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News analysis and commentary from Phillip Carter -- now located at http://www.intel-dump.com "For military analysis, stop by Intel Dump" -Time "(One) of the more interesting war blogs on the Internet." -The Washington Post "[A]n excellent source for real-time military analysis" -Slate RSS Feed E-Mail: inteldump -at- yahoo.com About Phil Phil's Articles 'Intel Dump' Defined Noteworthy Blogs How Appealing Volokh Conspiracy Instapundit Mark Kleiman Kaus Files Oxblog Dynamist Balkinization The Paper Chase FedLawyerGuy Statutory Construction Zone SCOTUS Bag and Baggage Unlearned Hand Winds of Change CalPundit One Hand Clapping VodkaPundit Defense Tech Priorities & Frivolities SGT Stryker Outside the Beltway Citizen Smash BlackFive StrykerNews Plastic Gangster Stop the Bleating Tapped Dan Drezner Brad DeLong War & Piece IRAQ NOW Dagger JAG Law From The Center Noteworthy Books 1. An Army at Dawn 2. Terror and Liberalism 3. Embedded 4. In the Company of Soldiers 5. The New Face of War 6. America's Role in Nation-Building 7. Boyd 8. American Empire 9. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 10. A Problem from Hell Archives Amazon.Com Terrorism & Security Bestsellers (c) 2002-2004 Phillip Carter |
Monday, July 21, 2003
Army examines its choice of weapons lube After taking sharp criticism from current and former soldiers alike for its continued use of "CLP" weapons lubricant, Inside the Army (subscription required) reports today that the Army has decided to relook its choice of lubricant for the standard M-16A2 assault rifle that most soldiers carry. (The same lube is also used for the M4 carbine and M249 squad automatic weapon) Inside The ArmyThis is something I've written on before, in connection with the report on the 507th Maintenance Company ambush. "Soldiers For The Truth" has also had some good reporting on this, along with blogger colleagues One Hand Clapping and Winds of Change. Few things are more important in combat than having small arms which work when they're needed. I'm not sure if Militec is the right answer here, but I'm pretty sure that CLP is less than adequate. Of course, no weapons lubricant will work when soldiers fail to do the necessary weapons maintenance, a trend which also appears in the 507th report. However, we owe it to our soldiers to give them the best materiel that our defense dollars can buy. I hope this investigation pushes the Army a little bit closer to that product -- whatever it is. Update: I recently updated this post with the full text of the article from Inside the Army, which is an independent publication which covers the Army and is associated with several other such publications about the other services. The original article was quite balanced, but I made the editorial decision to only post certain excerpts which criticized the Army. I received a note asking me to post the entire article, as well as permission to do so from the publisher, in the interest of fairness. I thought it was the right thing to do. For more outstanding coverage of this issue and others, I recommend making Inside the Army a regular stop. Their reporters consistently do a good job of reporting on this kind of stuff -- which as we see from this story, has a direct effect on the way our soldiers perform in combat. Sunday, July 20, 2003
Every generation has its heroes Sunday's Washington Post has an extremely moving story about the men who suffered some of the most grievous wounds during the war with Iraq, and who now are recovering from their wounds at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. (The Post also has the photos from the article available online.) On TV, the war was a rout, with infrared tanks rolling toward Baghdad on a desert soundstage. But the permanent realities unfold more quietly on Georgia Avenue NW, behind the black iron gates of the nation's largest military hospital.Some thoughts... The human cost of war is always one of the most troubling things to accept, because it really calls into question our reasons for the war itself. When you look at a wounded combat veteran, the question stares back at you: "Was this man's injury worth it?" I will reserve judgment on that question, given all that has come to light in the last few weeks regarding our casus belli in Iraq. However, I believe that we owe these answers to the men and women we sent to Iraq, and to the families of those who will not return. Our nation should never fight for an unworthy case; the cost in blood and treasure is too high. Saturday, July 19, 2003
Two memorials in Santa Monica I took my dog Peet for a walk today to the Third Street Promenade, and walked through two memorials to Wednesday's horrific incident at the Santa Monica farmer's market. One was what you might expect from the city of Santa Monica -- a multicultural, non-sectarian gathering to mourn the dead and give thanks for our existence. I've been a lot of memorial services, but this one didn't move me in any particular way. The second memorial was the Saturday farmer's market itself, which promoters and farmers decided to hold today despite Wednesday's tragedy. Every vendor commemorated the incident in some way, whether with black cloth around his stand or black ribbons in front of his table. But the overall message was: we will persevere through this tragedy. That was a powerful message, and I think it was the best way to memorialize those who died on Wednesday. Friday, July 18, 2003
Tony Blair: a great American The British have been blessed in our time to have great orators like Winston Churchill and Tony Blair for national leaders. In times of crisis, these men lift their citizens' morale and spirits with moving words. Speaking before a joint session of Congress yesterday, Prime Minister Tony Blair turned his words towards us, his somewhat reluctant allies across the Atlantic. Members of Congress, if this seems a long way from the threat of terror and weapons of mass destruction, it is only to say again that the world's security cannot be protected without the world's heart being won. So America must listen as well as lead. But, members of Congress, don't ever apologize for your values. (Applause.) Tell the world why you're proud of America. Tell them when "The Star-Spangled Banner" starts, Americans get to their feet -- Hispanics, Irish, Italians, Central Europeans, East Europeans, Jews, Muslims, white, Asian, black, those who go back to the early settlers, and those whose English is the same as some New York cab drivers I've dealt with -- (laughter) -- but whose sons and daughters could run for this Congress. Tell them why Americans, one and all, stand upright and respectful. Not because some state official told them to, but because whatever race, color, class or creed they are, being American means being free. That's why they're proud. (Cheers, sustained applause.)Words like these remind us of our ideals, and of what it means to be an American. I can't help but feel pride when a national leader like Tony Blair speaks this way about America and its role in today's world. Now all we have to do is live up to these expectations -- a task which is easier said than done. Planning for success? The Washington bureau of the Los Angeles Times has a very interesting (and very lengthy) report today on what went wrong with America's planning for post-war Iraq. This is more than your typical "first draft of history" journalism -- the Times reporters painstakingly lay out the pre-war planning process, and the various ways that nation-building planning was neglected by the Administration. Since the fall of Baghdad on April 9, U.S. and British troops have struggled to bring order from chaos. Water, electricity and security are in short supply, fueling resentment among many Iraqis. A guerrilla-like resistance has taken shape against the occupation; U.S. casualties mount almost daily in an operation that is costing nearly $4 billion a month and stalling the withdrawal of American forces. Thursday, July 17, 2003
Great initiative... not so great judgment Every month, the Defense Department General Counsel's Standards of Conduct Office publishes a monthly advisory on ethics within the Pentagon and the military services. SOCO has responsibility for promulgating ethics regulations, training guidelines, etc., for the Pentagon. Their staff takes it really seriously too, however, they often find ways to teach their lessons in humorous ways. Here's an excerpt from their July 2003 advisory: In yet another remarkable case of bad judgment, a Marine Corps company commander who was deployed in Iraq asked a tobacco company to send his men its products for free. After receiving the free goods, he sent a "thank you" note that was used as part of the tobacco company’s advertising. The letter implied that the DoD endorsed the product, and, eventually, garnered the attention of two Congressmen. Please remember the standards of conduct apply in Iraq, too.It's hard to suppress a smile at this Marine captain's initiative. If I was his commander, I'd probably recommend him for a Navy Achievement Medal for this sort of thing, while chiding him privately about the thank-you note. These are the kinds of things we expect of our junior leaders, who we entrust with the lives of our finest sons and daughters. I hope his chain of command took care of him the way he took care of his Marines. Federal judge says legal mission to Iraq was a sham USA Today reports today that 6th Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt has blasted the American government in Iraq for impeding a mission arranged by the Justice Department to restore Iraq's legal institutions. The DoJ-sponsored mission included federal judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys who had the charter of advising Iraq on its Constitution and the establishment of a new legal system. Senior U.S. District Judge (sic) Gilbert Merritt said the 25-member delegation's hopes of assessing Baghdad's judicial and law enforcement institutions were hindered by the chaos in the city of 5 million people. Guerrilla warfare continues, water and electricity service are limited, police forces are barely functioning, and many courthouses are bombed-out shells, he and other members of the delegation said. Pentagon to call up two National Guard brigades for Iraq Greg Jaffe reports in this morning's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) that the Defense Department has decided it must call up two brigades of National Guard soldiers for the Iraq mission, since it has been unable to enlist America's allies in the effort there. Two brigades equates to roughly 10,000 soldiers, which does not seem like a lot for the 480,000 active-duty Army to manage. However, as the article points out, nearly all of the Army is committed to operations in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea and Afghanistan right now, leaving the Guard as America's only option. