on a real-time basis. We could not get a complete picture of terrorist threats, therefore. People had -- different people had a piece of the puzzle, but because of law, they couldn't get all the pieces in the same place. And so we removed those barriers, removed the walls. You hear the talk about the walls that separate certain aspects of government; they have been removed by the Patriot Act. And now, law enforcement and intelligence communities are working together to share information to better prevent an attack on America.

* * *
The reason I bring it up is because many of the Patriot Act's anti-terrorism tools are set to expire next year, including key provisions that allow our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share information. In other words, Congress passed it and said, well, maybe the war on terror won't go on very long, and, therefore, these tools are set to expire. The problem is, the war on terror continues. And yet some senators and congressmen not only want to let the provisions expire, but they want to roll back some of the act's permanent features. And it doesn't make any sense. We can't return to the days of false hope. The terrorists declared war on the United States of America. And the Congress must give law enforcement all the tools necessary to protect the American people. (Applause.)

Analysis: There's actually a lot of interesting stuff in the President's speech that I recommend to anyone interested in understanding the policy debate over the Patriot Act. The President references roving wiretap power, administrative subpoena power, sentencing guidelines, and other technical areas usually reserved for lawyers and law review articles. His ultimate point is that these powers are vital for the Justice Department, and that without them, the American law enforcement community cannot effectively fight terrorism. Perhaps... although I think the the administration will have to sacrifice some of these powers if it wants to get the bulk of the Act renewed when its sunset provision kicks in.

My prediction is that the administration will sacrifice some of the Act's provisions, such as the notorious "library record" Sec. 215, in order to get the more important parts of the Act renewed. They'll do this in order to seize the moral high ground and show that they're willing to be reasonable on this stuff. The irony, of course, is that this most notorious provision has never been used, thanks to other procedures which allow DOJ to get the same records without going through the onerous FISA/Sec. 215 process.

Second, I think the Administration will play serious political hardball when it comes time to push this legislation through Congress. We got a taste of this when the Administration fought for the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In essence, "anyone who's not with us is against us" where these legislative items are concerned. The Administration will procure a long list of prosecutors, police officers, and others to testify about the need for such powers -- it's easy to find law enforcers on both sides of the aisle who support these measures. And they will paint anyone opposed to the Act's renewal as a tacit supporter of terrorism. That's going to be very ugly, but it's going to be what happens. And if it's timed to coincide with the 2004 election, as I think it will be, you're going to see a lot of negative campaigning (reminiscent of what was done to fmr-Sen. Max Cleland) on this subject. Anyone opposed to the Act's renewal will be targeted in their state or district by the GOP with intensely negative ads hinting their support for terrorism.

My guess is that a lot of Senators and Congressman will fear this attack machine and vote for the Act's renewal, regardless of any lingering concerns over civil liberties or the Act's efficacy. At best, you'll see the moderation of certain provisions, or the addition of reporting requirements about the use of certain provisions (like FISA warrants). But in the end, I am all but certain that the Patriot Act will be renewed -- this time, most likely, without a sunset provision at all.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:22

 
How Appealling moves to new site: Howard Bashman, the appellate litigator whose weblog has become the best source on the web for legal news, has officially moved to the website of Legal Affairs magazine. This is the latest in a series of moves by the best bloggers in the business, and by many magazines to acquire an online weblog presence. (See, e.g., Tapped and The Washington Monthly.) Clearly, there is great synergy between Howard's reporting and Legal Affairs, and I think this will be an excellent move for both entities.

Speaking of Legal Affairs... the magazine announced the winners of its 2004 legal writing contest for law students today. Congratulations to Kate Andrias of Yale Law School, who was selected as the first-place winner of this year's contest for her entry, "Locked Out," an essay about employers who are curtailing workers' rights by requiring them to sign arbitration agreements that bar pursuit of their interests in court.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:00

 
Bad news in the newsroom

The Wall Street Journal is one of my preferred news sources, because its news articles offer an excellent blend of reporting and analysis that far surpasses the average dispatch. I have come to know several WSJ reporters, including one who I actually knew when I was a reporter in college and he was a law student. Unfortunately, the Wall Street Journal does not appear to be taking care of its reporters with the same diligence that they are taking care of their beats. The AP reports that contractual negotiations between the newspaper and the reporters' union have broken down, and that labor relations at the paper are at an all-time low.

Nearly 100 staffers from The Wall Street Journal picketed the newspaper's headquarters in New York Wednesday as relations with the company's main union turned increasingly tense.

The protest lasted just under an hour and was aimed at pressuring the company ahead of the next bargaining session, which is scheduled for April 14. The newspaper's employees have been working without a contract for a year.

Besides the picketing, most of the newspaper's reporters at the New York headquarters showed up for work at about 1:30 p.m. as part of a work-to-rule job action. The union's contract calls for a 35-hour work week, but the reporters often put in far longer hours.

E.S. Browning, a stock market reporter with 25 years' experience at the paper, said that the normally collegial atmosphere at the Journal between reporters and management was breaking down, particularly since the company was seeking cutbacks in health care coverage at the same time that top managers were receiving large pay increases.

It goes without saying that if the Wall Street Journal can treat its byline reporters this way, then imagine how it (and other large newspapers) can treat their freelance writers and other staff. I have a personal interest in this, because I contribute occasionally to newspapers and magazines, and because several of my friends make a living writing for these big papers. Although I'm not a fan of unions and labor stoppages generally, I also recognize the benefits of collective bargaining. Indeed, I benefit from the work of the graduate student union here at UCLA, which negotiated the contract under which I work as a teaching fellow and research assistant. The facts in the WSJ situation seem to be pretty unfortunate, and I hope that the newspaper can see fit to do the right thing here and take care of its employees. They bust their humps for the paper, and they deserve better than what they're getting.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:53

 
Les armees privees proliferent en Irak: Guillemette Faure has an article in Le Figaro today which quotes me and others on the subject of private military contractors. I'm not fluent in French, so I'm not sure what the article says exactly. But it was fun to do the interview, and to see my quotes translated into another language.

And if you want to see more problems with the overuse of military contractors, see this article in today's Los Angeles Times. It describes, quite appallingly, what happens to American soldiers when certain services are contracted out and then the contractors fail to deliver because of deteriorating security or other reasons. As DaggerJag points out in his report from Iraq, "Unlike a soldier, you can't force a civilian trucker to drive if they don't want to." Unfortunately, soldiers (and Iraqi civilians) bear the hardship when contractors walk off their jobs or stay hunkered down.

... new troops arrived to Forward Operating Base Duke, an empty swath of desert outside the holy city of Najaf, to find a logistical nightmare.

Military buyers had signed contracts with local vendors to supply everything from water to portable tents. But the contractors were balking at delivering the goods.

"When the security situation gets bad, they don't want to deliver, and that's what's happening now,'" said Army Capt. Ron Talarico, who is helping coordinate supplies.

A temporary water shortage was remedied, but the camp still has only six portable toilets for the 2,500 troops because the company that provides them is reluctant to travel the highway.

There are no showers or laundry facilities. A shortage of tents forces soldiers to sleep in their vehicles in 100-degree weather and blistering sandstorms.

"It's a wasteland here," said 1st Lt. Matt Nethers, 24, of Los Alamitos. "The Army logistical system isn't what it could be."

posted by Phillip Carter at 07:31

 
Who pays the cost of chaos in Iraq? The Iraqis

Sunday's Washington Post carries this article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karl Vick on the front page which does a great job of detailing the effects of the last three weeks of violence in Iraq. A great deal of media attention has focused on the pitched battles between U.S. troops and Iraqi insurgents, but little has been written or reported on the effects this insurgency is having on the reconstruction of Iraq. This article hits the center-mass of that subject, and explains exactly what has happened to nation-building efforts since the start of this wave of violence:

The violence has brought the U.S.-funded reconstruction of Iraq to a near-halt, according to U.S. officials and private contractors.

Thousands of workers for private contractors have been confined to their quarters in the highly fortified Green Zone in Baghdad that also houses the headquarters of the U.S. occupation authority. Routine trips outside the compound to repair power plants, water-treatment facilities and other parts of Iraq's crumbling infrastructure have been deemed too dangerous, even with armed escorts.

Compounding the problem is a growing fear that insurgents will seek retribution against Iraqis working for private contractors and the occupation authority. Scores of Iraqis have stopped showing up for their jobs as translators, support staff and maintenance personnel in the Green Zone, even though there is a lack of lucrative employment elsewhere.

The security situation "has dramatically affected reconstruction," said another U.S. official in Baghdad. "How can you rebuild the country when you're confined to quarters, when only small portions of your Iraqi staff are showing up for work on any given day?"

Among the firms that have restricted the movements of their employees are the two of the largest private contractors in Iraq: Bechtel Corp. and Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton Co. The Research Triangle Institute, a North Carolina-based firm that has been helping set up city councils across Iraq, has sent 80 staffers -- about 40 percent of its non-Iraqi workforce -- to Kuwait as a precautionary measure.

Security concerns also have hindered the implementation of a $6 billion, U.S.-funded wave of construction projects intended to help improve security by putting legions of unemployed young men to work.

"We want to offer people opportunities that compete with the financial incentives they get" from insurgent leaders, an American official said. "But it's a Catch-22. We can't start the work that's supposed to help improve security until security improves."

Analysis: This isn't rocket science. Smart people including Gen. Eric Shinseki, James Fallows, James Dobbins, and others have written on the relationship between security and nation-building. Bottom line -- you cannot effectively do nation-building without security. This principle is as fundamental as any to the conduct of nation-buildling missions. You cannot build roads, schools, factories and utility plants until the people feel secure in their homes and cities -- and until the contractors feel secure enough to do the work. This dispatch in the Washington Post indicates that we have a very long way to go before we set the conditions for effective nation-building: namely, a secure-enough situation that allows contractors and Iraqis to work. Until we tamp down this insurgency and restore order to the nation, everything else is on hold.

Update: The New York Times has a front-page article in Monday's paper on the subject of private military contractors, and some of the problems associated with their (over)use in Iraq. This is something I've written on too. But here's a report from an Army officer now deployed to Iraq with the 1st Infantry Division, which makes the point quite well:

... the recent "problems" we've been having over here have had some interesting side effects. Many of the civilian truck drivers who are working in this area have refused to drive on our convoys and that has slowed down delivery of everything from mail to food (I'm going to stock up on my favorite MREs for when they close the mess hall). I've heard that something close to 200 KBR drivers have quit and the Turkish drivers aren't going past Mosul. So much for Rumsfeld's notion that we can "outsource" all the non-essential jobs in the army to contractors. Unlike a soldier, you can't force a civilian trucker to drive if they don't want to.

posted by Phillip Carter at 20:18

 
History of the 'state secrets' privilege: Sunday's Los Angeles Times has a very artfully written history/news piece on the history behind United States v. Reynolds, the case where the Supreme Court announced an evidentiary privilege for national security information. Today, this privilege comes up in terrorism cases, False Claims Act cases, and a variety of others where state secrets are at stake; it also has implications for other cases of national security deference, such as the three 'enemy combatant' cases now pending before the Supreme Court.

Part II appears in Monday's paper, and also makes for fascinating reading. Anyone interested in the intersection of law and national security should read this series.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:10

 
Iraqi insurgents and the law of war

I have written a bit on the law of war and its applicability to the conflict in Iraq. My inbox has been filled by readers calling my articles naive, because of the slim chance that this enemy will comply with the law of war. To rebut those criticisms, I offer this excerpt from a CNN article on the capture of PFC Keith Matthew Maupin, an Army reservist in Iraq. While his captors don't explicitly reference the 3rd Geneva Convention or other international covenants by name, they certainly incorporate these principles as they're found in Islamic law:

"We have taken one of the U.S. soldiers hostage," the narrator [of the video depicting Maupin] said.

"He is in good health and being treated based on the tenets of Islamic law for the treatment of soldiers taken hostage. We will keep him until we trade him for our prisoners in the custody of the U.S. enemy. We want them to know -- and the whole world to know -- that when we took him in, he came out of his tank holding a white flag and he lay face down on the ground, just like other soldiers."

Analysis: This is interesting for a few reasons. First, the conventional wisdom has been that the Iraqis would not follow the laws of war in their insurgency. That has been true in some situations, like the mutilation of the four contractors two weeks ago in Fallujah. However, both the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi insurgents appear to be following some codes of conduct with respect to the treatment of U.S. soldiers in captivity. Self-interest is probably animating this decision by the Iraqis. They probably want to encourage reciprocity, given the large numbers of Iraqi soldiers and insurgents in U.S. custody. The Iraqis may also be concerned about reprisals, both from U.S. forces and from the Iraqi justice system if they're ever captured.

Of course, the Iraqi insurgents continue to violate the law of war in many other situations. They employ perfidy as a standard tactic. They often hide in protected sites like mosques and schools and hospitals, putting Iraqi civilians in the crosshairs as a consequence. Iraqi insurgents use indiscriminate IEDs which are as likely to kill Iraqis or foreign civilians as U.S. soldiers. And the list goes on. But this story adds at least one counterexample of where the Iraqis are following the law of armed conflict. That makes it interesting... at least to academics like me.

Update: I'm not an expert on Islamic law, and some of my analysis above assumes that Islamic law thinks about prisoners of war in roughly the same terms as our Western theological traditions. (Contemporary secular laws of war evolved from chivalric traditions and Western theological doctrine.) However, I might have spoke too soon. The folks over at Jihadwatch.org (a site which makes no claim to objectivity) have a piece on this story as well, along with this citation to a relevant section of Islamic law:

When an adult male is taken captive, the caliph considers the interests (...of Islam and the Muslims) and decides between the prisoner's death, slavery, release without paying anything, or ransoming himself in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy. ('Umdat as-Salik, o9.14)

Assuming that's true, then there is a very loose connection between Islamic law and the 3rd Geneva Convention with respect to the proper treatment of prisoners of war. International law generally does not allow for the options of death, slavery or release upon ransom for a prisoner of war. In limited situations, the 3rd Geneva Convention does allow for repatriation exchanges. So, I should restate my analysis. The insurgents in Iraq are following some law of armed conflict -- just not the one that we subscribe to.

Suffice to say, there are very interesting theoretical issues that flow from the subscription of different sides to different laws of war and different conceptions of wartime morality. Which body of law controls? If one side commits a crime by the other's laws, does the other have any moral claim to try the crime? Is there any objective or universal law which governs each side? In a post-modern, 4th Generation conflict, is there any place for a law of war?
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:02

 
A prescription for the prosecution

Dahlia Lithwick has a smartly written essay this afternoon in Slate on the Justice Department trend towards prosecuting so-called "little fish" in the war on terrorism, and the implications of this trend for justice writ large. Her ultimate conclusion: that DOJ's decision to lock up the real terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed without a trial, while putting the small fries like Sami Omar Al-Hussayen on trial, does little to further the interests of justice.

The real question at the core of the Al-Hussayen trial is the same question that plagues the other big terror trials that have occurred since 9/11: Is this really the best way to stop terror? It's clear that the Bush administration doesn't believe in open criminal trials for "real" terrorists. That's why accused American citizens like Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla are languishing in Navy brigs right now and why a ranking al-Qaida member, accused of planning the 9/11 attacks, Ramzi Binalshibh is still being interrogated in some secret location. It's also clear that the administration is not really all that interested in a fair trial for its 9/11 scapegoat of choice, Zacarias Moussaoui. Long after it became apparent that he was never intended to be the 20th hijacker, Moussaoui's trial remains stalled over the government's insistence on imposing the death penalty. The administration is thus using the civilian courts to try only the low-level conspirators; the "passive supporters," the folks who don't quite rise to the level of terrorist—most of whom are just losers and misanthropes.

* * *
Because we haven't caught many real terrorists in the act of terrorism since 9/11, and since we won't trust those we have caught to the criminal justice system, we have been left to rely on this "material support" provision to convict numerous individuals, many of whom are Americans. So far, the folks convicted of terror-related offenses have been bit players, as is evidenced by the relatively short sentences they've received. No one would characterize them as perfect innocents—several tried to fight in Afghanistan; some look like members of sleeper cells. But no one can argue—although Attorney General John Ashcroft has certainly tried—that the courts have played a vital role in stopping terror attacks in this country. In exchange for this handful of relatively minor convictions, the Justice Department has condoned outrageous prosecutorial excesses, all to prove that these convictions matter more than they do. A sampling of the major terror convictions since 9/11 highlights the problem ...

Analysis: She goes onto cite the cases of the "Detroit Three", the "Lackawanna Six", and the "Portland Seven" (query - why does DOJ use such silly monikers for all these defendants?) to make her point. And I think it's a valid argument. DOJ has put a lot of resources into prosecuting these kinds of individuals for violations of 18 U.S.C. 2339a and 2339b, the "material support" statutes. The administration has justified this with the argument that it has been going after inchoate forms of terrorism -- that is, targeting terror cells in their infant stages before they can develop, mature, and conduct actual attacks. I think this focus on material support needs to be a part of the DOJ strategy, but I agree with Ms. Lithwick's question -- should it really be the main focus of the administration's legal war on terror?

The administration has advanced a number of arguments for why it should not put a real terrorist on trial, and it has pointed to the circus trial of Zacarias Moussaoui as its main evidence for what would happen if it did. The biggest (and most valid, in my opinion) reason is that a trial would interfere with ongoing intelligence collection efforts, both by impeding continued interrogation of the defendant (e.g. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) and by exposing "sources and methods" used in connection with the defendant. This is a very real concern. But I have to wonder whether this concern is somewhat diminished 12, 18, 24 months after the capture of these terrorists. Moreover, there are strong procedural safeguards in place (collectively codified as the Classified Information Procedures Act) for dealing with classified material in federal court, and a number of bigtime espionage cases have been conducted without a compromise of "sources and methods". It seems to me that the administration could mitigate these problems if it wanted to. In actuality, it seems to me that the real issue is one of certainty -- the White House and Justice Department don't want to risk an acquittal or hung jury in any of these cases. I'm not sure that's a good enough justification for keeping these cases out of federal court.

Stay tuned -- oral argument is scheduled in Al-Odah v. United States for Tuesday, April 20th, before the Supreme Court. Oral argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Padilla v. Rumsfeld is scheduled for Wednesday, April 28th. Each of these cases has the potential to radically change the landscape of the law with respect to terrorism, national security and civil liberties.

For more background on the Al-Odah and Rasul cases (consolidated for argument), see this note by the lawyers at SCOTUSBlog, complete with links to the lower court decisions and briefs in the case. Also see this Slate essay by WP Supreme Court reporter Charles Lane on how the issues may be framed in the case.

More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 17:17

 
The next big political book
New Bob Woodward book on Iraq war policy about to hit the street;
White House goes to the mattresses to ready its p.r. counter-offensive

In case you've missed the p.r. blitz so far, Bob Woodward's new book "Plan of Attack" is about to be released, and it's full of startling revelations about who knew what in the Bush White House as the nation marched to war. Like other Woodward books, the truth is mostly a function of access -- those who gave Mr. Woodward access are likely to be rewarded; those who did not will either be punished or left out. Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. Woodward was able to pick up some extremely interesting facts during his stint as a fly on the wall of the White House, including this passage as reported by the Washington Post:

By early January, 2003, Bush had made up his mind to take military action against Iraq, according to the book. But Bush was so concerned that the government of his closest ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, might fall because of his support for Bush that he delayed the war's start until March 19 here--March 20 in Iraq--because Blair asked him to seek a second resolution from the United Nations. Bush later gave Blair the option of withholding British troops from combat, which Blair rejected.

Woodward describes a relationship between Cheney and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell -- never close despite years of working together -- that became so strained that Cheney and Powell are barely on speaking terms. Cheney engaged in a bitter and eventually winning struggle over Iraq with Powell, an opponent of war who believed Cheney was obsessed with trying to establish a connection between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network and treated ambiguous intelligence as fact.

Powell felt Cheney and his allies -- his chief aide, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz and undersecretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith and what Powell called Feith's "Gestapo" office -- had established what amounted to a separate government. The vice president, for his part, believed Powell was mainly concerned with his own popularity and told friends at a private dinner he hosted a year ago to celebrate the outcome of the war that Powell was a problem and "always had major reservations about what we were trying to do."

Before the war with Iraq, Powell bluntly told Bush that if he sent U.S. troops there "you're going to be owning this place." Powell and his deputy and closest friend, Richard L. Armitage, used to refer to what they called "the Pottery Barn rule" on Iraq -- "you break it, you own it," according to Woodward.

But, when asked personally by the president, Powell agreed to present the U.S. case against Hussein at the United Nations in February, 2003 -- a presentation described by White House communications director Dan Bartlett as "the Powell buy-in." Bush wanted someone with Powell's credibility to present the evidence that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction -- a case the president had initially found less than convincing when presented to him by CIA deputy director John McLaughlin at a White House meeting on December 21, 2002.

McLaughlin's version used communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams and other intelligence. "Nice try," Bush said when he was finished, according to the book. "I don't think this quite -- it's not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from."

He then turned to Tenet, McLaughlin's boss and said, "I've been told all this intelligence about having WMD and this is the best we've got?"

"It's a slam dunk case," Tenet replied, throwing his arms in the air. Bush pressed him again. "George, how confident are you."

"Don't worry, it's a slam dunk," Tenet repeated.

I've already ordered my copy... I guess law school studying will have to wait.
posted by Phillip Carter at 15:10

 
Stop the Bleating moves to new home: The latest blog to move from Blogspot is the one run by my libertarian friends in Virginia, Stop the Bleating. Nice new look.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:59

 
Two old warriors with a bone to pick: Comments from retired Gen. Anthony Zinni in the SD Union-Tribune and Sen. John McCain on Larry King Live indicate some amount of displeasure within America's defense establishment towards current White House policy in Iraq. Zinni's a moderate with ties to politicians on both sides of the aisle; McCain is an unabashed Republican. But both guys are calling it like they see it, and the calls aren't pretty. Sen McCain's comments sure make me wish the 2000 GOP primary had come out differently... at least I cast my vote for the right guy.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:57

 
Thoughts on Iraq: I'm honored to be featured in the new edition of the Boston Phoenix in a discussion feature with 8 other people on the question of "Where do we go from here?" in Iraq. The panel puts forward some interesting thoughts, and I invite you to take a look.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:47

 
Pentagon takes its lumps for 9/11

The LA Times reports this morning on criticism of the Pentagon for its part of the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. This is a storyline we've heard before, but it has taken on a new edge with Richard Clarke's book and its criticism of military officials for doing too little in the late 1990s to fight Al Qaeda and other emerging threats. Most of the public's attention has focused thus far on problems with (and between) the CIA and FBI in the intelligence and law enforcement communities, but Josh Meyer writes that the Pentagon getting a big chunk of blame from the 9/11 Commission:

sources familiar with the commission's inner workings said the panel increasingly believes the Pentagon failed to adequately respond to the growing military threat of Al Qaeda. They said Pentagon ineffectiveness in both the Clinton administration and the current Bush administration was as much to blame for permitting the Sept. 11 attacks as inept law enforcement and intelligence efforts, a conclusion shared by many current and former U.S. officials and counter-terrorism experts.

When the commission releases its findings in late July, it is expected to conclude that both administrations failed on a wide array of military fronts, not just in the use of conventional force but in the sharing of intelligence and creation of special operations and technology to respond to the new threat posed by stateless terrorism.

Outright military action against terrorists would have to be ordered by the president. But critics fault military leaders for discouraging such actions and failing to present alternatives.

In private, the commission also is raising questions about the Defense Department's apparent lack of readiness on Sept. 11 to protect Americans from a military-style attack on the homeland.

On that day, a hijacked commercial jetliner was able to crash into the Pentagon building, despite months of elevated indications of an Al Qaeda attack and long-standing criticism that the military lacked a domestic security plan, the sources said.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, senior Pentagon officials in the Clinton and Bush administrations have defended their counter-terrorism efforts, saying they were hamstrung by a lack of "actionable" intelligence from the CIA, indecision by political leaders in the White House and Congress and reluctance by policymakers to spend money and take risks associated with a military response to Al Qaeda.

Commissioner Bob Kerrey, a former Democratic senator and decorated Navy veteran, said he could not comment on unpublicized commission findings. But he confirmed that the investigation to date has raised serious concerns about the Pentagon's pre-Sept. 11 counter-terrorism efforts, including its inability to carve out a substantial role for itself even after terrorists killed 36 military personnel in bombings of a military housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and a Navy warship, the Cole, in 2000.

"How come the Department of Defense didn't have a primary role?" Kerrey asked in an interview Thursday. "I'm guessing they didn't want it, that they said, 'We don't do terrorism.' "

Analysis: That's it, in a nutshell. It may call itself the Department of Defense, but the Pentagon really sees itself as the Department of Offense. It didn't used to be this way, of course. During the Cold War, the Pentagon poured resources into defensive programs like NORAD and the civil-defense system. But since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon has adopted a near-exclusive focus on threats abroad, and devoted nearly nothing to domestic security efforts. Ask any senior military official or Pentagon official and they'll tell you that the Pentagon plays the away game, while the Justice Department and state/local agencies play the home game. The only time this changes is when Congress steps in to give the military specific direction to do something domestically, e.g. counter-drug exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act or authority to run the National Guard WMD-Civil Support Teams.

On balance, I suppose it's probably a good thing to have the military so focused on the away game. As a civil liberties matter, we don't want our military getting too involved in the domestic intelligence or law enforcement area. (See Laird v. Tatum for an example of when they did this.) And as a strategic matter, we probably want to identify, interdict and fight threats overseas before they come to our shores, so it makes some sense to focus our military abroad. Nonetheless, as a conceptual matter, we have a Department of Defense to protect the national security of the United States, and it seems somewhat odd that this department would play such a minimal role in domestic security operations. Especially when you consider that (1) more than half of the intelligence community agencies fall under DoD; (2) the bulk of the U.S. capability for chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological events resides in DoD; and (3) DoD agencies are leading the hunt for terrorists abroad, as well as the interrogations of captured terrorists, so they may have a lot of valuable information for the domestic anti-terrorism fight.

What's the right balance?
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:22

 
White House mulls intelligence community reorganization
A good idea to make America more secure -- or another worthless government reorg?

Friday's New York Times breaks the story that the Bush White House may be ready to put forward a proposal to radically restructure the American intelligence community. Among other things, the proposal would create a Director for National Intelligence with authority over the many disparate American intelligence agencies. Such a plan might preempt some of the eventual findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and rebut criticism that the White House has done too little to fix the intelligence community failures that occurred before 9/11.

Under the proposal, management of the government's 15 intelligence agencies, and control of their budgets, would be put under the direction of a single person. That authority is now scattered across a number of departments and agencies.

The plan, drafted more than a year ago by a presidential advisory panel headed by Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser, was given little White House attention until now. It is being reviewed, the officials said, as a possible answer to the Sept. 11 commission's preliminary conclusion that the current organization of the government's intelligence agencies has left no one truly in charge on intelligence matters.

* * *
Administration officials declined to discuss the proposal by Mr. Scowcroft's panel on the ground that it was still classified. But they suggested that discussion inside the White House included extensive consideration of that plan, designed to install a more powerful and centralized overseer to take charge of an ad hoc system created in haste after World War II.

Also being discussed within the White House, the officials said, were possible changes within the F.B.I., including the creation of a new directorate within the bureau responsible for domestic intelligence-gathering and analysis. The alternative of creating a new domestic intelligence agency was also being discussed but was seen as less likely to be embraced, the officials said.

It is not known whether F.B.I. intelligence gathering would be under the control of the proposed new director of intelligence.

Analysis: So... have a Director of Central Intelligence, who by statute is supposed to be the principal intelligence officer for the United States. Yet, because the structure isn't working, we're going to create a new Director of National Intelligence and attempt to reform bureaucratic morass with... more bureaucracy? I understand the impulse to do something in response to 9/11, and to fix the problems that impeded our intelligence community from connecting the dots about Al Qaeda. It may well be that we need to fix intelligence by creating a more responsive and efficient command and control structure for America's intelligence community. But I'm not convinced that this is the answer, because I see two major pitfalls in this proposal: (1) It threatens to create more bureaucracy, gumming up the system more; (2) It focuses too much at the top level rather than creating interconnectedness and collaborate relationships at the operator level, where the need is greatest.

Operationally speaking, I think the last thing we need to do is impose more bureaucracy on the intelligence community and the intelligence process generally. Conceptually, we can visualize our national security process and the decision processes of our enemies as giant O-O-D-A loops, which stands for "Observe-Orient-Decide-Act". Col. John Boyd's work showed that in a variety of competitive settings -- at the tactical, operational and strategic levels -- the actor with the most efficient OODA loop tended to win regardless of other variables such as equipment or size. Agility of the mind -- and by extrapolation, of the organization -- counts for more in battle than shear numbers or brute strength. Applied to this situation, one can see the problem with more bureaucracy. More bureaucracy means slower decisionmaking; more layers of review; more oversight; more red tape -- ultimately, a less efficient OODA loop. Operationally, it means more time from the acquisition of information to the decision by the President to the action in the field that uses that information. And in a world where hours can make the difference between catching Osama and hitting an empty cave, that makes a big difference.

Theorists at RAND and the Naval Postgraduate School have looked at this problem, and come up with some good ideas. Their basic premise is that "it takes a network to fight a network." Al Qaeda, more so in its current form than three years ago, exists as a global terror network. It is not organized hierarchically or like conventional organizations such as drug-supply chains or even the small terror cells of the last few decades. Today's global terror network organizes in virtual, non-contiguous, non-hierarchical ways which are highly survivable, very adaptive, and extremely difficult to break. A good analogy is to the Internet -- an interwoven network of nodes and hubs and sites and users who interact in a variety of ways; others have analogized Al Qaeda to a galaxy or constellation of ideologically similar terrorists. Regardless of which analogy you pick, the point is the same. You cannot fight this type of enemy effectively with a conventional hierarchical bureaucracy. You will forever find yourself out-witted and two steps behind the threat; a prisoner of your own OODA loop and your own inflexibility. Yet, that is precisely what this new White House plan envisions.

So what should be done to fix intelligence? A lot of things, to be sure. But not something so sweeping as this that promises little in the way of net gains. Here are a few ideas that have been kicked around in the security community that can be done today, with far less political and bureaucratic effort:

(1) Build a robust intelligence information architecture. Janet Reno, Louis Freeh, Robert Mueller and John Ashcroft all agree -- the DOJ/FBI information architecture is horrible. It goes without saying that there is no tie-in between this system and the intelligence systems of the CIA, NSA, or any of the other interested agencies. And there's certainly no vertical links between federal and state/local intelligence efforts. Remember that local cops are as likely to find indicators of terrorism activity as national-level investigators -- perhaps more so -- so it's critical to have that tie-in. A seamless, efficient, compartmentalized, secure information architecture for America's security community would be invaluable to the anti-terrorism effort, and it would probably do more than any other measure to make our OODA loop more efficient. It would also provide the linkages to transform the disparate, disconnected, dysfunctional American law enforcement landscape into something approaching a network, which would be exactly what we need to fight Al Qaeda.

(2) Establish real priorities for the intelligence community. This point goes to what Amy Zegart wrote a while back for Mark Kleiman's weblog. If you fail to establish priorities for intelligence work, you will collect a lot of stuff but nothing in enough depth to do meaningful analysis. Since the end of the Cold War, the American intelligence community has lacked a sense of priorities, and indeed has been given too many to be effective.

(3) Develop new interagency network models to fight terrorism. There may need to be some reorganization of government to make our agencies more effective in the fight against terror. However, such a reorganization ought to incorporate our operational understanding of this enemy, and it ought to look very different from the reorg being floated in this NYT story. There are models in existence at the local level around the country of interagency cooperation, and we would do well to scale those up to the federal level. The Terrorism Early Warning Group model and the Joint Terrorism Task Force model both serve as excellent examples of how many different agencies can come together to do indications and warning, net assessment, operational planning and consequences management planning. Innovative standing organizations like these can often work better than formal agencies, because they're not saddled with a lot of the bureaucracy attendant in formal agencies. We should consider a model like this for the federal level, because as the RAND experts write, "it takes a network to fight a network."

What's the right answer here? Probably some combination of all of this stuff. Some amount of coordination at the top level is necessary to ensure that intelligence community budgets, collection efforts, and analysis programs are all playing off the same sheet of music. A lot of investment is also necessary in the lower levels of this community, particularly on the domstic side where intelligence capabilities in the FBI and INS and USCG and other domestically oriented agencies have been neglected for far too long. The thing is, we have an active, adaptive, dangerous enemy out there who's just waiting for us to drop our defenses. We can't afford the learning curve associated with a typical government reorganization, but that will cause a net decrease in America's security for the near term -- an operational window that Al Qaeda might use to strike. If we do this, we absolutely positively have to get it right the first time.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:32

 
President takes a jog with wounded soldier: For a staff sergeant in the U.S. Army, a chance to jog around the White House with any President would be an amazing experience. After all, he is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and that means something to soldiers regardless of political affiliation. It must have been even more special for Army National Guard SSG Michael McNaughton, who lost a leg to a landmine in Afghanistan last year. Pres. Bush visited SSG McNaughton at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Jan. 2003, where the sergeant challenged the president to a run when he healed from his wounds. Yesterday, the president kept his word to the sergeant, and the two enjoyed a short jog on the White House grounds together.