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is expected to sign off on a plan later this week that would establish a rotation to relieve Marine and U.S. Army soldiers deployed in Iraq, a Pentagon official said. After training, it would be March or April by the time National Guard soldiers would be deployed, likely for stints of 13 to 16 months including the training. Even so, demands on the active-duty Army would remain intense. Asked if he had ever seen the Army stretched so thin, one senior defense official recently said: "Not in my 31 years" of military service.This is going to be a challenge. America's National Guard has already been stretched thin by consecutive homeland security deployments since Sept. 11, known as Operation Noble Eagle. In the California Army National Guard, nearly every combat arms unit has already deployed once. The units which have deployed have returned in deplorable condition, with most soldiers opting to leave the Guard. There are a number of National Guard units which have been left alone for homeland security, and these are the likely units to deploy to Iraq. However, even that is a finite supply. If America is to stay in Iraq for the long hall, this solution won't work. Painful lessons in Santa Monica Yesterday's tragic incident in Santa Monica which left nine people dead is a tragic reminder of how quickly accidents can escalate into mass-casualty situations when crowds are involved. The incident (not an accident -- nothing is ever accidental; it always has some cause) happened a short walk away from where I live. I go to 3rd Street a lot, and I've been to that farmer's market a dozen or so times. Suffice to say, it was hard to work yesterday afternoon as the story unfolded. It appears that this driver had no evil intent. Details are still emerging, but it looks like he tried to pump his brake pedal, but instead found his accelerator pedal. That doesn't change the carnage he caused. He still killed 9 people, and left dozens more hurt. Despite the apparent lack of evil intent, this incident holds many lessons learned for us as we think about how we might respond to another kind of mass-casualty event -- a terrorist attack. This is just my thinking, as a former anti-terrorism plans officer, but I think it's what a lot of folks in the Santa Monica Police Dept. are probably thinking about right now. 1. Large groups of people are targets. The reasons are many fold. First, large groups of people maximize the chances for large casualty counts, and that's usually a goal for terrorists. Second, the proportion of people who have been to a place where lots of people are is high, thus, lots of people will say afterwards "I've been there before -- that could have been me." This increases the fear factor of an attack, adding to its psychological impact. Finally, large gatherings of people tend to be media magnets -- there's often a camera crew there already to catch the news. As Brian Jenkins said 30 years ago, "terrorism is theater." 2. Simple measures can work. A threat assessment for the farmer's market in Santa Monica would have noted the threat of an inbound car or truck-borne explosive -- either one of which would be deadly. The proximity of this market to traffic makes that a possible threat, though not a probable one. Moreover, mitigating this threat would not have been hard. Parking two cars to physically block the street at either end of Arizona Ave. would have been sufficient; so too would have been placing "jersey bounce" barriers (concrete barriers that can stop a speeding car) at either end. (This would've been more costly, and entailed a crane to move them every time. Ironically, the 3rd Street Promenade has retractable, sunk-in metal barriers at all ends, but those devices were never installed for the farmer's market area -- which has become somewhat of a permanent fixture. Perhaps the City Council should consider those before they reopen these markets. 3. Mass casualty plans and mutual aid plans work. The city of Santa Monica does not have the ambulance or medical capacity to deal with this kind of event. Luckily, the larger West L.A. area does. Within minutes, reports indicate, ambulances from other jurisdictions sped to Santa Monica to help, as did Life-Flight helicopters. Emergency rooms elsewhere in the area also pitched in, adding to the capacity of UCLA-Santa Monica Hospital and allowing the most urgent patients to be seen at the closest hospital. These measures save lives. California (and the L.A. area in particular) are actually quite good at this kind of anti-terrorism preparation. Our region has been cursed with natural and man-made disasters like earthquakes, wildfires, floods and riots. In response, our "consequence management" agencies (fire, medical, public health, etc) have developed great plans and working relationships for these kinds of incidents. Those plans and coordination paid off yesterday in Santa Monica. There are more lessons to be learned, but those are my initial thoughts on this morning after. More to follow as the story develops. Tuesday, July 15, 2003
Pentagon to loan Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to homeland security effort The trade journal Aerospace Daily reports today that the Defense Department plans to loan some of its high-tech unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs") to the Department of Homeland Security for border security. The loan will include military personnel and equipment. It's not clear whether the DoD personnel will merely train and familiarize DHS personnel with UAVs, or whether this loan will include some operational use of the UAVs for actual border security missions. The deployment, set to take place within the next few months somewhere along America's southern border, comes at the request of Gordon England, deputy secretary for homeland security at DHS and former secretary of the Navy.Analysis: This raises some of the same legal questions that I wrote about in Slate last year when the Pentagon loaned surveillance aircraft to look for the D.C. sniper. Federal law bars the use of military personnel for law enforcement, although a number of exceptions exist. So, when, exactly, can soldiers help the cops?As a matter of law, this UAV plan may be different from the case of the D.C. sniper. Arguably, the Department of Homeland Security is a national security agency more than a law enforcement agency. Its primary purpose in guarding the border is to prevent entry and secure the nation, though it certainly has the secondary purpose of prosecuting those who might break the law entering the U.S. The Posse Comitatus Act bars the use of military personnel and equipment for law enforcement -- it does not bar their use for national security functions. In addition, a number of exceptions exist, such as 10 U.S.C. 372, which states: (a) In General. - The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), base facility, or research facility of the Department of Defense to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.Ultimately, these exceptions are limited by 10 U.S.C. 375, which states that such assistance shall not include "direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law." Bottom Line: It looks to me like this UAV loan program will be covered by the exceptions to Posse Comitatus. The interesting thing will be whether the loan program will be covered by two provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the DHS. Sections 876 and 886 expressly limit the military activities of the new department, and reaffirm Congress' commitment to the Posse Comitatus doctrine. Sec. 876 states: Nothing in this Act shall confer upon the Secretary any authority to engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other military activities, nor shall anything in this Act limit the existing authority of the Department of Defense or the Armed Forces to engage in warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other military activities.There's a pretty good argument that this deployment of UAVs violates the spirit -- if not the letter -- of the Homeland Security Act. If Congress wanted a military homeland security effort, they would have simply told the Pentagon to make it happen without creating a Dept. of Homeland Security. Instead, I think that Congress wanted a civilian effort on the domestic security front. Eventually, I think that DHS probably plans to buy its own UAVs to run its own border security operations. But in the interim, I think they need to answer some tough legal questions about their plan to borrow them from the Pentagon. Judicial deference and national security I have a piece today in Writ, Findlaw.Com's online journal of legal commentary, which criticizes judicial deference to the Executive Branch on national security grounds as somewhat anachronistic and out-of-step with modern reality. The piece tries to paint a picture of Constitutional tension between individual rights on the one hand, and the President's power to command the military on the other. Ultimately, what's needed is more of a balancing approach, rather than a strict policy of deference by the courts whenever national security is involved. Does the judicial deference doctrine still make sense today? For a number of reasons, it may not be as well-justified as it once was.Update: CNN.com just picked up this piece and published it on the legal page of their news site. Monday, July 14, 2003
3rd Infantry Division to remain in Iraq MSNBC and others report that the Army has delayed the return of its 3rd Infantry Division from Iraq again. With attacks on Americans growing more frequent and deadly, Pentagon leaders appear unwilling to reduce their force in Iraq to deal with those attacks. The decision is the second for the "Rock of the Marne" division, whose soldiers had been told they would return to the U.S. in June. Many of 3ID's soldiers have been in the desert for 9-12 months, and numerous stories have reported on the morale problems for both soldiers and families created by the back-and-forth over the division's redeployment. Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount III, the division’s commander, said last week he hoped the division’s 1st and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams of roughly 9,000 soldiers could return home to Fort Stewart within the next six weeks.According to the 3ID website, a number of units have redeployed from Iraq, and more are on the way home. It also appears this redeployment is being done in rough reverse chronological order, based on who deployed to the desert first. Balancing mission accomplishment against morale is a hard thing. It's the quintessential challenge for every military leader, in peace and war. Every unit finds its own balance; some are more "hard core" than others. The redeployment of 3ID is essentially a large version of this problem. The Pentagon must accomplish the mission in Iraq; we've spent too much blood and treasure to lose now. But at the same time, we must take care of our soldiers and their families -- we owe them that. I think it's time to bring 3ID home and rotate another unit over there. But I would hate to see this division come home at the cost of the mission, because that would undermine all the sacrifices these men and women have made. Sunday, July 13, 2003
GO LANCE!!! Four-time Tour De France winner Lance Armstrong seized the overall lead today in the L'Alpe D'Huez stage that he has historically dominated. Although Lance didn't win the stage as he normally does, he did gain enough time on the pack to slide into 1st overall in the 21-day race. Lance now leads Joseba Beloki of Spain by 40 seconds. Winning the Tour De France four times in a row is spectactular enough, but Lance hopes to match Spain's Miguel Indurain by winning five consecutive tours. As many people know, Lance nearly died a few years ago from testicular cancer -- a story which he tells in his extremely moving book "It's Not About the Bike". I think it's amazing for anyone to even finish the Tour De France, let alone win it. Add to that winning it four times. Add to that winning it four times in a row after near-certain death. Lance is one of my heroes, and I am stoked that he has taken the yellow jersey in the French Alps. Friday, July 11, 2003
Rumsfeld orders restructuring of America's military Policy changes would shift forces from the reserves to the active force Esther Schrader scoops the competition in Saturday's Los Angeles Times by reporting on a memo that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent to his senior commanders and policy chiefs which directs them to start considering radical changes to the active/reserve mix of America's military. The changes come in the 22nd month of America's war on terrorism, with its military stretched to the limit with current operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The goal, Ms. Schrader reports, is to ready America's military for the next conflict -- one for which we may get only a couple of weeks warning. In a July 9 memo to the secretaries of the Air Force, the Navy, the Army and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rumsfeld called for shifting a broad range of professional specialties from the reserves to the active duty force to allow the military to mobilize for a major war within 15 days.Ms. Schrader's article correctly points out some of the complexities of this issue. In Vietnam, America's political leadership made a conscious decision to fight without the reserves; to use a conscription-based force of regulars instead. This was done because the reserves reach into every city and town in America. A callup of reserves requires a tremendous amount of popular support and political capital -- two things lacking in Vietnam. After that war ended, Gen. Creighton Abrams and others created the "Total Force Concept", in which critical functions would be put into the reserves so that their callup would be necessary for any future wars. The idea was to force the President to only fight wars where he had the political capital to callup the reserves. Acting on that idea, the active-duty services moved many of the specialties needed to fight a war - security, intelligence, transportation and logistics - over to the reserves and National Guard.The Bottom Line: America has missions is has to accomplish with its military. Its military is stretched to the limit. Our leaders can influence the ledger on either side of this equation. We can increase the size of our military, or we can decrease our mission commitments. It looks like our war on terrorism will last for the foreseeable future, and the same can be said of our occupation in Iraq. Therefore, we must figure out a way to bolster our force. The Pentagon has relied on a steady stream of reservists for some time to do this, but those reserves may be running out. The Rumsfeld plan may be the best available option. More to follow... The myth of the monolithic Pentagon: SecDef's office opposes move to give health coverage to reservists The AP reports today that the Secretary of Defense's office has written Congress to request deletion of a provision in the defense budget bill that would give full medical coverage to reservists and their families. This provision was designed to extend the benefits of the military health-care system to thousands of reservists (like me) who do one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. It would also have the side benefit of making mobilization easier, since these soldiers/families would already be integrated into the military health care system when the call to active duty came. However, the SecDef's office warned Congress that the policy would be enormously costly -- to the detriment of the Pentagon's already bloated $380 billion budget. [Rumsfeld] said he would recommend that President Bush veto the defense authorization bill if it included a Senate plan to expand TRICARE, the military health program. He estimated the change could cost $5 billion per year; Democrats disputed that figure.Analysis: I think both sides have a point here. The SecDef is correct about the financial impacts this would have on the current military health-care system, and the cost for the Defense Department. However, that may be a cost worth bearing. America has relied on these reservists more in the last 22 months than anytime since the Korean War. Medical coverage would be one way to show the reservists and their families that America cares about them. It would also boost reserve readiness, since a major mobilization problem has been getting soldiers up to active-duty medical standards. There may even be a tangential recruiting benefit here, if joining the reserves carried the benefit of full medical coverage. Bottom Line: I think the benefits outweigh the costs here. There's enough fat in the Pentagon's budget to pay for this; taking care of soldiers and families is more important than a lot of things in the $380 billion bill. Thursday, July 10, 2003
Recommended reading: The El Paso Times has uploaded a scanned version of the Army's report on the 507th Maintenance Company ambush. This is an extremely well-written executive summary of what happened to these soldiers, and I think it supports my conclusions below. Wednesday, July 09, 2003