It's a small gesture, and depending on your political outlook, it may mean very little at all. But it still struck me as a very classy thing to do. The president's promise motivated this soldier to get better, to the point where he is now able to run with a prosthetic leg. I don't think you can measure how much that mean to this sergeant and his family, or to veterans who appreciate what little gestures like this mean.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:14

 
Digital dog tags: Check out Noah Shachtman's interesting article in today's New York Times on the new technologies being fielded to soldiers which will aid battlefield identification and hopefully reduce fratricide.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:08

 
Gitmo chaplain case goes away

The LA Times and CNN report that Chaplain (CPT) James Yee has successfully gotten his non-judicial punishment overturned for various minor charges that arose out of his investigation for espionage committed at Guantanamo Bay. The charges included adultery, mishandling classified information, and downloading porn to a government computer. The prosecution began to fall apart after CPT Yee's lawyer contested the classification of the information at issue, and the case quickly became a comedy of errors. CPT Yee's 2-star commander at Gitmo gave him an Art. 15 for his actions, but CPT Yee appealed that reprimand to his 4-star commander -- and won.

Army Gen. James T. Hill, head of the Miami-based U.S. Southern Command, overturned on appeal the nonjudicial conviction and written reprimand handed down March 22 to Capt. James Joseph Yee. The decision marked the apparent end to a high-profile case in which critics accused the military of overzealousness and anti-Muslim fervor in its pursuit of the Bush administration's war on terrorism.

* * *
Fidell contended that Army Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, then the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, "erred gravely in putting Chaplain Yee in confinement, but he continued the error for an unconscionable period of time…. It's disturbing and there's a sense in which I'm afraid the Army, or at least this part of the Army, still doesn't get it."

Fidell has compared the case to the prosecution of Wen Ho Lee, who was indicted in 1999 for allegedly mishandling classified information at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Fidell said he hoped another commander, perhaps higher up the chain of command, would apologize for what he described as a zealous and unnecessarily embarrassing prosecution. Yee and his wife were compelled to watch in court as a woman, described as Yee's mistress, gave intimate details of her alleged affair with the chaplain.

No reprimand will appear on Yee's record, but Fidell said his client's future in the military was unclear.

Analysis: Clearly, CPT Yee has Mr. Fidell's expert advocacy to thank for this outcome, as well as a bunch of bad publicity for the Army that came out of this case. Mr. Fidell is the Mark Geragos of the military law community, and he was able to convince the powers that be that it was in the best interest of the Army to dismiss this case altogether. It may look like a no-brainer to the outside world, but to me, this is actually a surprising outcome. For a commissioned officer like CPT Yee, adultery and mishandling classified information are serious charges. I'm surprised that the Army dismissed those, notwithstanding any larger p.r. issues involved, because of the way such a dismissal will look to enlisted soldiers and other officers. It will look to the average soldier like CPT Yee purchased justice, and that if you make a big enough stink in the media, you can get your way. I'm not so sure that's conducive to good order and discipline.

Where does CPT Yee go from here? He will likely request release from active duty, since he's unlikely to have a good career in the military after this case. Regardless of his acquittal, he will be known as the chaplain who committed adultery and bungled classified information at Guantanamo Bay. That's bad enough for any commissioned officer -- it's really bad for a military chaplain, who's supposed to be beyond moral reproach. The Army will likely grant his request, and then he will be honorably discharged.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:06

 
One hell of a fight
Battles rage in Fallujah and on the highways of Iraq

Pamela Constable, who's embedded with the Marines in Fallujah, has a gripping report in the Washington Post cobbled together from after-action interviews with Marines who fought their way into the city to recover their buddies who had been ambushed and surrounded by Iraqi insurgents. The scenario sounds remarkably similar to what Mark Bowden described in his history of the Battle of Bakara Market, where Somali insurgents surrounded a company of Rangers and accompanying Delta operators. However, the outcome this time was quite different.

FALLUJAH, Iraq, April 14 -- It began as a routine supply mission to the front lines, in a volatile but largely becalmed city.

It ended as a fiery and chaotic rescue mission, with a small force of Marine tanks, Humvees and ground troops surrounded and attacked as they fought their way through a hostile neighborhood to save the crew of a burning armored personnel carrier.

Marine officials said the three-hour battle that erupted at dusk Tuesday on the streets of Fallujah, and was recounted Wednesday by several of the key officers involved, exemplified the bravery and resourcefulness that Marines are known for, even when surprised and surrounded by a host of enemy fighters on alien urban turf. By the end of the tumultuous encounter, the charred personnel carrier had been towed to safety by a tank and most of its 17 crew members -- several of them wounded -- had been rescued from a house where they had taken shelter.

But the incident also revealed some startling facts about the insurgency that the Marines are facing here, officers said. More dramatically than any armed confrontation since U.S. forces surrounded Fallujah nine days ago, it showed the tenacity, coordination, firepower and surprisingly large numbers of anti-American guerrillas who still dominate much of the city.

"We definitely stumbled into a wasps' nest. They were definitely a lot more organized than we thought," said Capt. Jason Smith, 30, commander of the company whose armored supply vehicle made a wrong turn into insurgent territory and was immediately inundated by gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades from all sides.

Read the rest...

And speaking of fights: My read of this story by Tom Ricks, the Post's veteran Pentagon reporter, is that he was actually in this convoy when it was ambushed. (Also see this Ricks article from yesterday on the increasing sophistication of Iraqi attacks.) It too makes for gripping reading, and it illustrates some of the problems the Army is having with the security of highways in Iraq. Ricks' article makes it clear just how difficult it is to get convoys through this route without being attacked -- even with armed HMMWVs and Bradleys for escorts.

In the biggest Army operation in central Iraq since last spring's invasion, dozens of convoys made up of hundreds of tanks and trucks moved into an area where Shiite Muslim militias had battled with occupation troops several times this month. Along the way, nearly every convoy was fired on, weary soldiers said afterward. Iraqi insurgents blew up bridges on the convoy routes, doubling or tripling the duration of trips scheduled to take six to 12 hours. And the U.S. military operation in Iraq began to feel less like a troubled occupation and more like a small war.

For one convoy, the journey began just before midnight Sunday at the U.S. base outside Baqubah, northeast of Baghdad. Amyett, 23, a 1st Infantry Division scout in charge of a two-Humvee section that would make up the rear of the 44-vehicle convoy, assembled his men for a quick and intense briefing.

"There's a 99 percent chance we're going to get hit," said Amyett, from Searcy, Ark., sitting on the hood of a Humvee and facing a cluster of soldiers who stood around him in the dark. "If they shoot, kill them. Shoot them in the face."

* * *
At 2:19 a.m. on Monday, the convoy rolled out the front gate of the base near Baqubah. The parade comprised not just tanks, Humvees and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, but many of the more exotic parts of the U.S. Army inventory, such as the new Stryker armored vehicle, huge portable bridges and special trucks for carrying M1 Abrams tanks.

You cannot overstate the importance of roads to the security and rebuilding mission in Iraq. Simply put, the roads are the arteries of Iraq, and the nation will die without them. They allow food, water, commerce, labor, and security forces to flow around the country. They also provide insurgents with a chokepoint to use to target and prevent the flow of these things. Thus, the fight over Iraq's roads is a fight for whether the U.S. can deliver food, water, medical care, security and reconstruction to the people of Iraq. The roads of Iraq have been the insurgents' battleground of choice for the past year, because this terrain supports their tactics of choice: hit-and-run ambushes and command-detonated improvised explosive devices ("IEDs"). For the foreseeable future, it's certain that these roads will continue to serve as key terrain for the battle in Iraq.

What can the U.S. do to retake these roads? As an operational planner in 4ID, we wargamed these kinds of scenarios in planning and command exercises quite a bit. The conventional answer is to allocate forces to route security -- MPs or infantry or scouts -- who can patrol routes constantly to detect and interdict insurgent ambushes before they're set. Another option is to conduct counter-reconnaissance patrols of key terrain which observes and controls the roads -- high ground on either side of the road, for example. However, as simple as these measures are, they require forces to be pulled from some other mission, and that was always the difficult inherent in these solutions.

It's true that there are 125,000+ U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. It's also true that if you add up all of the mission requirements, force-protection requirements, support requirements and other requirements, you quickly find these troops depleted. Especially when you consider that only a fraction of these are actual "trigger pullers" who can effectively do a mission like route security. If memory serves right, our planning factor was that it takes one MP company to patrol 90km of road in a semi-permissive corps rear area. Given the threat in Iraq, I might reduce that territory slightly or boost the force slightly. Gen. Abizaid has requested two additional brigade combat teams with which to secure his routes and conduct other counter-insurgency missions. The 1st Armored Division and 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment have been held in-country for another few months. 2ACR is the ideal force for this kind of mission; its light cav MTOE and training are extremely well-suited to route reconnaissance and security. Before Iraq, that was probably a METL task for this unit. I think it's likely that we will use this unit and others to conduct running patrols of key routes in Iraq in order to get them all up to "amber" or "green" status.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:53

 
Can the Witmer sisters stay home? That's the question I pose in this Slate "Explainer" column which was just published. The short answer is that these two sisters can ask the Army to reassign them after the death of their sister in combat, but that this hard choice is theirs alone to make.

Coda: I've gotten some e-mail on this subject that I thought I should respond to online. Most of the e-mail has said that it would be horrible to send these sisters back into combat. I agree -- it's horrible to send anyone into combat. But that's a decision that sometimes has to be made. And I would argue that it would feel horrible to these women, who by all accounts are excellent soldiers, for them to leave their comrades behind in Iraq. Stephen Ambrose didn't call his book "Band of Brothers" for nothing. The bonds between soldiers are as strong as the bonds between brothers -- and in today's Army, between sisters too. I think these sisters will have a really hard time exercising their option to be reassigned from combat. And in fact, I think this option is harder because of the fact that the Witmer sisters are in the National Guard, and will thus have to see their comrades in daily life after this deployment is over. My prediction: the daughters go back to Iraq.
posted by Phillip Carter at 15:02

 
Congratulations to appellate litigator Howard Bashman, whose weblog How Appealing will soon migrate to the webpage of Legal Affairs magazine. I had the chance to work with Howard during our filing of an amicus brief with the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, and I have been a big fan of his 'blog for a long time. It really is better than the AP wire for legal news. It only makes sense for him to join with Legal Affairs, a magazine that I also respect a great deal. This promises to be a mutually beneficial relationship, and we the readers stand to benefit the most.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:55

 
The future of the Army's future combat systems: Noah Shachtman has a few good reports here, here and here on the latest developments with the Army's programs to buy the next generation of military hardware. In a nutshell, the multi-billion dollar FCS program is experiencing significant growing pains, with many Army leaders questioning its wisdom in light of the need to fund current operations. Read Noah's articles at DefenseTech and in Wired for more.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:52

 
New rules proposed for private military contractors in Iraq

Last Friday, I wrote an essay for Slate arguing that it was in our interest to rethink the rules governing the conduct of American contractors in Iraq -- especially those providing "private military contracting" services such as security and convoy escort. Today, Mary Pat Flaherty and Dana Priest report in the Washington Post that the Coalition Provisional Authority is also becoming concerned about these issues, and that they're seeking to implement a number of control mechanisms on contractors in Iraq.

Many operational details are spelled out only in the contracts between security firms and the companies and government agencies that hire them, according to several private security firms.

The CPA now restricts the weapons private security teams may use to small arms with ammunition as large as 7.62mm and to some other defensive weapons. A Dec. 31 coalition rule spells out circumstances under which security firms can use deadly force, including self-defense, the defense of people or property specified in their contracts, and the defense of civilians.

Coalition contractors and their employees currently are subject to the legal jurisdiction of their parent countries because there is no Iraqi legal system, a CPA order states.

But with the June 30 handover, that condition "becomes a major issue," and "there is not a lot of clarity yet" on what laws will govern security firms, said Mike Baker, chief executive of D.C.-based Diligence LLC, which provides security for both government and private operations in Iraq.

Attempts to coordinate operations between private security firms and the military -- and operations among the companies themselves -- have been underway for months. But that pace has quickened.

* * *
The brutal killings of four American security contractors in Fallujah two weeks ago prompted 13 Democratic senators led by Jack Reed (R.I.), to ask the Defense Department to provide a tally of how many private armed non-Iraqi security personnel are in Iraq. In their letter, the senators said that "security in a hostile fire area is a classic military mission. Delegating this mission to private contractors raises serious questions."

"Policy is way overdue in this area," Reed said.

More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:12

 
Are soldiers heroes? Andy Rooney answers "not really" with a sharply written op-ed for the Tribune media service. BlackFive, a former Army paratrooper, shoots back with a more convincing response. From where I sit, it looks like Mr. Rooney took an extra dose of cynicism this morning which has skewed his sense of proportion and reality.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:01

 
Gen. Abizaid requests more troops for Iraq
Two brigades may -- or may not -- be enough to secure the country

The Los Angeles Times reports this morning that Gen. John Abizaid has sent a formal request up to the SecDef for two more brigade combat teams -- roughly 7,000-10,000 troops -- to give him the resources he needs to do the job in Iraq. The request comes at the same time that the Army is tweaking its rotation of troops through Iraq to keep the maximum amount of combat power on the ground for the longest period possible.

An expected deployment of thousands more troops for duty in Iraq answers congressional calls for backup and comes as administration officials work to prevent allies from following Spain's planned withdrawal of its forces.

But the request Monday also revealed the Pentagon's lack of options for finding reinforcements. Army Gen. John Abizaid, head of the Central Command, called Iraqi security forces a "great disappointment." As a result, most of the new troops are almost certain to come from the thinly stretched U.S. Army.

* * *
Abizaid has a reputation within the Pentagon as a straight shooter, but some observers were betting on further increases.

"If Abizaid says he needs two brigades, one can be certain that that's the very minimum he needs, given the reluctance by him and other commanders to acknowledge that they need any more troops at all," said former ambassador James Dobbins, who supervised peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia and now works for the Rand Corp.

* * *
The U.S. force in Iraq peaked at roughly 155,000 during the invasion last year. Despite the addition of 200,000 Iraqi police, army and other security forces since then, U.S. troop strength has dropped by only 25,000.

Current and former Army officials have noted that when then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki warned Congress before the war that 225,000 U.S. troops then poised for attack around the Persian Gulf would be needed for years, Pentagon officials called his estimate wildly inaccurate.

"This is what Shinseki was talking about. This is what everybody's been talking about," retired Maj. Gen. William Nash said. "The failure to do it right at the beginning means that we're going to have to do it at the end with a lot of deaths and a lot of trouble and it's going to be much harder now. The insurgents are building momentum."

Analysis: Precisely -- MG Nash is right. I'm going to beat the proverbial dead horse again by saying that our failure to plan effectively for Phase IV (post-war stability) and our failure to resource Phase IV allowed the Iraqi insurgency to take root last spring in a chaotic operational environment. The result today is that we face a mature, dug-in, well-supported insurgency with lots of weapons and recruits. It's hard to overstate the importance of these initial failures. By not planning for our rapid success, and by letting chaos reign in those first few weeks, we lost control over Iraq and ceded the initiative to the insurgents. It has been a very long struggle since April 2003 to retake the initiative. We have prevailed in a number of cities, from Basra to Mosul, and our nation-buildling efforts have done a lot for the Iraqi people. But to be successful, we have yet to establish the basic security necessary for a free society and market economy to flourish.

Insurgent ambushes of Iraqi-driven supply trucks on the highway from Baghdad yesterday -- and subsequent refusal of Iraqis to move commercial goods along that road anymore -- threaten this stability. American contractors, such as Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, have suspended convoys along these roads until they're made safe -- delaying nation-building efforts dependent on KBR shipments. This isn't just a military "line of communication" -- this road is also a civilian artery of commerce. Without the freedom to move people and goods around the country, and Iraqi economy will sputter and die. If we don't fix the security situation, we will not be able to rebuild Iraq. It's that simple. Security comes first, because without it, people are afraid to do their jobs and leave their homes.

So what can be done now? I hate to say it, but we have to get more combat power into Iraq. That probably means disturbing the Army's carefully drawn unit rotations for OIF 3 and OIF 4; it may also mean the mobilization of additional National Guard enhanced brigades. Absent some major political change in Europe or Washington, I don't see our NATO and UN allies jumping into this one to save our bacon. So we have to plan for this one on our own, and we have to give Gen. Abizaid the resources he needs to succeed.

Update I: Greg Jaffe and Chris Cooper have a good report on this subject in today's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) as well, wherein they describe the changes in the threat which are driving this need for more forces.

Senior military officials in and around Fallujah said that the enemy now appears far more determined than the former Baathists and Saddam Hussein loyalists who initiated the insurgency. "The enemy has become more fanatical, and some Iraqis here are clearly taking up the call to arms," said one senior Army official based in western Iraq. "These people are being spun up by religious leaders who are being backed by terrorists."