Report: Unit's weapons didn't work during convoy ambush Breakdown in basic soldiering skills led to disastrous capture of American POWs The Washington Post reports tonight on a report (also reported by the NY Times and LA Times) that identifies the main reason why PFC Jessica Lynch and five other soldiers were captured by Iraqi guerrillas on the road to Baghdad -- faulty weapons training and maintenance. The report indicates that soldiers had difficulty firing both their personal weapons (the M16A2 rifle) and their crew-served weapons (the M2 .50 caliber machine gun) at the enemy when fired upon. Few things will end a firefight badly more easily than weapons that won't shoot. Unfortunately, it appears from this report and others that the culprit was poor weapons training and maintenance. "These malfunctions," the report says, "may have resulted from inadequate individual maintenance in a desert environment" where sand, heat and improper maintenance combined to render the weapons inoperable.Analysis: I'm going to revert back to my NTC Observer/Controller training to pick out some issues that seem obvious from this story. These may seem like harsh criticisms, but if these things happened during a rotation at the National Training Center, these are exactly the things that would be discussed in the After Action Review. A causal link exists between each of these failures before combat and what happened in combat. (1) Weapons Maintenance. Rifles and machine guns require a lot of tender loving care to work properly -- they require even more TLC in the harsh desert environment. Despite popular conceptions, the M16A2 rifle is a fairly intricate piece of machinery with lots of small moving pieces. It takes regular cleaning and lubrication in order to work. In the California desert, my platoon made a standard practice of field cleaning our rifles once a day -- more if possible. The sand is even more fine in Iraq. I have been told it resembles an awful form of talcum powder that gets in everything. In those conditions, the rifle would need to be cleaned and lubricated more than once a day. The rifle would also need to be protected in some way from the elements, such as with a plastic cap or latex balloon over the muzzle. Leaders must check their soldiers' weapons constantly to ensure this is being done. As the old maxim says: "Soldiers do what leaders check." (2) Lubrication. It's not enough to clean the M16 rifle, M249 squad automatic weapon, or M2 .50 cal machine gun -- you also have to regularly apply lubricant in order to keep the metal parts moving against each other. The standard military lubricant for small arms is called "CLP" (See this discussion regarding CLP at Winds of Change). It worked okay for me in Korea and Texas, but not well. My platoon sergeant (an avid hunter) liked to use special commercially-available lubricants that he knew worked better. Apparently, he knew more than the Army's procurement folks. In the weeks since the war, several after action reviews have concluded that the Army's standard weapons lube was inadequate for the job in the desert. Lubricant: Soldiers provided consistent comments that CLP was not a good choice for weapons maintenance in this environment. The sand is as fine as talcum powder here. The CLP attracted the sand to the weapon. ? Soldiers considered a product called MiliTec to be a much better solution for lubricating individual and crew-served weapons.Various current and former military officers echoed this report, saying that CLP was one of the worst lubricants the Army could buy for the desert: "The CLP and Breakfree brand oil the military purchases is worthless," said Aaron Johnson, a 10-year veteran of the Army and Army Reserve, and author of a DefenseWatch guest column on the Army M9 sidearm "How to Save the M9 Beretta"; June 16, 2003). "I'm sure large amounts are acquired [by the Army] at relatively low cost, but that's why it should be done away with. That oil is too rich, and has little effectiveness at keeping weapons clean."Once again, our soldiers went into harm's way with lousy equipment because the procurement system failed them. There is some irony here, in that the original M16 rifle went into combat in Vietnam with many flaws that were learned at the cost of American lives. Today, we appear to have the best military in the world. Yet we are forced to learn lessons about our equipment the hard way. 3. Weapons Training. Weapons maintenance and lubrication are often a function of weapons training. Soldiers who know their weapons well will take care of them, because they are familiar with the effects of not doing so. Moreover, at least one part of the 507th Maintenance Company report indicates a probable failure of weapons training: King [the company commander] then split the company into three groups, according to the Army investigation.The M2 .50 caliber machine gun doesn't just fail -- it fails for a reason. It's one of the most venerable weapons in the Army inventory; its basic design has not changed for decades. The most common reason for failure is the operator's failure to properly set the head space and timing. The internal parts of the .50 cal have a certain amount of play, and these parts have to be set right in order to work. If you set the headspace or timing wrong -- or fail to reset it after a while -- the weapon will malfunction. In some cases, this means it will fire one shot and then stop. In others, it may cause the weapon to misfire more severely, or even blow up. In any case, this is the most probable reason for the .50 cal's failure in the 507th convoy. And it traces directly back to a failure to train the operator on how to shoot the .50 cal. In many units -- especially support units -- .50 cal training is hard to get in peacetime. The ranges are few and the ammunition is usually short, and it's often hard to get the right guy to the range because soldiers are often rotating through positions within a given unit. In combat, all of these are just excuses. The bottom line is that the 507th's convoy didn't have its .50 cal when it needed it, and its soldiers paid the price. 4. Land Navigation and Fieldcraft. It appears that Captain King got his convoy lost in the desert. Either he failed to properly copy the route, failed to follow the route, or failed to adjust the route based on information from his higher headquarters. The results were fatal. Soldiers in the Army don't do enough training on basic land navigation. Indeed, in many units, they simply rely on their Global Positioning Systems for this skill, as Captain King appeared to do: The 507th, based at Fort Bliss, Texas, was not a combat unit; its members included cooks, mechanics, technicians and clerks. On March 21, the company crossed into Iraq from Kuwait as part of a convoy supporting a Patriot missile battalion. But early into the deployment, the company's commander, Capt. Troy King, misread his assigned route, the report said.Getting lost in peacetime is embarassing; it usually means you have to buy the beer or do pushups. Getting lost in wartime can be fatal. I learned this lesson in Korea when I misread the terrain once and wound up driving up a long canyon that led straight to the DMZ -- it took an extra 2 hours to back up the canyon and drive home. I never got lost again as an Army officer. My unit, a division MP company, trained a lot on land navigation because we knew that logistics units like the 507th would rely on us for this skill. As flattering as that was, it's the wrong answer. Every soldier and leader must be capable of moving from point A to point B in a way that gets them there alive. And they need to be able to do it without gadgets like the GPS, at night, with just a map and a compass (see FM 3-25.26 for more on the basics of land navigation) Summary: I don't want to keep picking on support units, but in this case, I see a trend. Support units work hard in peacetime to keep our equipment running, often to the neglect of their own field training. The result is that they do not meet the standard for basic soldiering and warfighting skills. Of course, they learn through trial and error just like every unit. But the result of waiting to learn these lessons in wartime is that young Americans die as the unit climbs the learning curve. Our Army needs to embrace the warrior ethos in all units -- not just the combat arms -- and it needs to ensure that every unit can fight its way out of an ambush like this one. In the end, none of this may have made the crucial difference and saved the convoy. War is chaotic, and bad things happend to good units who do everything right. But commanders strive to set their units up for success; to do everything possible to make the fight an unfair one -- for the enemy. Training, maintenance, pre-combat checks, pre-combat inspections, and fieldcraft are what enable good units to execute when the time comes on the battlefield. The 507th Maintenance Convoy failed in these areas, and the effects were devastating. Enemy combatant asks court for release Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, who has been deemed an "enemy combatant" by President Bush, filed suit in federal court today seeking release from that status and from Defense Department custody. Like Jose Padilla and Yasser Hamdi before him, Al-Marri contends that such a status is unlawful and unconstitutional. Lawyers for the student, Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, argued in an appeal filed in federal court in Illinois that Mr. Bush's June 23 order declaring Mr. Marri to be an operative for Al Qaeda and an enemy combatant represented an act of "unbridled authority" that was illegal and unconstitutional.Indeed they will... If the Hamdi and Padilla cases are any indicators, the Bush Administration will vigorously contest this case in court to uphold its authority to designate enemy combatants and detain them as such. This is another issue where the courts have been very deferential to the Executive Branch. However, the deference hasn't been perfect. A federal judge in New York ordered the Pentagon to allow Padilla to meet with his lawyer in Dec. 2002, and the government has lost other legal battles in the Moussaoui case relating to its power to sequester combatants who may also be material witnesses. It's likely that the Al-Marri case will follow the path of the others, and end at a brick wall for Mr. Al-Marri. That may be right outcome. Nation-states have had the authority to designate their enemies for centuries. If Al-Marri is an enemy of the United States, then our President has the inherent power as the leader of a sovereign nation to take military action against him. Normally, that would entail killing him. But we have chosen in this instance to take him prisoner and interrogate him for intelligence. That is a perfectly lawful act as a matter of international law. Indeed, the Third Geneva Convention precludes the trial of a combatant in civilian court for the lawful acts of a soldier (war crimes are a different matter). Plaintiff files first post-Lawrence challenge to the military Today's New York Times reports that a former Army lieutenant colonel has filed suit in federal court against the Army challenging his discharge for being gay. Loren S. Loomis was forcibly discharged one week before his 20-year retirement after firefighters found tapes of him having sex with another man while responding to a fire at his residence near Fort Hood, Texas. Emboldened by the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, Mr. Loomis has filed suit challenging the legality of his discharge. The Army discharged Mr. Loomis, who was wounded in the Vietnam War, in which he won two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart, under "other than honorable" conditions, a move that deprived him of pension and benefits that he says are worth more than $1 million.Analysis: The discharge of gay servicemembers is governed today by Title 10, Section 654, United States Code, which states: "A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations:To win, Mr. Loomis will have to get the court to rule that this statute places an unconstitutional burden on his fundamental right to intimate conduct, as stated by Justice Kennedy in his Lawrence opinion. Once a fundamental right is implicated by a law, the court must ask two questions: (1) Does the law further a compelling government interest? (2) Is the law narrowly tailored to further that compelling government interest? Lots of things can affect this calculus, and it's by no means easy to predict how courts will go. However, the burden clearly lies with the government to justify its exclusion of gays from the military. Laws which burden fundamental rights are presumptively unconstitutional, unless the government can show why the law should survive. I think they have the "compelling interest" prong down cold -- America needs an effective military with cohesive units. But it's not clear that this policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. It may be both underinclusive and overinclusive in the sense that it requires an overt statement, act or marriage to trigger the exclusion. So will the law survive here? It's hard to tell. The reason is that the courts have historically given great deference to the Executive Branch and the military on matters of national security. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States; Doe v. Bush. Such deference will be given to the military on both prongs of the fundamental rights analysis. The courts will most likely defer to the military on the issue of whether this policy furthers a compelling government interest. And the courts will also give weight to the military's judgment about whether this is the best tailored policy possible for achieving the compelling interest of a cohesive and effective military. In any other context, the law would certainly fail. But the doctrine of military deference affects the fundamental rights calculus in a weird way, as seen in military cases on religion and speech. In addition to the military deference doctrine, there's also a doctrine of deference to the political branches on issues best resolved by Congress and the President. The legislative history of 10 U.S.C. 654 indicates that this statute was hammered out as a compromise between the two political branches after an extremely contentious political debate. The courts may not be willing to step into that fight. Bottom Line: Military deference and political deference can only go so far. At some point, the court may decide this issue is too important to decide on those bases. The court may also decide the Constitutional rights at stake are too important to leave to military decisionmaking and political arm-wrestling. I honestly don't know how this will turn out, because I don't have the Constitutional Law expertise to offer an intelligent answer to these questions. Lawrence put this issue into play, after a series of courts had ruled against such challenges in the 1990s, but it's not clear how it will be resolved this time. Good arguments exist on both sides -- it's now up to the judge to decide. Tuesday, July 08, 2003
Army contracts for 100,000-soldier barracks in Iraq In what seems like deja vu from our deployment to the Balkans, Inside the Army reports that the Army has contracted Kellogg Brown & Root to build barracks for 100,000 soldiers in Iraq. This is a major step towards a long-term, institutionalized, semi-permanent U.S. presence in Iraq. Permanent bases are easier to secure, better for the soldiers, and more conducive to long-term deployments. I think this is an indicator that the Pentagon is planning for a long-term occupation of Iraq -- perhaps up to 10-30 years. While some of the housing might be as crude as tents, Army officials say the project could provide more durable structures and describe accommodations similar to those found at longer-term peacekeeping spots around the world, like Kosovo. Monday, July 07, 2003
The ugly face of war Embedded reports from the Marines' 1st Reconnaissance Battalion A lot has been made of the reports that came from embedded reporters in the recent war with Iraq. For the most part, I think they did a good job of reporting on a part of war that has often been neglected for operational security reasons. Some reporters, such as the Washington Post's Rick Atkinson and William Branigin, and the LA Times' Tony Perry and David Zucchino, did a particularly good job of covering the units they were with. But until now, I haven't read any stories that hit me the force of some first-person accounts I've read. Evan Wright's reports in Rolling Stone are different. For the entire war, Mr. Wright traveled with a platoon of the elite 1st Reconnaissance Battalion of the U.S. Marines. The 1st Recon Marines were not used as stealthy infantry scouts, the way such a unit might normally be employed. Instead, these Marines were employed like an Army light cavalry unit, fighting their way in Hummvees north from Kuwait to Baghdad. Mr. Wright reports on the entire journey of these men, over the course of three outstanding pieces in Rolling Stone magazine. Here's an excerpt from the second piece: It's not a good day for god in Iraq. Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Bodley, chaplain for the First Reconnaissance Battalion, is trying to minister to fighting Marines, now resting for the first time since the invasion of Iraq began more than a week ago. They have set up a defensive camp by the airfield they seized near Qal'at Sukkar, in central Iraq. After their initiation into urban-guerrilla warfare in An Nasiriyah to the south, followed by three days of continual fighting against an enemy they seldom actually saw, the 374 Marines of the elite battalion have been given forty-eight hours of downtime to recuperate. Their camp is spread across two kilometers of what looks like a fantasy Martian landscape of dried-out, reddish mud flats and empty canals. Each four - to six - man team lives in holes dug beneath camouflage nets placed around its Humvee. Throughout the day, Bodley walks around the camp and attempts to minister to his flock of heavily armed young men. Although the Marines in First Recon have already killed dozens, accidentally wounded civilians and taken one casualty of their own (a driver shot in the arm), the chaplain encounters few troubled by war itself. "A lot of the young men I talk to can compartmentalize the terrible things they've seen," he says. "But many of them feel bad because they haven't had a chance to fire their weapons. They worry that they haven't done their jobs as Marines."I hope that Mr. Wright takes this material and writes a book about the experience these Marines went through. I suspect his detached view would make a great companion to first-person accounts like that of Anthony Swofford in Jarhead. If he writes it, Mr. Wright's book will join Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down on my bookshelf as two of the best journalistic accounts of war that I have read. Rolling Stone has also put the first and third articles online; I recommend them to anyone who wants to see the ugly face of war up close, without censorship. Attacks on U.S. troops raise specter of guerilla war Was an urban insurgency the Iraqi strategy all along? Tom Ricks, probably the best defense reporter out there, reports today in the Washington Post (along with Rajiv Chandrasekaran) that Iraqi attacks on American troops in recent days have spurred concerns about the conflict that just seems to keep going in Iraq. Despite the declaration by the President that major combat operations have ended (see below), and the repeated declarations by Pentagon officials that we are not in a guerilla war, that seems to be exactly the case. Recent Iraqi attacks on U.S. troops have demonstrated a new tactical sophistication and coordination that raise the specter of the U.S. occupation force becoming enmeshed in a full-blown guerrilla war, military experts said yesterday.Keeping the peace is just one problem. Fighting the war is another. Peace and war are not like pregnant and not-pregnant -- it's not a binary choice. Conceptually, I think there's more of a spectrum from peace to war, along which you have law enforcement, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, low-intensity conflict, and war. (This isn't just my thought; it's also what official U.S. Army doctrine says.) So what are we seeing in Iraq? I don't think we're just seeing criminal activity or the activity of out-of-work soldiers. I think we're seeing the start of a real guerilla war, in which we will fight a determined, well-equipped and organized enemy in the streets of Iraq for some time. Ricks' article alludes to this trend: Retired Army Col. Richard Dunn, a former head of the Army's internal think tank, agreed, saying, "I'd like to be wrong on this, but we may be seeing a classic insurgency situation developing." At the same time, he said, it is possible that "we may just be seeing a surge of activity that they're unable to sustain."Analysis: What if this was their strategy all along? What if, instead of fighting America in the desert, the Iraqi command authority made a conscious choice to suck us into their cities and fight us 1 platoon at a time, with small-unit ambushes