One increasingly worrisome scenario for military officials is that determined, fanatical fighters continue to mount successful attacks on civilian contractors and aid workers throughout the country. Such attacks might force commanders to divert troops now focused on battling radicals to play a greater role providing security for convoys along Iraq's highways.

Since the war began, 30 employees of Halliburton and its subcontractors have been killed. At any given time, Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root has 700 trucks on Iraqi and Kuwaiti roads, the company said. Securing those supply lines against insurgent attacks is a massive undertaking, according to military officials.

posted by Phillip Carter at 06:55

 
Justice Department presses the legal fight against terrorism
Case could test the outer limits of a federal law designed to attack support to terrorism

Paul Barrett reports in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) today on a case going to trial in Idaho which illustrates a key aspect of the Justice Department's war on terrorism: the use of 18 U.S.C. 2339b to go after people who provide "material support" to foreign terrorist organizations. The law has provoked sharp criticism because of its use against so-called "little fish" -- people whose only crime was to contribute small amounts of money or other support to organizations on the State Department's FTO list. However, DOJ officials respond that these are the vulnerable points of global networked terrorism, thus the need to prosecute them.

The weapon is a law aimed not at masterminds or bombers but at secondary players who provide terrorists with "material support and resources." The phrase provides a flexible net, and prosecutors have used it to charge 57 people in Detroit; Lackawanna, N.Y.; Portland, Ore.; Seattle; Tampa and other cities since Sept. 11, 2001. But some federal judges, uneasy about the provision's vagueness and its potential to squelch free speech, have begun to poke holes in it.

Now, the case of Saudi graduate student Sami Omar al-Hussayen could help determine how aggressively the government will be able to pursue alleged promoters of terrorism: people who raise money, offer advice or amplify calls to violence.

No one disputes that Mr. Hussayen, a 34-year-old Ph.D. candidate in computer science, is a loving husband, a gentle father of three young boys and an esteemed leader of the Muslim community in this small town. But in its indictment, the government accuses the University of Idaho student of setting up a series of Web sites and an e-mail group that recruited fighters and collected funds "for violent jihad in Israel, Chechnya and other places."

The most incendiary message that has come to light in government court filings is an "urgent appeal" posted in February 2003 by another individual in the e-mail group that Mr. Hussayen allegedly helped to moderate. It called on Muslim-American soldiers to "provide information on potential targets for attacks," such as U.S. military bases in the Middle East and the bases' drinking-water supplies.

* * *
In the Hussayen case, the government seeks for the first time to apply the material-support statute to someone whose primary alleged crime is promoting militant Islam online. Mr. Hussayen, whose partially completed Ph.D. thesis addresses computer-network security, is accused of offering expert advice, among other forms of aid, to the Islamic Assembly of North America by helping set up and edit Web sites such as www.alasr.ws, an online Arabic magazine. In court papers, the FBI says that in June 2001, the site carried an article by a Saudi-trained Kuwaiti cleric titled, "Provision of Suicide Operations." An excerpt in English translation says in part, "This can be accomplished with the modern means of bombing or bringing down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses."

Analysis: This case raises huge First Amendment issues which will may eventually be decided by the Supreme Court. Past prosecutions for material support under 18 U.S.C. 2339a and 2339b have focused on the giving of tangible things -- money, for example. The use of this statute to prosecute speech which provides material support to terrorism is a very novel use of the law, and one that is sure to result in a challenge on First Amendment grounds.

In the past year, federal courts have ruled parts of this law unconstitutional on vagueness grounds, but they have not yet applied the Supreme Court's test for speech that incites crime. The 9th Circuit ruled in Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft that two terms in 18 U.S.C. 2339a's definition of "material support" were void for vagueness -- "personnel" and "training." U.S. District Judge Audrey B. Collins ruled earlier this year that another term in 18 U.S.C. 2339a's definition -- "expert advice and assistance" -- was void for vagueness. These decisions gutted the material support laws, but it's not clear that these decisions have had an effect beyond the 9th Circuit where they are binding authority.

However, the challenges so far have been successful on technical grounds -- the vagueness doctrine. This case seems almost tailor-made for a challenge on First Amendment grounds -- does 18 U.S.C. 2339b comport with the test from Brandenburg v. Ohio for speech that incites violence? In Brandenburg, the Court held that “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” is unprotected when it is:
1) "directed to inciting or producing" ... (usually requires specific intent)
2) “imminent lawless action” (time horizon must be short)
3) “and is likely to incite or produce such action.”

The takeaway points from this test are that the first prong requires specific intent; the second prong requires a very short time horizon for the speech, and the third prong is extremely hard to prove in court. (Thanks to Eugene Volokh, my First Amendment law professor, for teaching me about this stuff last year.) I actually taught Brandenburg to the students in my Law & Terrorism class, and we applied this test to 18 U.S.C. 2339b in class. It was not clear whether the statute would survive, and in the instant case, I'm really unsure whether the courts will be willing to uphold its use to prosecute the speech of Mr. al-Hussayen.

More to follow...

Update I: Eugene Volokh has a very provocative (and lengthy) law review article in draft form on crime-facilitating speech and whether there should be an exception to the First Amendment which allows for the prosecution of this speech. I highly recommend reading it if you're interested in this subject, because he covers the entire legal terrain on this issue in the piece.
posted by Phillip Carter at 10:51

 
Iraq dangers lead to restrictions on reporter movement

The Wall Street Journal (subscription required) has an interesting story this morning on the orders from several media organizations to their reporters in the field telling them to stay safe in Iraq. In the past two weeks, one Japanese reporter has been taken hostage and two NYT reporters have been detained at gunpoint. The risk of death, injury or capture has many editors telling their troops in the field to play it safe.

So far, there are no reports of major U.S. news organizations completely pulling out of Iraq. But the street violence has become so intense and unpredictable that many reporters are staying indoors, taking only short trips or traveling with the military rather than risk being kidnapped or killed.

* * *
In the wake of two attempted kidnappings of its reporters, the New York Times also has asked its reporters to stay within city limits, for now. Still, the newspaper plans to rotate a few more reporters to its Baghdad bureau in the next two weeks. "I think you have to ask yourself periodically, 'Is it safe to be there at all?' But so far, the answer has been quick and unanimous, 'Yes,' " said Executive Editor Bill Keller.

Other reporters are staying inside, in part because this weekend's anniversary of the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue was expected to prompt a new wave of violence in Baghdad. "We've told them to stay in their resident hotels and not to venture out for even midlevel stories," said John Stack, vice president of news gathering at News Corp.'s Fox News Channel.

Analysis: The interesting thing here is that so few reporters have not been hurt or killed recently. You might recall that reporters and photographers got images and stories from within the crowd of Iraqis that killed the contractors in Fallujah, or that we've seen images from other gory events in the past two weeks. For the most part, the Iraqis are protecting the media, because they want their mayhem to be broadcast around the world. As RAND terrorism expert Brian Jenkins said so many years ago, "terrorism is theater." If the Iraqis can't get their actions seen, and their message heard, then they will fail.

I don't mean to suggest that U.S. media are aiding the enemy by their coverage; they're not. They're just covering the news, for the most part, and doing their jobs. But I want to point out that there is a very complex interaction of factors on the ground in Iraq that allows reporters to operate in places where soldiers could not, and that given the dangers in Iraq, I'm surprised that so few reporters have been killed thus far. I think it's prudent for these major media organizations to protect their reporters in the field, even at the expense of getting the story. But I would not be surprised if a few enterprising reporters are still able to go out and get the story, given the Iraqi interests in having their side heard. We'll see.
posted by Phillip Carter at 10:30

 
Iraqi battalion refuses to fight Iraqis

In what may be the worst possible development for U.S. officials hoping to hand sovereignty to the Iraqis on June 30, 2004, Tom Ricks reports in the Washington Post that a newly-minted Iraqi Armed Forces battalion has refused to go fight in Fallujah against Sunni Muslims fighting U.S. forces there. Mutiny in wartime is always a bad thing; it's a worse thing when the overall security strategy hinges on the ability of the Iraqi armed forces to pacify their own population.

BAGHDAD, April 10 -- A battalion of the new Iraqi army refused to go to Fallujah earlier this week to support U.S. Marines battling for control of the city, senior U.S. Army officers here said, disclosing an incident that is casting new doubt on U.S. plans to transfer security matters to Iraqi forces.

It was the first time U.S. commanders had sought to involve the postwar Iraqi army in major combat operations, and the battalion's refusal came as large parts of Iraqi security forces have stopped carrying out their duties.

The 620-man 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces refused to fight Monday after members of the unit were shot at in a Shiite Muslim neighborhood in Baghdad while en route to Fallujah, a Sunni Muslim stronghold, said U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who is overseeing the development of Iraqi security forces. The convoy then turned around and returned to the battalion's post on a former Republican Guard base in Taji, a town north of the capital.

Eaton said members of the battalion insisted during the ensuing discussions: "We did not sign up to fight Iraqis."

He declined to characterize the incident as a mutiny, but rather called it "a command failure."

The refusal of the battalion to perform as U.S. officials had hoped poses a significant problem for the occupation. The cornerstone of the U.S. strategy in Iraq is to draw down its military presence and turn over security functions to Iraqis.

* * *
Eaton added: "The lines are blurring for a lot of Iraqis right now, and we're having problems with a lot of security functions right now."

A soldier with the 1st Armored Division, who has recently been engaged in combat in Baghdad, said many of the Iraqi security troops with whom he has worked are no longer reporting for duty. "I think what we are seeing is not some mass quitting and mutiny by ICDC [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps], but rather just plain fear," the soldier said. "And all it takes is one Iraqi to take the lead in leaving, and they all do out of fear."

Analysis: Why won't the Iraqis fight, when U.S. soldiers with arguably less at stake will? What are the reasons for this refusal? Fear is clearly part of the decision calculus for these Iraqis. They know they're not as well-trained or -equipped as their U.S. brethren, and they're probably multiplyin U.S. casualties in their head as the likely outcome for their lesser force. Sympathy for their fellow Iraqis is probably a good reason. Imagine the most vile group of Americans -- neo-Nazis who have recently blown up a church or synagogue, killing scores of innocent Americans -- and then imagine the difficulties that our FBI or local SWAT teams would have if they were told their orders were to clear this separatist stronghold. ("Clear", as a tactical task, roughly means to painstakingly eliminate every enemy soldier from a piece of terrain, as opposed to "defeat" or "destroy", which doctrinally mean killing/capturing enough enemy troops that they stop fighting.) I think that it would be very hard to convince our security forces of the justness of this task, and thus I can imagine the difficulty in getting the Iraqis to go fight.

So why do U.S. units fight? It's a combination of unit cohesion, solid leadership, belief in their training and equipment, and a certain historical fatalism that the best way to go home is to win. Dr. Leonard Wong led a study by the Army War College last year of this question -- which looked at morale in both the U.S. and Iraqi armies. Here's what it found:

As a means of comparison, they began by interviewing Iraqi Regular Army prisoners of war to examine their combat motivation and unit dynamics. The researchers then interviewed U.S. combat troops fresh from the fields of battle to examine their views. What they found was that today's U.S. soldiers, much like soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and well in today's Army. Yet, Dr. Wong and his fellow researchers also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation. Today's soldiers trust each other, they trust their leaders, they trust the Army, and they also understand the moral dimensions of war.

But what about U.S. agencies whose job it is to apply force to U.S. civilians? How do local agencies like the LAPD do it, or national agencies like the FBI? A National Guard unit tasked to do riot controL? It's not easy. The short answer is that is that they have built an organizational culture over time which motivates individual soldiers to do these tasks despite the moral difficulty with using force against fellow citizens. In law enforcement, the moral deprecation of the enemy (criminal population) is important, because law enforcers have to believe that they're doing good by using force. Similarly, police commanders engaged in riot control operations have to find some way to justify their actions, and it's generally accomplished with public safety imperatives. And of course, there are sanctions that are applied to anyone who falls out of ranks. U.S. cops or soldiers who don't play ball will be ostracized by their peers, and will likely also face administrative and/or criminal penalties as well.

All of these U.S. systems -- unit cohesion, leadership, administrative incentives/penalties -- take time to develop, along with the organizational culture which allows a unit to do these things. Even the Iraqi Army, as studied by Wong et al., lacked the organizational culture necessary to stand in fight. We should not be surprised that the infant Iraqi armed forces lack the will to fight, and especially that they lack the will to fight their own countrymen. I think this is a pretty strong indicator that (1) we cannot turn over sovereignty until we have crushed the most dangerous parts of the Iraqi insurgency and (2) that we must leave some force in Iraq to continue the fight until the Iraqis can build a viable force.
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:15

 
What went wrong in Iraq last week: Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Anthony Shadid, two of the Washington Post's veterans in Iraq, have a lengthy report on the mistakes and successes which helped foment the current uprising underway in Iraq. It's an excellent piece of reporting and analysis, and I highly recommend it.
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:10

 
Read the book... or wait for the movie: The AP reports that Sony Pictures Entertainment has purchased the movie rights to Against All Enemies, the book by former White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke. A lot of the book is quite dry, but the story from inside the White House on Sept. 11, 2001, will likely make for good movie material. No deal details were released, nor was a production timeline.
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:01

 
Measuring gains and losses in Iraq
"The lid of the pressure cooker has come off"

The situation in Fallujah, as well as the rest of Iraq, has been fluid for at least as long as the current engagement has been going on. As the saying goes, the issue is still very much in doubt. Thus, despite extensive reports in the NYT, WP and LAT, I'm reticent to read the tea leaves as pointing to a particular end. MG David Petraeus' question is certainly apt here -- "Tell me how this ends. I think that Virginia Postrel articulates this point well on her weblog:

I have the same problem blogging on this topic that I do blogging on every little twitch in the economic statistics: It's too hard to separate the transient noise from the long-run trend, and the long run is what matters. Things are bad in Iraq right now, but is this a last-gasp effort by our enemies, the beginning of a quagmire, or, most likely, something in between whose conclusion depends largely on our response? Rushing to judgment, especially from afar, is a prescription for foolish conclusions and bad policies.

One reason pundits focus so much on the political, as opposed to substantive, effects of economic or military developments is that political effects do take place in the short run. Plus it's easier to understand poll numbers than to peer through the fog of war (or the complexity of the economy).

Virginia's thoughts, refined by years of economic analysis, are spot on. In war, it is very difficult to see the forest through the trees -- to piece together those indicators on the battlefield in order to a form a complete picture of what's really going on. American military doctrine calls this "situational understanding", and it's a very hard thing to acquire through the fog of war. So, I'll try to focus on some discrete details of the engagements in Iraq to make observations, and I'll only make a tentative guess as to the big picture.

The AP reports that (Iraqi?) government negotiators have moved into Fallujah to broker some sort of agreement -- either a lasting peace or temporary cease-fire -- with the militants for humanitarian purposes. The American command appears to be blessing this effort with a temporary pause in combat operations.

FALLUJAH, Iraq (AP) -- Government negotiators entered the besieged city of Fallujah Saturday as fierce battles raged elsewhere in central Iraq, including Baghdad. Forty Iraqis were killed, two U.S. servicemembers and two Germans were missing, an American civilian was captured and a Red Crescent official was gunned down.

Several members of the Iraqi Governing Council met with Fallujah city leaders, trying to win the handover of people who killed and mutilated four American civilians last week. They also want the insurgents to give up foreign militants in the city, council member Mahmoud Othman said.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt said the military was seeking a cease-fire during the talks, but explosions and sporadic gunfire continued to be heard Saturday afternoon in the city. The Marines largely remained in the industrial zone they hold in the eastern part of the city, 35 miles west of Baghdad.

Some Marines moved a few blocks into a nearby neighborhood, breaking into homes, witnesses said, in an apparent attempt to clear out gunmen firing on them. An AC-130 gunship airplane raked insurgent positions with gunfire Friday night.

Analysis: This is a very interesting development. It runs counter to the old maxim of American diplomacy, that we never negotiate with terrorists. By negotiating with the insurgents in Fallujah (or by blessing the Iraqi negotiations with them), we have elevated the status of these insurgents to something approaching a legitimate military force. My sense is that we're offering humanitarian aid to the civilians in Fallujah and safe passage for them in exchange for the handoff of the actual people responsible for last week's ambush and mutiliation of the contractors, and we probably also want some agreement to let Iraqi police/military units patrol Fallujah without being attacked. Prediction: the insurgents will tell us to go pound sand. In a week, they have inflicted significant losses on an elite American unit and held their ground, and their situational understanding probably tells them they are winning right now. At most, they will allow humanitarian convoys to enter the city, but they won't let Iraqi civilians leave en masse, because that would deprive them of a significant source of protection against American firepower.