and such? This looks an awful lot like classic insurgency warfare; what some call 4th Generation Warfare. It reflects an old maxim most recently stated by Chinese leader Mao Zedong: "The reed bends with the wind, and then snaps back up again." I do not think we're seeing low-level criminal activity anymore; I also don't think we're seeing uncoordinated attacks. I think that our enemy has coalesced into something larger and more menacing. Of course, I don't have the on-the-ground intelligence to make this assessment, nor do I have access to anything but open-source reports. But the tea leaves look clear to me. The Iraqis have strategically withdrawn from the desert and regrouped in the cities, and instead of fighting us where we are strong (the desert), they are now fighting us where we are weak. Their ultimate goal is to mimic Somalia. The Iraqis hope to inflict enough casualties on us that we will go home with our tail between our legs. Ultimately, this is a dubious strategy, given our national level of commitment to Iraq as compared to our commitment to Somalia. But in the short-term, it means that Iraqi guerillas will seek to kill as many Americans as possible wherever they present targets of opportunity. If I were a planner again... I'd recommend three main courses of action: (1) Boost the U.S. troop presence, because you're going to need a lot more boots on the ground in order to properly secure the American footprint in Iraq. (2) Ratchet up the force protection level significantly, to the point where U.S. troops conduct their nation-building operations as if they are still at war. This will hamper and delay much of the nation-building, as it's more difficult to conduct business at rifle's length that an arm's length. But we cannot let our guard down like we have been in recent weeks. (3) Go on the offensive, as we did with Operation Peninsula Strike and Operation Scorpion. Find the Iraqi guerillas, their weapons caches, and their leadership -- and take them out. Again, these offensives require more soldiers, because you have to have enough for basic security and offensive missions. But if you let the enemy seize the initiative, you're toast. We absolutely have to take the fight to these Iraqis before they take the fight to us, and fight them on terms favorable to us. Update: I've been asked to comment on this issue and the situation in Iraq tomorrow morning between 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on WCTC, New Brunswick, NJ (AM 1450). If you're in that area, I hope you can tune in. Update II: David Adesnik at Oxblog has some thoughts on the relationship between stories like this and soldier morale. For what it's worth, I think that criticizing the mission and the cause can create a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure. We ought do that for the sake of the mission and our soldiers in the field. But I think we should recognize this conflict for what it is -- something in the gray area between peace and war -- and devote the resources necessary to win it. Back from the holiday weekend... blogging will resume at my regular summer pace. Thanks for stopping by; more to follow. Thursday, July 03, 2003
You make the call... May 1, 2003 -- Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California. "Thank you all very much. Admiral Kelly, Captain Card, officers and sailors of the USS Abraham Lincoln, my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. (Applause.) And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country."Jul. 2, 2003 -- Press Conference by LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General, V Corps, Baghdad (as reported in the New York Times). "We're still at war," Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the commander of coalition forces in Iraq, said in a news conference today. While saying the attacks did not appear to be centrally or even regionally coordinated, he asserted that there had been an "increase in sophistication of the explosive devices used" against American forces.Who's right? It's really hard to tell. The President is correct that major combat operations have ended, insofar as American tanks are no longer charging across the Iraqi desert. But it appears that we are now fighting a new kind (or a very old kind) of war -- a counter-insurgency campaign against hardened guerillas and terrorists who attack with unconventional weapons and tactics. I think LTG Sanchez is right to say the war has not ended -- it has merely begun a new phase. This phase will look a lot more like Somalia than Gulf War I, but hopefully with a better result. More to follow... Hasta la vista, Saddam USA Today reports that America has deployed Arnold Schwarzenegger to Iraq as part of a USO tour to visit American soldiers there and elsewhere in the Middle East. It's not clear whether Arnold will merely entertain the troops, or also lend his expertise as demonstrated in the movies Commando, Predator and Terminator. Is America's Army broken? The answer, according to Brookings Institute expert Michael O'Hanlon, is "yes". Writing on the op-ed page of today's Washington Post, O'Hanlon says the current operational commitments for the Army have all but sapped its ability to do anything else that might crop up -- like say, a deployment to Liberia. Without an authorization of additional soldiers by Congress, or a significant change in America's commitments abroad, the Army will not be able to deploy anywhere for some time. This total of nearly 250,000 deployed troops must be generated from an Army of just over 1 million. The active-duty force numbers 480,000, of which fewer than 320,000 are easily deployable at any given moment. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard together include 550,000 troops, many of whom already have been called up at least once since 9/11.Analysis: O'Hanlon offers some suggestions to fix the mess, like "Make a higher percentage of Army troops deployable" or "Approach a broader range of allies, especially larger countries such as France and Germany and even Japan and South Korea, for substantial troop contributions." I've been saying this for some time too. But these prescriptions are easier said than done. The short-term fix is probably to lean on our allies to provide some additional soldiers for our commitments in places like the Balkans and Iraq. But that will require our compromise on some of our strategic goals, since our allies may not see entirely eye-to-eye with us on every single issue. Given a choice between that, and a broken Army, I would choose the former. Our world is too uncertain for America to face with a force that needs 2-3 years to rebuild itself. We must start posturing now for the threats we can see, and those we can't see, and that means rebuilding our military capacity to deploy as rapidly as possible. White House plans new aid push for Afghanistan Elaine Grossman reports in Inside the Pentagon that the Bush Administration has decided to boost the aid it's giving to the infant nation of Afghanistan. The boost will include more money, as well as additional American boots on the ground. Presumably, this comes in response to a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which many critics have attributed to a lackluster U.S. effort there to secure and rebuild the country. Concerned that hard-won security and political successes in Afghanistan may be at risk without fresh support, the Bush administration's national security team is crafting what officials describe as a major new aid initiative to bolster that nation's central government in Kabul, Inside the Pentagon has learned. Wednesday, July 02, 2003
Happy 30th Birthday, All-Volunteer Military America's military celebrates an important birthday this week -- the 30th anniversary of its transformation from a conscription-based force to an all-volunteer force. For a generation now, America's finest sons and daughters have volunteered for military service instead of being pressed into service by force of law. The change has been spectacular. America's military could not train, deploy and fight as it does if not for the high caliber of people in the ranks. Gadgets don't win wars -- people do. Thirty years ago today - a full generation back - the United States put the military draft behind it.Analysis: Earlier this year, Rep. Charlie Rangel suggested a return to the draft for a variety of reasons. Some were flatly political -- he wanted to embarass the members of Congress who called for war without a personal stake in the venture. But he also wanted to return to the days where Americans shared the burdens of military service, and felt the sacrifices. I think that's a noble goal. But it's not the ultimate goal of the military. We have a military to fight and win our wars, and also to prevent war by deployments such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. Our military is not a social experiment, nor is it a way to promote national bonhomie or civic pride. I agree that military service does promote those things, and most veterans have a certain sense of patriotism that non-veterans can't themselves enjoy. But that's not a good enough reason to resume the draft, and destroy the hard-won gains of our professional military. There are problems that stem from the existence of an all-volunteer force; these must be mitigated. A professional force may separate itself from civil society, in order to promote the martial virtues necessary for military success. We mitigate this by encouraging short-term enlistments (like mine), where citizen-soldiers rotate through the military for a few years at a stretch. A professional force also has the potential to become a mercenary force. This has not occurred yet, but it may occur someday if America becomes sufficiently distanced from its military so as to cavalierly send it into harm's way. Our military could also become a mercenary force if it divorced itself from the Constitutional ideals of our nation, or the norms and values of American society. The constant rotation of junior personnel through the ranks makes this unlikely, as does the oath of office sworn to by every soldier and officer. But it is a danger we should be cognizant of. Tuesday, July 01, 2003