The Los Angeles Times reports on another large development relating to the battle for Fallujah. Several members of the nascent Iraqi Governing Council appear to be severely disenchanted with American tactics in Iraq, to the point where they have announced their departure from the IGC or their thoughts about doing so. Given that the IGC is America's hand-picked governing body for Iraq, this obviously presents major political and strategic problems.

One council member, angered by this week's heavy fighting in Fallouja and the prospect of a U.S. move against the militia of an anti-American Shiite cleric, suspended his membership Friday. Four others say they are ready to follow suit.

A sixth council member, Adnan Pachachi, a respected former diplomat who less than three months ago had accompanied First Lady Laura Bush to the president's State of the Union address, harshly criticized U.S. actions as "illegal and totally unacceptable."

* * *
"The coalition has opened too many fronts in Iraq, alienating a large swath of the population," said Hachim Hassani, who is representing the Iraqi Islamic Party, a leading Sunni Muslim group, on the council. "The Iraqi people now equate democracy with bloodshed."

The council members say the only move that would stop them from suspending or resigning their membership is the U.S. military's agreement to halt military operations in Fallouja long enough for council members to engage in negotiations with the local community to try to forestall further bloodshed.

Analysis: I'm no Iraq expert or trained political scientist -- see Juan Cole's site for that perspective. However, this development has some major strategic implications. First, the Iraqi tactics are becoming clear -- they are operationalizing the "bond" theory of insurgency. This theory posits that the institutions of a given society -- political leadership, the military, the people -- are bound together by relationships which themselves can be targeted. The Iraqi insurgents right now are targeting the bonds between the American people and its political leadership, through the infliction of American casualties. They are also targeting the same bond in the Iraqi society. To some extent, they are succeeding in both campaigns. But this development on the IGC is most disturbing because it shows that they are really succeeding at breaking the bond between the Iraqi people and their current governing body.

Now, it's always been known that self-determination is a messy thing, and we should not be surprised that battlefield events have unpredictable (and unwanted) consequences for Iraqi democracy. But I think that we should take steps to protect Iraqi democracy while it's in its fragile infancy, and not allow the insurgents or terrorists to pull at its levers while it's at such a sensitive point. We must find some way to keep the IGC together, with a membership that represents most of Iraq, or else we will not be able to hand over sovereignty in 80+ days. And if we let the IGC be weakened by insurgent tactics, we will effectively be setting it up for failure.

The Washington Post reports this morning on the battlefield tactics being used in Fallujah, as well as the progress of the American offensive around the country. It does not surprise me to see the U.S. winning slowly as it applies combined-arms firepower to each enemy stronghold in Fallujah and elsewhere. Even the most disciplined, well-trained, and well-armed force would be overwhelmed by this synchronized application of firepower -- let alone an ad hoc force of insurgents. The deliberate speed of the American advance is likely a function of risk management; commanders are doing what they can to minimize casualties through the use of standoff firepower and caution. Clearing buildings takes time, and the price of speed is measured in blood. American forces appear to be taking back some of the ground gained by insurgents thus far, but the issue is still in doubt, according to The Post.

Sadr has taken refuge in Najaf, and his militia, called the Mahdi Army, maintained control over the city Friday while U.S. forces have remained outside. In Kut, another southern city held by insurgents since Ukrainian troops retreated earlier in the week, about 1,000 U.S. troops fought Friday to reassert coalition control.

Fighting between insurgents and coalition forces was also reported in the northern cities of Mosul, Baqubah and Muqdadiya, as well as Karbala, the holy city where Shiite pilgrims have been gathering for a religious observance this weekend.

In Nasiriyah, about 200 miles southeast of Baghdad, fighting continued between Italian forces based on the south side of the city and Sadr's militiamen on the north side, across the Euphrates River. Explosions rang out across the city shortly after midnight as an Italian army brigade moved across the river. By Friday evening resistance was "minor and manageable," said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the coalition deputy for operations.

In Baghdad, explosions echoed across the city during the night after a day marked by several mortar strikes around the center of the capital. Shiites and Sunnis prayed together outside each other's shrines, and worshipers continued to donate tons of food for residents of Fallujah.

The Post and other media also report on the possible kidnapping of several persons by the insurgents, including possibly several Americans. Reports are still sketchy, but it looks like insurgents ambushed a fuel convoy and took several hostages in the process. CNN reports with some more fidelity on this developing situation, but it's still not clear what's going on.

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- An Australian television network broadcast footage on Saturday of armed militants in Iraq holding a man who appeared to be an American, as U.S. and coalition forces searched for foreign nationals who have been kidnapped or reported missing in recent days.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation showed a car stopping on a highway and masked, armed men getting out and asking journalists to look at a hostage, who was sitting in the back seat next to a gunman.

A journalist asked the man what happened and the man, white and middle-aged, replied in a slight Southern U.S. accent that "they attacked our convoy. That's all I'm going to say."

It is unclear if the man on the video is referring to an incident Friday when a fuel convoy was attacked near Baghdad International Airport.

* * *
The Pentagon said two U.S. soldiers and four civilian contractors -- some of them American -- are unaccounted for after a fuel convoy was attacked near Baghdad International Airport Friday. The four were from the same company.

Analysis: We need to be very careful about this risk, because American prisoners in Iraqi hands are a very powerful bargaining chip. The insurgents have likely seen the way we responded to the capture of American scouts in Kosovo, and the capture of American soldiers (including PFC Jessica Lynch) in Iraq. They know our creed of not leaving behind a fallen comrade, and the extent to which we will act to bring prisoners home alive. Thus, they may now have a strategy of opportunistic kidnapping. American soldiers -- and contractors -- must take additional measures to ensure they do not travel in small groups that make them vulnerable to kidnapping. We can't afford to give the insurgents these kinds of chips to play poker with.

How does this end? Some parts of Iraq remain in coalition control, and a lot of good nation-building work continues without interruption. But the situation in many parts of the country remains quite fluid -- and violent. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw painted a very realistic picture of what's going on, based on the information he's received through his government and ours:

"[T]here is no doubt that the current situation is very serious and it is the most serious that we have faced."

* * *
"It is plainly the fact today that there are larger numbers of people, and they are people on the ground, Iraqis, not foreign fighters, who are engaged in this insurgency," he said. "The lid of the pressure cooker has come off, and some of the tensions and pressures which were there and would have come out in any event have to a degree been directed toward the coalition."

How do you put the lid of the pressure cooker back on? The short answer is that you can't. If that's the right metaphor, and the lid has literally been blown off, then we must wait until things simmer down until we can restore peace and order in Iraq. Of course, we cannot (and should not) wait passively. American forces ought to hunt down and capture or kill as many insurgents as possible, because these people will come back to fight another day if we don't. But we should recognize the broad nature of this uprising and the extent to which disaffection and dissent permeate Iraqi society. And in the long term, we must figure out a way to allow this kind of dissent and to structure the Iraiq democracy so as to survive it -- and indeed, to incorporate this kind of dissent into Iraqi democracy through free speech, free elections, and other peaceful means.

Trust me -- I know this task is easier said than done. But no one said that nation-building was easy.

Update I: Check out the excellent analysis here, here and elsewhere at Back to Iraq, a weblog written by journalist Chris Allbritton (it's called that because he's trying to raise money through the 'blog to send himself back to Iraq.)
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:38

 
From the Intel Dump archives -- on the lethality of street fighting

As American forces closed to within striking distance of Baghdad last year, lots of people began to speculate on how the U.S. Army and Marines would take down Baghdad and deal with the urban fight. In the face of casualty estimates in the hundreds or thousands, some readers asked me to explain why urban combat was so bloody. This week, as combat operations in Fallujah and elsewhere have claimed the lives of more than 40 young Americans, I thought it might be useful to reprint the note I wrote on March 28, 2003.

Why is urban combat so bloody?

A number of readers have written in with questions about urban combat and the various forms it may take for the U.S.-led force in Iraq. I should state up front that I have no crystal ball; it's not clear how warfare will unfold in Iraq's major cities. However, there are some basic truths about urban combat which we've learned in places like Hue, Saigon, Mogadishu, and from other nations exploits in places like Chechnya. This is an illustrative list of some of the issues we may see if we take the fight into Iraq's cities.

1. Three-dimensional combat. It's commonly said that urban warfare takes place in three dimensions -- whereas surface warfare or desert warfare takes place in just two. That's because of the vertical dimension to streetfighting, where threats may come from above, below or to either side of you. This adds a great deal of complexity to the fight. This complexity generally aids the defender, since he's fighting on his home turf and has the ability to ensconce himself in buildings, sewers, and other places where he can fight from.

2. Cover and concealment. The U.S. has a major technological advantage on the open battlefield because it can see the enemy from a long distance away and shoot to kill that enemy -- either with artillery, tank fire, or even rifle fire. In urban combat, this advantage basically disappears. Enemy soldiers can hide in buildings with relative ease, and there still aren't a lot of technical means to find them. (Hard to see through buildings) One sniper can hole up in a large building and wreak havoc by shooting through windows, holes in the wall, and ventiliation shafts. In urban combat, the enemy has a million places to hide -- and it takes tedious, detailed work by infantry to root them out.

3. Civilians and paramilitaries. Distinguishing between civilians and soldiers in urban areas becomes a lot more complicated, because there are a lot more civilians and a great incentive for soldiers to blend into that population to avoid deliberate U.S. targeting. We've already seen a lot of unconventional warfare by the Iraqis, and it stands to reason that they would use it even more in an urban setting. American forces also found in Mogadishu that civilians often take up arms and fight as paramilitaries when fighting against an aggressor. If we don't do the Civil Affairs and humanitarian missions right, we may face intense resistance from Iraqi civilians with AK-47s fighting as paramilitaries and guerillas. That's pretty much our nightmare scenario. (See Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down for more on how this issue played out during the Battle of Bakara Market in October 1993)

4. Communications. America's military works on mostly FM-based communications systems which generally require line-of-sight transmission paths. The concrete, steel and glass in urban areas interferes with these commo systems and makes it hard for units to talk with one another beyond a few blocks. This is an acute problem at the lowest level -- the infantry squad -- where soldiers fight with battery-powered radios that may or may not be able to punch out of a concrete building.

5. Force structure. Since Vietnam, America's military has substituted capital more and more for manpower (in macroeconomics terms). The basic idea was to send a bullet (or bomb), not a man, whenever possible. We have poured money into cruise missiles, tanks, helicopters, ships, and aircraft that can hit a target from miles away without involving the muddy-boots work of the infantry. Unfortunately, urban combat requires a wholly different sort of force. As T. R. Fehrenbach wrote about the Korean War, this kind of war can only be won by nations that are willing to put their young men in the mud. Our military -- even with the reserves -- does not have a substantial amount of infantry. It has a high tail-to-tooth ratio, meaning that there are a lot more support troops than combat troops in the military. And of course, most are not infantrymen -- they include tankers, combat engineers, artillerymen, etc. One immutable truth of urban warfare is that it requires a lot of infantry.

Bottom Line: I can't predict what will happen in Baghdad or Basra. Our military has done a lot of homework in recent years to get better at urban combat, especially the U.S. Marine Corps and the Army's light infantry community. My hope is that we wait on the outskirts of the city and use unconventional means to draw out civilians and take down Saddam's regime. But as one famous general quipped, "Hope is not a method."

Update: Not much has changed since then about urban combat -- it remains a Hobbesian form of warfare where technological advantages are often offset by the complex terrain and presence of civilians. For more on this subject, see this story by ABC News; this newsletter on Urban Combat Operations from the Army's Center for Lessons Learned, this review of Russian military operations in Grozny, and this article in the Boston Phoenix on urban ops.
posted by Phillip Carter at 21:58

 
The problems with private military corporations
Most do good -- but lingering issues of control, accountability and propriety remain

Dana Priest (one of the best reporters at the Washington Post) and Mary Pat Flaherty have an article in this morning's Washington Post that ought to stir the pot about the wisdom of employing private military contractors to provide security and other functions in Iraq. My first reaction while reading the story was "WTF?" - a military acronym that is usually accompanied by raised eyebrows and a certain sense of incredulity. Basically, Ms. Priest and Ms. Flaherty tell a story of private armies coalescing in Iraq to meet the threat and fill a vacuum left by the U.S. military.

Under assault by insurgents and unable to rely on U.S. and coalition troops for intelligence or help under duress, private security firms in Iraq have begun to band together in the past 48 hours, organizing what may effectively be the largest private army in the world, with its own rescue teams and pooled, sensitive intelligence.

Many of the firms were hired by the U.S. government to protect its employees in Iraq. But because the contracts are managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the coordination between the CPA and the U.S. military is limited, and by their accounts inadequate, the contractors have no direct line to the armed forces. Most of the firms' employees are military veterans themselves, and they often depend on their network of colleagues still in uniform for coordination and intelligence.

"There is no formal arrangement for intelligence-sharing," Col. Jill Morgenthaler, a spokeswoman for the U.S. military command headquarters in Baghdad, said in an e-mail in response to questions. "However, ad hoc relationships are in place so that contractors can learn of dangerous areas or situations."

The demand for a private security force in Iraq has increased since the war ended, said officials with the CPA, the U.S.-led authority that is running the occupation of Iraq. There are about 20,000 private security contractors in Iraq now, including Americans, Iraqis and other foreigners. That number is expected to grow to 30,000 in the near future when the U.S. troop presence is drawn down after the June 30 handover to Iraqi authorities.

The presence of so many armed security contractors in a hot combat zone is unprecedented in U.S. history, according to government officials and industry experts.

Analysis: There are lots of issues in this story to parse, including many specific operational issues that have developed in the past few days. I'm going to take a swing at some of those issues, and offer some thoughts about why we should be concerned about the growing use of private military contractors (PMCs) in Iraq. Unfortunately, I'm writing something on this up tonight for publication and thus I can't share my thoughts right now. More to follow...

Update I: As promised, here is the article I was working on relating to problems with private military corporations. This article captures some of the legal issues associated with this practice, which has grown by leaps and bounds during the last two years of America's global war on terrorism.

Update II: In addition to these issues, there are some other non-legal issues worth considering in connection with PMCs. Here is a brief rundown of some of the issues I think deserve discussion:

- Intelligence and information security. The Post's article contains this very interesting description of the way that intelligence passes between military and PMC command centers:

Many of the firms were hired by the U.S. government to protect its employees in Iraq. But because the contracts are managed by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the coordination between the CPA and the U.S. military is limited, and by their accounts inadequate, the contractors have no direct line to the armed forces. Most of the firms' employees are military veterans themselves, and they often depend on their network of colleagues still in uniform for coordination and intelligence.

"There is no formal arrangement for intelligence-sharing," Col. Jill Morgenthaler, a spokeswoman for the U.S. military command headquarters in Baghdad, said in an e-mail in response to questions. "However, ad hoc relationships are in place so that contractors can learn of dangerous areas or situations."

* * *
"There is absolutely a growing cooperation along unofficial lines," Edmunds said. "We try to give each other warnings about things we hear are about to happen."

This is problematic for a few reasons. First, we should be wary of any ad hoc systems of intelligence that share classified information with non-governmental organizations. Yes, there's a threat, and yes, we have a vested interest in protecting contractors and NGOs. However, we also have an interesting in protecting classified information, especially to the extent that it reveals sources and methods of collection. Some of these contractors (e.g. Blackwater) clearly have experience with classified stuff, and they can probably be trusted to secure this information. But there is no way to control this stuff once it gets out into an ad hoc contractor network. Without appropriate control measures, this intelligence could reach the wrong people and do significant damage to the U.S. intelligence community.

- Military force structure and PMCs. The size of the U.S. military is capped by law in a number known as "end strength". This figure is stated in each year's National Defense Authorization Act, with a tiny bit of wiggle room for the services based on when and how this number is calculated. The Pentagon has not-too-secretly evaded this constraint since Sept. 11 by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of reservists to support the war on terrorism at home and abroad. The Pentagon currently has 174,378 reservists on active duty. The outsourcing of military functions (and support functions) to private military contractors represents another kind of end run around the end strength limitation. It allows the U.S. government to put more boots on the ground without paying for more military manpower, or the institutional overhead that goes along with each soldier.

- Constitutional issues of accountability and control.: The Constitution divides the war powers of the United States between the President and Congress, in a scheme that's supposed to provide for immediate reaction in case of an armed attack, as well as deliberate consideration of the decision to declare war by Congress. The use of private military contractors frustrates this carefully constructed balance of war powers by allowing the executive branch to evade various Congressional control mechanisms, from funding conditions to reporting requirements. In an age of global networked terrorism, the consequences of American foreign policy may well wash up on our shores and affect our population in deadly ways. Thus, we should be wary of any mechanisms which allow the executive branch to freelance an aspect of foreign policy or military action, without ensuring there are adequate controls in place to make sure the national interest is being upheld.

Update III: Also see this article by David Wood of the Newhouse News Service on the issues associated with the use of private military contractors. It even includes a reference to the "daily intel dump from the local military HQ."

Update IV: Josh Marshall has an interesting e-mail from a friend of his who's an ex-military intel guy working in Iraq for a private military contractor. The e-mail comments on the current situation and offers some analysis of moves by the CPA and CJTF leadership.
posted by Phillip Carter at 18:51

 
DoD investigators hit the body armor black market

Investigators from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service announced today that they had executed search warrants in seven states relating to a probe of black market sales of American military body armor. The alleged black marketeers were selling the body armor, and associated small-arms protective inserts, mostly to soldiers and civilians headed towards Iraq who were not receiving the gear from their units or employers.

DCIS agents, working with agents from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, launched a multi-state execution of search warrants in Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. There were 27 subject interviews conducted in various states and two arrests warrants were executed.

The investigative activities this week are the culmination of covert operation “High Bidder,” conducted by the DCIS since July 2003. This operation has identified individuals who have attempted to sell military issued outer tactical vests (OTVs) and/or small arm protective Inserts (SAPIs) over the Internet. To date, the operation has executed 30 search warrants and prosecuted seven individuals. Subjects included current and former military members and civilians. This investigation is ongoing.

posted by Phillip Carter at 14:24

 
"There's only one front, and that is the country of Iraq."

Those remarks came from Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the deputy director of operations for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, during a press conference today. BG Kimmitt was taking exception to reports in major newspapers such as the NYT and WP which portrayed the violence of the past few days as a two-front campaign by Sunni and Shiite Muslims respectively to eject American forces from Iraq. Here's the context of BG Kimmitt's statement:

Q. Thanks. Luke Baker from Reuters. General Kimmitt, you used the phrase "destroy the Mahdi Army" on several occasions. Can we interpret from that that this now is your biggest concern, bigger even than the insurgency you're facing? And how are you going about sort of adapting to fighting a war on two fronts?

GEN. KIMMITT: Well, first of all, we are not fighting a war on two fronts. There's only one front, and that is the country of Iraq. We are -- at this point, it would appear that -- in the Al Anbar province, working towards restoring civil order in Fallujah -- that program, that operation, is going quite well at this point, on schedule, on target.

With regards to the southern and the central portion of Iraq, as we continue to go against the Mahdi Army we're getting our foothold into this. We are now understanding more and more about the Mahdi Army -- how they operate, where they operate, against whom they operate.

So in terms of fighting two fronts, I think that is probably a misrepresentation. We've been fighting simultaneous operations in this country for quite a while, and we don't seem to -- have not encountered any problems continuing the operations up to this point.

Q. Just a very quick follow. Will you take on the Badr Brigade as well? Do you intend to disarm them?

GEN. KIMMITT: It is very simple with regards to militia. The policy is well known, the policy is well understood. Militias are outlawed in this country. Those militias that take to violence, they will become a target for the Iraqi security forces and the coalition.

Analysis: I think that BG Kimmitt is 100% correct. This is not a two-front battle. This has become a nationwide uprising that is quickly spiraling out of control. The picture painted by NYT, WP and LAT correspondents is one of an escalating situation in several different parts of the country, with several different insurgent elements at work behind these uprisings. The Coalition Provisional Authority may be able to isolate the al-Sadr uprising in Baghdad or the violence in Fallujah as the work of a few discrete groups. However, I do not think that it can apply the same box to the uprisings in Kut, Najaf, Karbala, Kufa and Kirkuk. The Post's report describes an Iraq on the brink of total civil war:

In Fallujah, an epicenter of the Sunni resistance, U.S. Marines attempting to root out insurgents pushed toward the center of the city, drawing heavy rifle and grenade fire. After a contingent of Marines was attacked by gunmen hiding in a mosque, a U.S. jet and a helicopter took the unusual step of bombing the compound's outer wall. Witnesses told Arab journalists in the city that as many as 40 people were killed in the bombing, although the U.S. military said it had no reports of civilian casualties.

In central and southern Iraq, fighters loyal to Moqtada Sadr, a Shiite cleric who vowed Wednesday to turn Iraq into "another Vietnam for America," tightened their grip on the holy cities of Karbala, Kufa and Najaf. Members of the Mahdi Army, a militia loyal to Sadr, seized control of Kut, a city to the southeast of Baghdad, when Ukrainian troops withdrew after an overnight gun battle.

The U.S. military's director of operations in Iraq, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, said American troops would "destroy the Mahdi Army."

The unrest also spread to northern Iraq for the first time as U.S. troops in Hawijah, near Kirkuk, fired on an angry mob protesting American tactics in Fallujah, killing eight Iraqis. Although Baghdad's Sadr City slum, the site of bloody clashes earlier in the week, was largely calm, violence erupted in other parts of the capital. Shortly after nightfall, gunmen opened fire on a U.S. base in Baghdad's Shiite enclave of Kadhimiya and on another in the Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya.

We ought not minimize the threat from this uprising, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is doing with the news about the current fighting in Iraq.

The recent surge in violence has involved both a rise in attacks by Sunni insurgents and a new militant campaign by Shiite forces loyal to cleric Moqtada Sadr. At a Pentagon news conference, Rumsfeld and Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disputed characterizations of the violence as a popular uprising. They said battles have involved relatively small numbers of militants, estimating the size of Sadr's militia at 1,000 to 6,000 fighters.

"There's nothing like an army or large elements of hundreds of people trying to change the situation," Rumsfeld said. "You have a mixture of a small number of terrorists, a small number of militias, coupled with some demonstrations and some lawlessness."

I respectfully disagree. This is the most intense combat that American forces have seen since the war, and in many respects, it is more intense than the combat seen by American forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The casualty reports support this argument. The most intense fighting of the war occurred in two places: Nasariyah, where the Army's 507th Maintenance Company was ambushed and 18 Marines were killed in one day; and Baghdad, during the final assault on the city by the 3rd Infantry Division and the Marines. Those engagements included thousands more troops than the battles being fought right now, and yet the casualty numbers were lower than they are today. Moreover, U.S. troops did not engage in this kind of bloody streetfighting during the war -- they simply backed off and used standoff firepower to respond to dug-in threats. The need to minimize collateral damage and win decisively has meant the increased use of infantry to do the job this time, and the result has been more American casualties.

We also should not minimize the threat this poses to the long-term goals and objectives of the U.S. and Coalition Provisional Authority. The Pentagon has responded by tweaking its force rotation plan to keep more boots on the ground in Iraq. And The Post also reports that the U.S. has asked more than 12 nations to contribute forces to protect the U.N.'s mission in Iraq. Yet despite those measures, I think this uprising has the potential to do several things. First, it can (and probably will) derail the U.S. plan to transfer sovereignty on 30 Jun 04. Second, it can and probably will require elections to be postponed, because it's hard to see how any meaningful democratic elections can take place amidst this violence. Third, this violence will certainly delay any U.S. exit from Iraq, and require us to keep large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq for the duration of 2005 and possibly 2006. Army planners are already working on the contingency plans for that eventuality.

How does this end? I don't know. At this point, I'm not even sure how we define victory or success in Iraq, and how we conceive of an exit that will allow us to achieve that victory without seeing it vanish 6 months later in a bloody civil war. This is an issue that absolutely must become part of the 2004 presidential election debate -- how do we win in Iraq, and how do we get out?

Update I: John Hendren, an LA Times reporter who's spent a lot of time in Iraq during the past year, has a story in tomorrow's paper that's aptly headlined "Uprising Could Signal a Second War for Iraq". I think his analysis is right on target. Clinton National Security Adviser Sandy Berger has the most telling quote of the story: "We're at a tipping point in Iraq, with a real danger of losing control of the situation."

Update II: For a more optimistic analysis of the situation, see this column by Austin Bay over at StrategyPage.Com.

Update III: Word reached the soldiers in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division yesterday that their tour in Iraq would be extended by four months in order to bolster the U.S. force in Iraq. 1AD has primarily operated in Baghdad, where part of the current uprising is rooted, and its soldiers have seen both the highs and lows of the counter-insurgency effort in Iraq. I can only imagine what this order must've done to soldier morale in 1AD. However, I think this was a good decision, because having more troops on the ground will make it easier to mass combat power against the insurgents, and that will ultimately result in less U.S. casualties and a greater likelihood of mission accomplishment.

Update IV: Notwithstanding the orders received on the ground by 1AD (see Update III above), the Los Angeles Times reports that the Pentagon is still thinking about how it will bolster the U.S. force on the ground in Iraq.

[CENTCOM Commander Gen. John] Abizaid, who is directing the war in Iraq, ordered commanders this week to craft plans in case conditions worsened and he called for more troops. As of Wednesday, he had not made that request of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said.

There are now 135,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, 20,000 more than called for under the current Pentagon plan because new units have arrived before those they are replacing have left.

But some soldiers who planned to depart soon have been ordered to remain on duty, Di Rita said. "At this moment, they're being used in combat activities," he said.

Asked if their yearlong tours of duty had been extended, he said, "Not yet."

posted by Phillip Carter at 21:07

 
Overtaken by events
I was completely wrong about the U.S. response in Fallujah

In this Findlaw.Com and CNN.Com column, I argue that the U.S. will likely take a deliberate and cautious approach to quelling the violence in Fallujah. Additionally, I argue that the U.S. is likely to follow the international law norms of necessity, proportionality and distinction because it's in the U.S. interest to do so.

In Fallujah, commanders are likely to err on the side of proportionality for at least two reasons. First, the world will be watching the American response, and it will judge the justness of America's continued occupation by the judiciousness of our force.

Second, the use of force will have an effect on the Iraqi mob responsible for the incident. Too much force could provoke a backlash and foment a new Iraqi insurgency; too little force could show weakness and also provoke more insurgent activity. Obviously, these two considerations counsel taking some middle path among the options.

Ultimately, American commanders will likely choose a path in Fallujah which conforms with necessity, proportionality and distinction not only because the law requires, but also (or, from a more cynical point of view, primarily) because it's in our interest to do so. Such a middle path will likely include increased patrols of the city, searches of suspected insurgent homes and weapons cache sites, checkpoints to limit the flow of people and materiel into the city, and curfews to control the population at night. The U.S. response will likely not include massive air or artillery bombardment, such as that employed during World War II or more recently by the Russians in Chechnya.

Historically, nations have always tended to follow the laws of war when it was in their interest to do so, and Fallujah presents another case of where American operational interests and legal imperatives converge.

Thus, American forces will likely respond in Fallujah with measured, precise force against those who can be proven to be responsible -- and no one else. Such a response will both comply with the laws of war, and help to win the hearts and minds of the many Iraqi citizens who weren't part of the mob.

Uh, waiter... one large order of crow please? I did a fair amount of research over the weekend and contacted several smart folks to see if this was a good argument before filing my story. However, events in Iraq have subsequently proved my predictions wrong, and thus I feel obliged to take some responsibility. I still think my legal analysis of the contractors' status in Fallujah was accurate, along with the points about which Iraqi and international laws apply to the killings of the Blackwater employees last week. However, my ultimate argument and conclusion has been overtaken by events and proven wrong. Of course, this is a risk whenever you go out on a limb and try to predict the future. And as we used to say in the Army, "the enemy gets a vote too". Even if the U.S. plan was to go into Fallujah with judicious force, that plan did not survive first contact with the enemy.
posted by Phillip Carter at 21:01

 
DoD lawyer files suit to challenge tribunals

Neil Lewis reports in tomorrow's NY Times that one of the JAG officers assigned to defend a Gitmo detainee has filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the Constitutionality of the military tribunal order under which his client will be tried. The NYT story is essentially a follow-up to this report by Jess Bravin in Wednesday's Wall Street Journal. (subscription required) (Thanks to How Appealing for the heads up, which also provides a link to the complaint filed in this case. How Appealing really is better and faster than the AP for legal news.)

The suit asserts that Mr. Hamdan, a Yemeni, was never involved with Al Qaeda or with any military action against American forces in Afghanistan. He is described as a Muslim pilgrim who went to Afghanistan on the way to Tajikistan. Failing to get there, the papers say, he took a job as a driver on Osama bin Laden's Afgan farm and later became a driver for Mr. bin Laden himself.

The tribunal system set up by the administration does not provide for review in any civilian courts. Appeals may be taken only up the military chain of command.

The new suit, before Judge Robert S. Lasnik, asserts that the Constitution guarantees civilian court review of the military justice system. Military officials have contended that the prisoners are unlawful enemy combatants and as such are not entitled to the protections of American law or international treaties.

Analysis: This is a great case of zealous advocacy by a military lawyer. The Secretary of Defense and his staff support the tribunals, and this officer's chain of command runs straight to the SecDef. Yet, he's willing to set aside pure careerism in order to challenge the validity of the White House's tribunal order in federal civilian court. Of course, it can be argued that he may be enhancing his career by taking such a zealous stand. You see, JAG officers may ultimately work for the SecDef, but their respective services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) control their careers and promotions for the most part. The service JAGs don't really like the tribunals, so he's likely to be taken care of by his own service chain of command. Nonetheless, I still think it takes major league cojones (or chutzpah) to fire a direct shot like this at the SecDef. You don't see that many military officers, regardless of the rightness of their views, willing to fight publicly with the Pentagon like this.

The cynical side of me wants to say that the SecDef and his staff planned this all along -- that they want zealous JAG officers to fight the tribunals in court because it will lend the tribunals a veneer of legitimacy and respectability. Perhaps. But what's the practical difference between allowing such dissent for spin purposes, and actually establishing a process which includes some modicum of fairness and due process. At some point, the lines become blurred. And at the end of the day, I'm pretty confident that these JAGs will execute their professional duties by fighting for their clients to the best of their ability.
posted by Phillip Carter at 20:37

 
Pledge break: Thanks to everyone who has graciously supported this site so far. I'm happy to report that I have raised enough money to purchase my new domain (www.intel-dump.com), the new software I'll need, and the server space/bandwidth necessary to run a professional weblog. I will likely transition this site in early May after I finish finals and before I start my bar study course.

However, I am still trying to raise more money for the other costs of running Intel Dump. Subscribing to several different publications costs money, and spending 3-4 hours/day on this site takes away from the time I'm able to devote to other freelance writing projects (which pay). Also, I'm trying to replace my aging laptop so that I can keep up the site, and every little donation helps me towards that end. My long-term project is to finance a reporting trip to Iraq, as a combination of donations and support from one of the magazines that I freelance for. Josh Marshall was able to raise a few thousand dollars to help him cover the New Hampshire primary, and while I have nothing close to his readership, I'd like to raise part of that by the end of the summer to subsidize this trip (if possible).

So, I'll make the same pitch I've made before. If you value this site like a daily newspaper, please consider making a donation of $1 (or more if you read it more than once). If you think this site is as valuable as a magazine you might buy, please consider donating $5. If Intel Dump is more like a magazine subscription, please consider giving $25 or $30. I appreciate your continued generosity, and will do my best to return your investment with informed analysis over the coming weeks and months. Thanks.
posted by Phillip Carter at 20:25

 
On the offensive in Fallujah
Violence spreads; casualties mount on both sides -- how does this end?

On Apr. 5, Tony Perry (who's embedded with the 1st Marine Division) and Edmund Sanders of the L.A. Times reported that the Marines kicked off their offensive to retake Fallujah and establish U.S./CPA rule over the lawless city where four contractors were brutally slain last week. Perry was embedded with the Marines from Camp Pendleton during the invasion of Iraq last year, and his reporting has generally been some of the best from Iraq. Here's how he described the start of the offensive:

All roads leading to this city of 300,000 were cut off and barricaded with tanks and concertina wire. Working through the cold and windy desert night, Marines set up camps for detainees and residents who might flee.

Before dawn, several Marine positions on the fringes of town were hit by mortar rounds and rocket-propelled grenade fire; one Marine was reported killed.

The Marines called in air support to take out some enemy positions and said in some cases the attackers were working in groups as large as 12.

Witnesses reported gunfire overnight and said at least four homes had been hit by U.S. aerial strikes.

At daylight, Marines in armored Humvees began distributing leaflets asking residents to stay in their homes and help identify insurgents and those responsible for last week's killings. They also took over the local radio station and used bullhorns to get the message out.

* * *
Marines said they had no plans to conduct random door-to-door searches; they intended to work from a list of addresses where intelligence suggested suspects might be hiding and weapons might be stored.

"Everyone's in position; now we'll see it develop," Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, commanding officer of the 1st Marine Division, said shortly after 10 a.m. today.

And develop it has -- but not in a good way for American forces. Tony Perry reports today how the Fallujah mission turned into a bloody street fight that has claimed dozens of Iraqi and possibly more than a dozen U.S. lives.

Insurgents, meanwhile, were demonstrating a resolve of their own.

When Marines entered the neighborhood in tanks and helicopters, insurgents held their positions and fired back with rifles, mortars and small arms.