Why Lawrence may have an effect on the military A partial response to Jacob Levy of the Volokh Conspiracy Jacob Levy writes a lot of things in his post on the military. It's clear at the outset that there is room for disagreement between reasonable and intelligent people on this issue. Notwithstanding that, I think he's wrong about a few things. 1. The Uniform Code of Military Justice isn't precisely the issue here; 10 U.S.C. 654 is. Nonetheless, I have some issues with the way he characterizes the UCMJ. First, he writes that "The internal governance of the military isn't quite a black box as far as constitutional law is concerned; but it's very close." That's not exactly right. For starters, the UCMJ is subject to the constraints of the U.S. Constitution. Criminal adjudications under the UCMJ are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, a court which has the same stature (although not the same prestige) as any Art. III appeals court. Military convictions are subject to the same Constitutional rules that civilian convictions are, and indeed, many are overturned in the military context. 1a. He also writes that "The Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes court-martial and other internal legal proceedings that are very clearly not as advantageous to defendants as the (currently-interpreted-) Constitutional minumum for civilian trials." It's also unfair to say the military system is more punitive or less fair than the civilian system. In many ways, the military system is more fair than the civilian system because it must compensate for the overarching coercive nature of the military environment. For example, the military privilege against self-incrimination is substantially stronger than that in the civilian world, and indeed was cited in the Court's Miranda decision as a model for the protections articulated by the Court in that decision. (For more on this, see my piece in Writ at Findlaw.Com on the military justice system.) 2. The UCMJ exists in Title 10 as a creation of Congress; it's codified in Chapter 47 of Title 10 in the United States Code. However, Congress has delegated the administration of the UCMJ to the President, and executive branch attorneys actually revise the UCMJ every two years and promulgate the rules of evidence and procedure that go along with the actual punitive articles. There is a great deal of deference to the UCMJ because it is very much an executive-branch creation; a product of the respective service JAGs. 3. 10 U.S.C. 654, on the other hand, is somewhat different as a matter of law and politics. It is a creature of Congress, not the Pentagon, and can only be changed by Congress or the courts. As a federal statute, it is due the deference that the Court would give to the political branches on any legislative matter. It may also be due some Constitutional deference in accordance with the delegation of powers in Art. I, Sec. 8: "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." I don't think it's a slam dunk to say this is a matter of national security and military deference, therefore the courts will defer. For starters, it's not clear whether this ban is in America's national security interest. (See, e.g., the discharge of Arab-speaking linguists from the Defense Language Institute earlier this year) Second, it's not clear that a statute like this will receive the same deference, given its legal context and legislative history, as a regulation promulgated directly by the Pentagon. Third, I'm not sure that this policy will get the 100% backing of the Pentagon today. 4. I cited to Goldman v. Weinberger for exactly the opposite proposition that Jacob points out, with help from a couple of other cases like Rostker v. Goldberg. The point is that the military is allowed to make certain regulations that do not heavily burden the exercise of fundamental rights. The military can burden such rights on the margins, such as requiring Jewish soldiers to wear earth-tone yarmulkes or shave their beards in order to achieve a proper seal with their M40 protective mask. But it cannot flatly tell these servicemembers not to engage in their conduct. In other words, a little burden is okay; a big burden is not. The military has gotten away with burdening fundamental rights in a small way, and it has been deferred to by the courts. But it may not get such deference when it heavily burdens fundamental rights that have been recognized by the court. This is somewhat of a slippery slope problem, on which I am grateful to Eugene Volokh's thoughtful piece in the Harvard Law Review. (Full disclosure: I'm still trying to understand the full argument of Eugene's article) However, the point is that the military's conduct may be okay at one point on the slope, while not being okay at a subsequent, lower point on the slope. As I understand fundamental rights analysis, the extent of the burden plays some role in determining the outcome. To the extent that the policy on gays burdens the rights of gays much more heavily than any other military policy does with respect to a fundamental right, this policy may be struck down. 5. Jacob writes that the military policy does not directly prohibit sodomy, and since that's what the Supreme Court recognized, the Supreme Court's decision does not directly delegitimize the military's policy. I can see this point, but I think it's wrong as a matter of Constitutional law. For starters, Justice Kennedy's opinion did not just strike down the Texas sodomy statute; it recognized a fundamental right of intimate conduct for homosexual persons. The fundamental rights analysis does not require an exact fit between the facts of Lawrence and the facts of a military case in order to work. Once the Court recognizes a fundamental right, the analysis works quite differently. The burden shifts to the government to show a compelling interest for its policy which burdens the right, and that the policy is narrowly tailored to that compelling interest. The right recognized by the Court was not just sodomy -- it was "intimate conduct". 10 U.S.C. 654 may not directly speak to sodomy per se, but it certainly speaks to "intimate conduct" of homosexual persons. Thus, I believe this policy cannot stand as a matter of Constitutional law. But as I said before, this is an area where reasonable people can disagree, and it's certainly no slam dunk. Update: Jacob has a response at the Volokh Conspiracy, which he slyly calls a "couple of quick rejoinders". Hah. Remind me never to pick an intellectual fight with an academic again. Jacob has a long and well-researched note that I frankly don't have time to respond to. Even if I could, it looks like he's probably right on some of the important legal issues that will decide this fight in the courts. I may write on this later, if I get some time after work tonight or tomorrow. But until then, it's back to the salt mines (law firm) for me. . . Will Lawrence have any effect on the military? Jacob Levy thinks I'm wrong (along with Mark Kleiman) about Lawrence and gays in the military. He shares his reasons why at the Volokh Conspiracy. I agree with some of his arguments, but disagree with his conclusions. More to follow tonight ... Monday, June 30, 2003
'An army of builders' Fareed Zakaria writes in Newsweek that America may need to reorient its military towards nation-building in the wake of our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and maybe now Liberia. The point is one that I also made in my essay on nation-building in the Washington Monthly. Our 21st century military force has transformed itself to fight with more lethal precision and efficacy than any military in history. But it has not effectively transformed itself to deal with the challenges of nation-building. Zakaria writes: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is rightly proud of having pushed the military toward thinking about war in the 21st century. He has made it fight wars of the future, not the past—except in one crucial sense. America’s future conflicts are all likely to be short on war and long on nation-building.Thoughts... Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has pushed the military to realign its force structure in some small ways towards this end. The FY2005 Pentagon budget bill will include legislative provisions to shift manpower in key specialties (MP, Civil Affairs, engineers, etc) from the reserve forces to the active forces. That will help a great deal. But it's still not enough. We have invested an awful lot in the information architecture of way, and the precision firepower of war. We have not built human organizations capable of managing the complex operations after the war's completion. If the current trend continues, and America continues to deploy its military to failed states, we may need to build some type of constabulary force that's organized and equipped to deal with this precise situation. If we don't, we will continue to pound square combat units into round nation-building missions and suffer the consequences. Also see this piece by Frederick Kagan in the current issue of the Weekly Standard. He writes, as I have before, that: It is time to stop pretending that the United States can prosecute a war on terror, conduct peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, and maintain the security of the homeland without a substantial increase in the size of the armed forces. General Shinseki, the recently retired Army chief of staff, warns us to "beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division army"--and even he understates the problem. In truth, the armed forces need an increase in size of at least 25 percent. Friday, June 27, 2003