Residents reported that insurgent cells, which had been lying low in recent days, had a higher profile Tuesday, openly carrying weapons and positioning grenade launchers in the middle of the streets. One carload of Iraqis was captured while attempting to plant homemade bombs in the road.

"We will continue to resist them," said Abu Khamis Khulaifawi, who described himself as part of the insurgency in Fallouja. "We have enough mortars, enough rocket-propelled grenades and enough light arms."

Insurgents also appeared to have a strategy to defend the city.

They have blocked streets with buses and other vehicles in an attempt to divert military vehicles and have used an antiaircraft gun ? later destroyed ? to try to shoot down helicopters. One copter was hit by small-arms fire but not seriously damaged. The insurgents are using buses to transport fighters around the city and have darted in with cars to retrieve their dead after battles.

That's a big change from the kind of "hit and run" tactics the Iraqis have demonstrated to date. Even during the war, it was rare that Iraqis or their out-of-country compatriots would stand and fight against U.S. forces. The result is that U.S. forces have to now painstakingly clear each piece of terrain they want to hold -- a very tough and bloody process in the 3-dimensional urban battlefield. Pamela Constable, a Washington Post reporter embedded with the 1st Marine Division, adds this report today on the fierce combat in Fallujah:

Officials said Marine units in Fallujah encountered well-armed and well-orchestrated resistance by local guerrillas. Snipers fired repeatedly at patrols from rooftops and windows, and others lobbed mortars and rockets at military convoys and bunkers dug around the perimeter of the city, 35 miles west of Baghdad.

"As soon as we pulled up, they started shooting at us," said Lance Cpl. Jamil Alkattan, 23, whose unit entered the city at 2 a.m. Monday. "There were mortars, rockets and bullets flying everywhere. They were definitely waiting for us. It seemed like everyone in the city who had a gun was out there."

* * *
One company commander said that as his squads moved through residential areas, they were fired on from inside a mosque, and snipers took potshots at them from numerous hiding places. Many enemy fighters wore black clothing and had scarves wrapped around their faces.

"As soon as we crossed the line, there was a huge change in tone in the people, a real uneasy feeling," the commander said at an early evening briefing. "Little kids made roadblocks."

That's the picture in Fallujah so far -- a bloody street battle that is far from over. The AP and Washington Post report this morning that it has escalated even further, with a U.S. helicopter firing missiles into a mosque complex, killing 40 or more. In Ramadi, an Iraqi insurgent raid killed 12 Marines and wounded as many as 20. Those numbers make that one incident the most bloody battle of the war so far, with the exception of one day at Nasiryah where 18 Marines died (10 due to a errant U.S. airstrike). And the New York Times reports that Sunni and Shiite Muslim elements around the country have begun to rise up in armed opposition to the U.S. and coalition forces, with violence spreading to at least 4 other cities besides Ramadi and Fallujah.

Mr. Sadr, whose followers on Sunday began the most serious insurrection of the postinvasion period, said, "I will put the city with the golden dish between Ali Sistani's hands after liberation."

The golden dish refers to the golden shrines of Najaf, some of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. Najaf, south of Baghdad, is the home of Ayatollah Sistani, who is considered much more moderate than Mr. Sadr. On Sunday, Ayatollah Sistani issued a religious decree urging Iraq's Shiites to stay calm.

So far, though, followers of Mr. Sadr have not been heeding it. His black-clad militiamen have rolled over Iraqi security forces in a number of cities, including Kufa, Najaf, Nasiriya, Basra and Baghdad, and taken over government offices.

The string of successes seems to inflate Mr. Sadr's popularity and draw more recruits to his Mahdi Army , a private militia that attracts both idle youth and adults with jobs. In some cities, like Kufa, his followers have completely replaced police and security forces, essentially establishing an occupation-free zone and patrolling towns in blue and white government cars that just days ago were driven by the newly formed Iraqi security forces.

Mr. Sadr has moved from a mosque in Kufa, where he was holed up Monday, to his main office in Najaf, in an alley near the city's holiest shrine. Hundreds of militiamen were protecting the office. On Tuesday night, military flares could be seen burning over the area.

Analysis: The unbelievably rapid escalation of violence in Iraq leads me to ask the same question that MG Petraeus asked historian Rick Atkinson during the war: "how does this end?" MG Petraeus is a pretty smart guy, and he might have had an inkling during the war of the latent insurgency brewing in Iraq. There has been a qualitative and quantitative paradigm shift in that insurgency during the last week. Put simply, major combat operations have resumed in certain parts of the country. The threat has taken the initiative and launched a coordinated campaign of urban violence aimed at several key operational and strategic goals:
(1) Destroying the developing bonds between the U.S./CPA and the Iraqi people;
(2) Inflicting sufficient casualties on the U.S. -- military and civilian contractors -- in order to reduce support for the war at home and hasten the exit of U.S. forces;
(3) Rally jihadists around the world to the cause of the Muslim insurgents fighting an invasion of Western infidels;
(4) Demonstrate the capability of the Iraqi insurgents to resist both U.S. and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps assaults, with the idea that success in the near term (even with heavy casualties) will make the U.S. look weak and inspire more Iraqis to resist.
(5) Escalate the level of violence to the point where international reinforcements and U.N. involvement becomes unlikely;

The key qualitative change in this insurgency has been the addition of a virulent Islamist ideology from Moktada al-Sadr. Before being shut down, his newspaper called for this kind of violent action; his preachings have given the Iraqis a new cause to fight for -- a new reason to stand and fight. CPA officials have issued a warrant for his arrest, with the approval of an Iraqi judge, but that has only enhanced the moral standing of al-Sadr with his backers. It's hard to see how this will end, short of absolute U.S. dominance on the battlefield and the eradication of this insurgency -- jihadist by jihadist, block by block, city by city.

In response to the escalating violence in Iraq, U.S. officials hinted earlier in the week that they would reconsider the troop levels in Iraq. The current rotation of U.S. troops was previously planned to result in a net decrease of 20,000-40,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. However, there have been indications that this plan has changed, and that more troops may even deploy to Iraq in the near future to help fight this insurgency. USA Today confirmed that report, adding that the rotation of troops would be delayed to keep as many as 24,000 troops in theater beyond their projected departure date.

Will that be enough? What will it take to defeat the Iraqis? It's still too early to tell. It's hard to estimate the aggregate size of this insurgency from the disjointed reports filed in the major papers, but it looks to me like U.S. forces are facing an enemy in the hundreds or low thousands -- at the most. If that's true, and the U.S. is able to concentrate its combat power, there may be enough boots on the ground now to win this thing. That may require the U.S. to shift its forces away from other cities and missions to this one, which may incur some operational risk of insurgencies in those cities. The situation is still very fluid, and it's hard to tell whether the U.S. concept of the operation will be successful. My gut tells me that U.S. commanders will not simply throw more combat power at the problem if that results in diminishing returns; we will instead try to find the enemy's center of gravity and focus on that. But I think this is a long way from being over, in any sense of the word.

More to follow...

Update I: Noah Shachtman has some interesting stuff (here and here) on this over at DefenseTech, partly based on his reporting about urban warfare technologies.

Update II: Josh Marshall passes on an e-mail from a private security consultant in Iraq about the situation on the ground there, as of about 48 hours ago.

Hey Josh ... thanks for the concern . I wrote the other day but power went out. This place is HOT! I am driving with max Iraqi bodyguards (whom I have just finished training), max weapons and max bodyarmor. WHAT WERE THEY THINKING with this Moqtada Sadr thing? Were they just bored with Fallujah. The place is a hornets nest now. Armor is all over the streets but doesn't seem to have disrupted most city life ... I told [a reporter] two weeks ago we were "one massacre away from the second Intifada of Iraq." Well I think we are there now.

I'm not yet ready to say that this is the second Intifada of Iraq. But this violence has the potential to escalate to that point, particularly if it spreads any more than it already has. Unfortunately, the thing that we need the most right now is more boots on the ground -- preferably from other countries and the U.N. However, the current violence makes that all but impossible, since few countries want to send their troops to Iraq to keep the peace, let alone conduct counter-insurgency operations. The insurgents know that.

Update III: Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor who's an expert on Iraq, has some well informed comments over at his site.

Update IV: The casualties have started to filter through the Pentagon's casualty notification system, and we now have public releases giving the names and hometowns of the men who have given their lives during the latest wave of violence in Iraq. A quick survey of the Defense Department press release repository at 8:30 Pacific time on 7 April indicates that 12 of the last 15 press releases from the Pentagon have been casualty announcements. This is the bloodiest combat since the war, and in terms of intensity, probably tougher than anything except for specific fights in Baghdad, Nasariyah and Najaf during the war.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:04

 
TSA to start a preferred traveler program: Wednesday's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) reports that the Transportation Security Administration will soon have a program wherein you can go through a background check in order to be spared the hassle of a secondary screening the airport. The program will be launched first with a pilot program, and there are no details yet about how or where to apply for this program.

I'll be interested to see how this thing gets rolled out, and how the civil liberties and civil rights crowd criticizes this program. My guess is that their criticisms will fall into two categories: (1) the willingness of some Americans to play sheep to the Orwellian government shepherd, and (2) the inherent problems of giving preferential treatment to any class of persons. I predict there will be some practical problems with this too. But in the future, I also think that we all may be subject to these kinds of background checks if we want to fly, and this may be the first step down that slippery slope. More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 21:29

 
Wars on drugs; wars on terrorism: Mark Kleiman, who is one of the nation's experts on drug enforcement policy, completed a study of the connections between terrorism and illicit drug trafficking titled "RL 32334: Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat" which has just been released by the Congressional Research Service. I haven't had time to read the study yet, but if it's anything like his book Against Excess, it'll probably be quite good.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:51

 
Army units hit reenlistment targets
Numbers may contradict dire predictions of personnel exodus

I missed this story last week because of my travel schedule, but the Washington Times reported on a pretty big development in the Army personnel world. The five Army divisions (3ID, 101ID, 82ID, 4ID and 1AD) that fought in Iraq or served in the post-war force have met (or nearly met) their retention goals for the period of their deployment, and/or the initial period since their redeployment. This is big news, because many people predicted an exodus of soldiers once their enlistment contract was up, due to family and personal pressures related to the high Iraq-related operational tempo.

The Pentagon has been closely monitoring the re-up rate for five Army divisions that fought in Iraq for about a year. Some officials feared the time away from home and the gritty duty would prompt a large soldier exodus. After all, the war on terrorism is unchartered territory. The 30-year-old volunteer Army has never been this busy in combat.

But numbers compiled this week for the first half of fiscal 2004 show that those five combat units met, or nearly met, all retention targets for enlisted soldiers ? the privates, corporals and sergeants who total 416,000 of the Army's 490,000 active force.

"This tends to rebut armchair critics who said the sky is falling and the vultures are circling and the Army is gong to lose all its troops," said Lt. Col. Franklin Childress, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon. "This is not true. The soldiers get it."

The Army also met its recruiting goal of 73,800 inductees last fiscal year, and 34,000 for the first six months of this fiscal year, which began Oct. 1.

"Soldiers are extremely resilient," said Col. Elton Manske, chief of the enlisted division at Army headquarters in the Pentagon. "There is absolutely no sign of a 'hollow Army.' Soldiers are continuing to re-enlist at least at historic rates."

* * *
Officials attribute the soldiers' recent votes of confidence to love of job, patriotism and cash. The Army in December created a new, $68 million pot that paid soldiers up to $10,000 to re-enlist and stay in their current unit for 12 months.

Analysis: I'm very glad to see that my predictions of a personnel crisis have not come true, or at least, that Army officials have mitigated that risk by throwing cash and other incentives at the problem. I also agree with the senior officers and NCOs who say that the force left behind by those who get out will be a solid, experienced force. The combat experience of today's Army is higher than anytime since Vietnam, and that greatly adds to the lethality and effectiveness of American combat units. Even if the force loses 30%-40% of its soldiers with combat patches, it will still retain a solid base of experience in the ranks. And those who stay do so knowing the risks of future deployment.

However, these numbers may be deceptive. While they were deployed to Iraq, the soldiers in these units were subject to stop-loss/move orders. Thus, they did not have the choice between reenlisting and coming home right away. Rather, their choice was between reenlisting and getting out immediately after their redeployment, without sufficient time to arrange a transition to the civilian world. From a rational actor's point of view, it makes sense that these soldiers would reenlist while deployed, especially if their reenlistment carried a sizable cash bonus that was tax-free while given in a combat zone. Second, the numbers for the reserve units deployed to Iraq may tell a different story, and I would like to see those numbers before forming a conclusion about this war's effect on the Army's soldiers. At least two surveys I've seen indicate that reservists have substantially (and statistically significantly) lower levels of morale than their active-duty counterparts, and that they indicate a broad desire to leave the service after this deployment. Even if the Army throws money and benefits at reservists, I'm not sure it can stop these people from getting out. We'll see.

More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:22

 
Civilian contractors engage the enemy in Najaf

The Washington Post reports this morning that a team of ex-special ops guys from Blackwater Consulting came to the rescue of the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Najaf Sunday, fighting off a determined Iraqi attack. A small contingent of U.S. soldiers and Marines were present too, but the Blackwater team was able to save the day by deploying a lethal combination of firepower -- and even its own helicopter.

Before U.S. reinforcements could arrive, the firm, Blackwater Security Consulting, sent in its own helicopters amid an intense firefight to resupply its commandos with ammunition and to ferry out a wounded Marine, the sources said.

The role of Blackwater's commandos in Sunday's fighting in Najaf illuminates the gray zone between their formal role as bodyguards and the realities of operating in an active war zone. Thousands of armed private security contractors are operating in Iraq in a wide variety of missions and exchanging fire with Iraqis every day, according to informal after-action reports from several companies.

In Sunday's fighting, Shiite militia forces barraged the Blackwater commandos, four MPs and a Marine gunner with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 fire for hours before U.S. Special Forces troops arrived. A sniper on a nearby roof apparently wounded three men. U.S. troops faced heavy fighting in several Iraqi cities that day.

The Blackwater commandos, most of whom are former Special Forces troops, are on contract to provide security for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Najaf.

* * *
A spokesman for Blackwater confirmed that the company has a contract to provide security to the CPA but would not describe the incident that unfolded Sunday.

A Defense Department spokesman said that there were no military reports about the opening hours of the siege on CPA headquarters in Najaf because there were no military personnel on the scene. The Defense Department often does not have a clear handle on the daily actions of security contractors because the contractors work directly for the coalition authority, which coordinates and communicates on a limited basis through the normal military chain of command.

Analysis: Whoa... so these guys work for the U.S. government, but not for the CPA and CJTF chain of command? That's not just odd, that's dangerous. Even if the Blackwater guys are the best in the world, I'm a little reticent to support the idea of armed contractors running around on their own without command, control and coordination with American and allied units on the ground. It worked this time, but it seems like a fratricide formula in the future.

Moreover, there is a certain "WTF" factor here, to quote a friend of mine. What are these contractors doing that they have this much firepower, and a friggin' helicopter of their own? And what kind of command system does CPA and CJTF have that they had zero visibility of this incident until presumably the Washington Post reported on it? Blackwater's employees exhibited a great degree of heroism on Sunday in Najaf, and they should be commended for their initiative and personal courage. However, it may be wise to reconsider the system of command and control that lets these guys run around Iraq with this much firepower and no accountability to U.S. government agencies.

Suffice to say, actions like this clearly support my argument that the Blackwater contractors in Fallujah were not entitled to protection as non-combatants under the 4th Geneva Convention. And unfortunately, because they fight outside the U.S. command structure, don't wear uniforms, and don't always carry their arms openly, they're likely not combatants under the 3rd Geneva Convention either. Thus, they fall in the gray area between the two categories. Ironically, the unlawful combatants we have detained at Gitmo fall into the same gray area. I don't think it's necessarily the best idea to contract out combat functions like these to private military contractors, and I think we're assuming a great deal of risk because of the legal issues in play.

Update: Mark Kleiman has some good thoughts on this too. I'm not ready to call these guys mercenaries, because I think there's a line between domestic PMCs and mercenaries or hired guns. Darren Kaplan agrees with me that these guys aren't mercenaries, and cites to Art. 47 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (not adopted by the U.S.) to support his contention.
posted by Phillip Carter at 08:27

 
Leading Marines in the fog of war

Christopher Cooper has an exceptional article on the front page of today's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) on the events surrounding the battlefield relief of USMC Col. Joe Dowdy, who commanded the First Marine Regiment during much of its march to Baghdad. The incident, in which Maj. Gen. James Mattis relieved Col. Dowdy of command, is surely to become a case study for officers and historians seeking insight into the art and science of battle command. Here's a short excerpt from the story:

Assuming a battlefield command is the pinnacle of a Marine's career. Being removed is near the nadir, exceeded only by a court martial. It's extremely rare for the modern U.S. military to relieve a top commander of duty, especially during combat. Col. Dowdy, 47 years old, was the only senior officer in any of the military services to be dismissed in Iraq. He says he would rather have taken an enemy bullet.

Col. Dowdy's firing was even more unusual because he didn't commit any of the acts that normally precipitate a dismissal: failing to complete a mission, disobeying a direct order, breaking the rules of war. "It was a decision based on operating tempo," says Lt. Eric Knapp, a spokesman for the First Marine Division. He wouldn't elaborate.

The colonel's removal sparked media coverage and intense speculation in the Marine Corps. The reasons for his firing weren't clear, mainly because the colonel and his superiors refused to talk about it. Now, interviews with Col. Dowdy and a score of officers and enlisted men show the colonel was doomed partly by an age-old wartime tension: Men versus mission -- in which he favored his men.

Gen. Mattis and Col. Dowdy personify all that is celebrated in Marine Corps culture. Gen. Mattis, 53, is a "warrior monk," as some of his men put it, a lifelong bachelor consumed with the study and practice of battle tactics. Col. Dowdy is beloved for the attention he pays to his men, from the grunts on up.

The qualities of these two Marines eventually tore them apart. Gen. Mattis, a Marine for 33 years, saw speed as paramount in the Iraq war plan. Col. Dowdy thought sacrificing everything for speed imperiled the welfare of his men.

The dispute was stoked by widespread but mistaken assumptions about how the Iraqis would fight. The desire for speed stemmed from the Pentagon's expectation of a fierce, protracted battle in Baghdad, with far less resistance in other areas. But it turned out that Baghdad fell easily, while the countryside continued to seethe with resistance.

Today, as U.S. forces tangle with an enemy they clearly underestimated, the military still is debating whether speeding to the Iraqi capital was the best way to proceed.

Analysis: The article does a great job of laying out the facts of the Marines' advance towards Baghdad, and describing the tension between the imperative to move quickly and the desire to conserve combat power and minimize U.S. casualties. In an industrial conscription-based force, the problem is easily solved -- simply throw men into the crucible without regard for numbers or losses. But with the advent of the professional force and America's all-volunteer military, this calculus has changed. Contemporary U.S. commanders are extraordinarily careful when it comes to spending the lives of their soldiers and Marines, and with good reason. Nonetheless, the mission must be accomplished, and it is a very difficult task to balance mission accomplishment against troop welfare. Part of it is art; part is science -- a lot is luck.

American military history is replete with examples of commanders who were relieved -- and commanders who were left in place too long before they were relieved. Last month, I finished reading Rick Atkinson's Pulitzer Prize-winning book An Army at Dawn, in which he describes the fitful way that the America's Army learned to fight in North Africa. Suffice to say, too many colonels and generals kept their jobs for too long in that conflict.

The jury's still out on Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the actions of the generals who fought the initial campaign from Kuwait to Baghdad. I don't feel remotely qualified to judge the relief of Col. Dowdy, or judge the decision of Maj. Gen. Mattis. Ultimately, the Marines accomplished their mission -- either because of or in spite of this command decision by Maj. Gen. Mattis. You'll have to judge that one for yourself.
posted by Phillip Carter at 14:59

 
CONGRATULATIONS!!! The Los Angeles Times was recognized with five Pulitzer Prizes today for its journalism in 2003, including the national reporting prize a series on Wal-Mart's role and globalization and the local breaking news award for the paper's coverage of last fall's devastating wildfires. A full list of Pulitzer winners is available at the organization's website.
posted by Phillip Carter at 13:03

 
Mayhem in Fallujah: I have an article today in Findlaw.Com's Writ analyzing some of the legal issues surrounding last week's ambush in Fallujah, including the legal status of the American contractors and the legal principles which will govern the U.S. response. The piece was also picked up by CNN.Com. I welcome your feedback and criticism.

Also (or instead of) my piece, check out this outstanding essay from Mark Bowden which appeared today on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. (It's also available on their free site, OpinionJournal.Com.) Mr. Bowden is uniquely qualified to comment on the anarchy in Fallujah, based on his reporting on the anarchy in Mogadishu that led to the book and movie Black Hawk Down. Among other things, Mr. Bowden argues that America cannot back down in the face of this savagery:

It is a mistake to conclude that those committing such acts represent a majority of the community. Just the opposite is true. Lynching is most often an effort to frighten and sway a more sensible, decent mainstream. In Marion it was the Ku Klux Klan, in Mogadishu it was Aidid loyalists, in Fallujah it is either diehard Saddamites or Islamo-fascists.

The worst answer the U.S. can make to such a message -- which is precisely what we did in Mogadishu -- is back down. By most indications, Aidid's supporters were decimated and demoralized the day after the Battle of Mogadishu. Some, appalled by the indecency of their countrymen, were certain the U.S. would violently respond to such an insult and challenge. They contacted U.N. authorities offering to negotiate, or simply packed their things and fled. These are the ones who miscalculated. Instead the U.S. did nothing, effectively abandoning the field to Aidid and his henchmen. Somalia today remains a nation struggling in anarchy, and the America-haters around the world learned what they thought was a essential truth about the United States: Kill a few Americans and the most powerful nation on Earth will run away. This, in a nutshell, is the strategy of Osama bin Laden.

Many Americans despise the effort under way in Iraq. They opposed overthrowing Saddam Hussein by force, and disbelieved the rationale offered by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair. There may well be a heavy political price to pay for the mistakes and exaggerations; President Bush faces a referendum in just seven months. But however that election turns out, and however imperfectly we have arrived at this point, the facts on the ground in Iraq remain. Saddam is gone and Iraq, thanks to U.S. intervention, is struggling toward a new kind of future. Its successful transformation into a peaceful, democratic state is in everyone's interest except Saddam's extended family and the Islamo-fascists. It's time for opponents of the war to get real. Pictures like those we saw from Fallujah last week should horrify us, but they should also anger us and strengthen our resolve. The response should not be to back away from the task, but to redouble our efforts.

Roger that.
posted by Phillip Carter at 13:00

 
WP: Clarke's accounts bolstered by the evidence

Walter Pincus and Dana Milbanks, two of the Post's most experienced reporters, write that independent reviews of Richard Clarke's book Against All Enemies have largely corroborated his accounts of events -- despite White House efforts to say otherwise. In general, the Post story says that Clarke's accounts are accurate, subject to minor variations and defects in memory that don't affect the truth of any of assertions -- only the exact details of events, conversations and other minutiae.

... the broad outline of Clarke's criticism has been corroborated by a number of other former officials, congressional and commission investigators, and by Bush's admission in the 2003 Bob Woodward book "Bush at War" that he "didn't feel that sense of urgency" about Osama bin Laden before the attacks occurred.

In addition, a review of dozens of declassified citations from Clarke's 2002 testimony provides no evidence of contradiction, and White House officials familiar with the testimony agree that any differences are matters of emphasis, not fact. Indeed, the declassified 838-page report of the 2002 congressional inquiry includes many passages that appear to bolster the arguments Clarke has made.

My final report on Clarke's book: I just finished Dick Clarke's book Against All Enemies, and have only a couple of things to add to my earlier thoughts. In general, I was somewhat disappointed with the book after all the hype that has surrounded it. The most valuable part of the book, for me, was the look that it gave me into the inner workings of the National Security Council and the national security process generally. The extent to which personality affected policy and process really surprised me; so did the power of professional public servants in relation to their political masters.

But as for the final chapters, which supposedly damn the Bush Administration's for its terrorism policy and policy towards Iraq, I was unconvinced by Mr. Clarke's writing. I have immersed myself in the world of anti-terrorism and the law during the past two years, and I was not convinced by a lot of what he said with respect to the legal and financial strategies against terrorism. My experience and research has showed me that these fights have been quite aggressive indeed -- perhaps too aggressive in some quarters.

As for Mr. Clarke's argument regarding Iraq, I closed his book without having been persuaded by his argument. He did not marshal enough evidence to persuade me that the Bush Administration had deceived the American public to march towards war, or that it had considered (and disregarded) all of the strategic costs of the war. That's not to say that these things aren't true -- only that Mr. Clarke's book didn't do a good job of making these arguments. Similarly, I was unimpressed by Mr. Clarke's argument that the war in Iraq has been a distraction from the war on terrorism. With his knowledge of this issue, I expected a detailed breakdown of all the ways that the war in Iraq took away resources, political capital, and focus from the domestic and foreign war on terrorism. I found that argument to be lacking as well. He did not, for example, discuss how intelligence assets devoted to finding Iraqi WMD might have been devoted to finding Al Qaeda personnel and equipment. Nor did look at the resource-allocation problem with his NSC-trained eye, in order to make the argument the billions spent on Iraq might have been otherwise programmed for homeland security.

Ultimately, I recommend this book for anyone interested in terrorism and national security policy. It does contain a great deal of background information on the way things get done on the National Security Council, and those parts of the book are quite valuable. However, Mr. Clarke's larger point really comes back to himself. He makes a great effort to blame others for their failings in the war on terrorism -- the FBI for being too focused on law enforcement; the CIA for being too risk-averse, and too constrained by a lack of HUMINT capabilities; the military for also being risk-averse, and for jealously guarding its financial pot. If we take all of these criticisms as true, then the real blame belongs to the White House.

My understanding of the national security process is that that the NSC has the job of coordinating its separate agencies, to make sure everyone's playing off the same sheet of music, and everyone's working for the same boss. The failure to harmonize CIA and FBI and DoD performance with White House strategy seems to indicate a breakdown at the NSC and OMB level. If the FBI refuses to invest in information technology or commit agents to anti-terrorism work, then it's the White House's job (including NSC and OMB) to make them do their job. Similarly, if the CIA doesn't want to arm Predators to hunt for Al Qaeda's top leaders, but the White House does, who should win that fight? I'm unconvinced by any White House account that lays blame on subordinate agencies, at least where I don't also see concrete evidence (e.g. the firing of a cabinet secretary) to show that the White House really exercised some leadership. Maybe the White House needs to bring back President Truman's "The Buck Stops Here" sign and make it a permanent fixture in the Oval Office?

Bottom Line -- what Mr. Clarke describes in his book is a breakdown in leadership. And this breakdown is common to both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, because the faults that Mr. Clarke describes start in the 1990s and continue through the election of 2000, all the way to the present day. Mr. Clarke's book may be best known to the public as a criticism of the Bush Administration's war with Iraq. But to me, it was more about allocating blame to other people in Washington. Ironically, by pointing fingers at so many different agencies, Mr. Clarke is really pointing the finger back at himself, because it was his job to coordinate those agencies on the critical issue of terrorism. Ultimately, such blame belongs to the men who sit in the Oval Office, not to any political or professional public servant on the National Security Council. Nonetheless, I got the sense from Against All Enemies that the NSC deserved at least part of the blame here for not managing and coordinating U.S. policy on this issue during the ascendance of Al Qaeda.

Next book: In the Company of Soldiers by Rick Atkinson, the Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington Post reporter who was embedded with the 101st Airborne Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The book was slammed in the WP's book review as being a book about officers, not soldiers, but praised in the NYT book review. Regardless, I'm looking forward to it, because of the caliber of Mr. Atkinson's previous work.
posted by Phillip Carter at 12:22

 
Analysis of the response to the Fallujah incident: Check out this analysis of the plan to pacify Fallujah and this analysis of some of the obstacles facing that plan over at Belmont Club. The writer hits a number of the key issues facing U.S. planners right now, including the terrain challenges of Fallujah and operational considerations relating to the proper calibration of force.
posted by Phillip Carter at 11:43

 
A loss for the special operations community: The Los Angeles Times reports on the passing of retired Col. Aaron Bank, an OSS officer during WWII who founded the Army's special forces and was known as the "father of the Green Berets." I have read about Col. Bank's exploits, and this guy was a legendary warrior and great American. It's hard to measure what he contributed to this country's national security, and yet, he was reportedly quite humble about his accomplishments -- a true "quiet professional." In lieu of flowers, the family asks that donations be sent to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, P.O. Box 14385, Tampa, FL 33690.
posted by Phillip Carter at 09:25

 
First report: I just finished reading the first 200 pages of Richard Clarke's Against All Enemies on a cross-country plane flight. Either the book is well written, I'm just that much of a terrorism and policy junkie. Anyway, I'm just reaching the part of the book where President Bush comes into office in 2001, and I'm looking forward to reading the most controversial parts of the book. But a few things leap out at me from the first four fifths of the book:

- There's no love lost between Richard Clarke and the FBI. He singles out former FBI Director Louis Freeh for some particularly choice treatment, basically calling him a self-aggrandizing wimp when it comes to terrorism. He lambastes the FBI and Justice Department for its lethargic anti-terrorism work during the 1990s, and clearly lays a lot of the blame for 9/11 at this agency's feet.

- Similarly, Richard Clarke is very critical of the American military for its anti-terrorism performance during this period -- especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military planners who stood in the way of Clarke's plans to attack Al Qaeda. He doesn't go so far as to call the military cowardly, but he implies that they weren't organizationally or institutionally committed to anti- and counter-terrorism until the USS Cole and WTC/Pentagon attacks.

- The book lacks footnotes, or end notes, or any kind of annotations that would help me connect some of the events Clarke describes with events/laws/facts I know about outside of the book. This is probably my academic background and training talking; I just finished grading student papers where I was big on citation. But honestly, there were some parts of the book (especially where Clarke discusses anti-terrorism laws and enforcement strategies) where I wish I knew what he was referring to, because he was too general and conversational with his descriptions.

More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 18:08

 
Travel break: Intel Dump will slow down over the weekend while I travel and work on a couple of projects. Regular analysis and commentary will resume on Monday. Thanks.
posted by Phillip Carter at 07:30

 
Contractors on the battlefield

The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, CNN and the Washington Post all carry stories on their front pages today discussing the civilian contractors slain in Fallujah this week, and their status as something in between a civilian and a combatant. Some have even gone so far as to call these contractors "mercenaries", because of their work as private military operatives. In general, the media reports agree that there has been a trend towards privatization in the military sector over the past 10-20 years, and that many tasks once done by soldiers are now done by private contractors like Blackwater Security -- the employer of the four Americans slain on Wednesday. The NY Times reports:

The scene, captured in horrific detail by television and newspaper cameras, shocked the nation and outraged the tightly knit community of current and former Special Operations personnel. But it also shed new light on the rapidly growing and loosely regulated industry of private paramilitary companies like Blackwater that are replacing government troops in conflicts from South America to Africa to the Middle East.

"This is basically a new phenomenon: corporatized private military services doing the front-line work soldiers used to do," said Peter W. Singer, a national security fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington who has written a book on the industry, "Corporate Warriors" (Cornell University Press, 2003).

"And they're not out there screening passengers at the airports," Mr. Singer said. "They're taking mortar and sniper fire."

* * *
Though there have been private militaries since the dawn of war, the modern corporate version got its start in the 1990's after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At that time, many nations were sharply reducing their military forces, leaving millions of soldiers without employment. Many of them went into business doing what they knew best: providing security or training others to do the same.

The proliferation of ethnic conflicts and civil wars in places like the Balkans, Haiti and Liberia provided employment for the personnel of many new companies. Business grew rapidly after the Sept. 11 attacks prompted corporate executives and government officials to bolster their security overseas.

But it was the occupation of Iraq that brought explosive growth to the young industry, security experts said. There are now dozens, perhaps hundreds of private military concerns around the world. As many as two dozen companies, employing as many as 15,000 people, are working in Iraq.

They are providing security details for diplomats, private contractors involved in reconstruction, nonprofit organizations and journalists, security experts said. The private guards also protect oil fields, banks, residential compounds and office buildings.

Though many of the companies are American, others from Britain, South Africa and elsewhere are providing security in Iraq. Among them is Global Risks Strategies, a British company that hired Fijian troops to help protect armored shipments of the new Iraqi currency around the country.

Blackwater is typical of the new breed. Founded in 1998 by former Navy Seals, the company says it has prepared tens of thousands of security personnel to work in hot spots around the world. At its complex in North Carolina, it has shooting ranges for high-powered weapons, buildings for simulating hostage rescue missions and a bunkhouse for trainees.

Analysis: I'm sitting in the airport right now waiting to board my flight, so I don't have time to do a full write-up on this. However, I will have a column on Monday discussing some of the legal issues surrounding these killings -- including the legal status of the Blackwater employees. In a nutshell, these employees are not quite civilians and not quite soldiers. They carry arms and act as the agents of the U.S. government, removing their protection under the 4th Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of civilians. However, they don't wear uniforms or belong to a properly constituted armed force or militia, so they don't really fall under the 3rd Geneva Convention's definition of a combatant either. The murkiness of their status means that it is really tough to define the a that actually occurred last week as a war crime, or anything else beyond what domestic Iraqi law says about it. More to follow...
posted by Phillip Carter at 06:48