A U.S. led permanent peacekeeping force? Esther Schrader reports in the Los Angeles Times that this is exactly what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has in mind. Such a force could be deployed in hotspots like East Timor, or as a follow-on force to places like Iraq. The force would operate outside the auspices of the United Nations and NATO and would include thousands of U.S. Army troops trained for, and permanently assigned to, peacekeeping work. Such an undertaking would represent a major reversal by the Bush administration, which came into office deeply opposed to tying up U.S. military forces in international peacekeeping operations. The plan would probably be opposed by the Army, which has resisted efforts to have its troops drawn into peacekeeping duties. There are other obstacles as well. Some analysts question how many nations would sign up for such a force if it were under the control of the United States, whose willingness to collaborate with other countries is highly suspect in many parts of the world.Query: Why doesn't the Army just do this on its own? Why not realign part of the force structure to build brigade-sized task forces of MPs, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical and other specialty units needed for peacekeeping? I think the multilateral component is useful for political reasons. But if we see a need for this kind of force, we ought to build it ourselves. Coda to my note on Lawrence Several learned readers wrote me with questions and critiques related to my thoughts on Lawrence. I'd like to address a couple of them, since I thought they were particularly good. 1) Doesn't a challenge need a plaintiff? Yes, it does. Various judicial doctrines require someone to actually be affected by a policy in order to sue the federal government. In this case, that means that someone who challenges the "don't ask, don't tell" policy needs to have been affected. I see two classes of potential plaintiffs: - Gay men and women currently serving in the military who feel the current policy burdens their fundamental rights to intimate sexual relations, but who have not been detected or discharged yet. - Gay men and women who served on active duty but did come to the attention of their superiors, either by statement, act or marriage. (See 10 U.S.C. Sec. 654 for its definition of what counts) Unfortunately, there are no shortage of either group of plaintiffs. I knew a few gay soldiers and officers in the Army, and I imagine there were many more I did not know. The latter category includes several thousand men and women from the last decade alone, according to the Servicemember's Legal Defense Network. (See, e.g., the 7 military linguists discharged from the Defense Language Institute.) 2) The decision doesn't expressly overrule the military's policy -- how can it apply? The Court went further in Lawrence than it ever has before in the area of personal liberty, and specifically, sexual liberty. Justice Kennedy's opinion includes extremely broad language of the sort I remember reading in Brown v. Board of Education, or Miranda v. Arizona. This language will now form the foundation of any legal challenge to the policy, and lower courts will be bound by the parameters set forth by Justice Kennedy: "Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.This is extremely broad language for the Court, and I think it's all but certain that it would help a plaintiff overturn the ban. Remember, this is not the kind of case where you would need to analogize between the facts of Lawrence and the facts of a challenge to the military's ban. Once the Court recognizes the fundamental right, the challenge may occur in all sorts of contextual contexts. Subsequent courts need only apply the "strict scrutiny" test to the law burdening the fundamental right in order to see if the law will stand. I'm no expert on the subject (for real expertise, see Eugene Volokh and Jack Balkin), but I'm pretty sure this decision is the death knell for the military's current policy. 3) What about discrimination in other contexts? Some lower courts have upheld decisions by adoption agencies and other administrative bodies to deny certain rights and privileges to gays because, inter alia, their conduct could be criminalized. I think that Lawrence also means the end of these laws as well. If you cannot criminalize this conduct anymore, and indeed, if such conduct is a fundamental right, then it follows that these kinds of policies can't stand either. However, there may be some more to these laws that I don't understand, so I defer to the real experts in the family law area. 4) What about colleges who don't want ROTC? I agree with Mark Kleiman here -- I think this is going to be the battleground on this issue in the next 5 years. Universities like UCLA currently accept the military's presence because federal law threatens the withholding of their federal research and financial money if they don't let them on. In many situations, e.g. UCLA and Berkeley, the requirement to allow the military on campus clashes with the university's policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It's as if federal law required these colleges to allow a law firm on campus to recruit when that firm refused to hire minorities. I think it's likely that some universities will now challenge that federal law, known as the "Solomon Amendment", on the basis that it is unconstitutional per Lawrence. I'm not sure whether the underlying policy would need to be banned first, or whether the universities could challenge the Solomon Amendment beforehand. But I think it's a safe bet that we will see this issue resurface on college campuses in the near future. That would be unfortunate, both for the universities and the military. Here, I speak not from a legal perspective but from that of an Army officer who graduated from UCLA with a liberal education. The institutions most likely to kick the military off campus are the institutions we most need represented in our military. When the Harvards and Berkeleys no longer produce military officers, the military suffers a great deal. In many ways, these officers raise the intellectual bar within the military, liberalizing it on the margins and adding something that would not otherwise be there. To be sure, West Point is a fine institution that produces amazing leaders. But they do not come to the Army with the same diversity of perspective and experience that officers from civilian universities do. That experience can be useful when building a cohesive unit to fight a war. But this diversity of experience critically important when dealing with complex nation-building missions like the one in Iraq right now. I hope that university leaders pursue a path of moderation on this policy, seeking the best answer for their institutions and for the military. Thursday, June 26, 2003
What will the Supreme Court's decision mean for the military? Today, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects the liberty of homosexual persons to engage in "intimate conduct" in accordance with their personal preferences. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy effectively demolished the Court's precedent from Bowers v. Hardwick, expressly overruling it and its holding that states could regulate the conduct of homosexual persons. What does this mean for the current law banning gays in the military? That ban exists as a matter of federal law -- 10 U.S.C. 654 -- and presumably can be overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court. I think that one of the first effects of Lawrence will be to trigger a challenge in U.S. District Court to the current policy banning gays in the military. That challenge will essentially cite Lawrence for the proposition that homosexual conduct is a fundamental right that the state cannot burden without some compelling interest -- and that the restrictions must be narrowly tailored to that compelling interest. The plaintiffs will argue that this policy (the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy) burdens the right of gay soldiers to engage in the conduct they want to, and that such a burden on a fundamental right is unconstitutional. Given the Court's holding today in Lawrence, I think that a lower court would almost certainly side with the plaintiffs. The only possible savior for the military's ban will be the "national security" deference sometimes given to the Executive Branch and the military by the courts. In recent cases, such as challenges to President Bush's war on Iraq, the courts have expressly deferred to executive judgment on military matters, and left such issues to be decided by the political branches. Such "national security" deference was also invoked by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, where the Court upheld the detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II. However, I don't think such deference will save the ban on gays in the ranks. The Court has held in religious freedom cases that the military can curtail certain personal freedoms, such as the right of Jews to wear certain religious garb. However, this is different. This ban places much more of a burden on the rights of gays than the military's uniform policies do, and this ban has a much more drastic effect (automatic discharge). After reading the Court's opinion in Lawrence, I think it's likely that this ban will be struck down as unconstitutional. Read 'em yourself! Slowly, like a glacier, our government is opening itself to the public. I've already praised the Pentagon's webpage as a great resource for reporters and citizens alike. Today I'd like to call your attention to the Supreme Court's site, which should get a lot of traffic today as the Court announces some major decisions. The Court posts its recent opinions on this page, in PDF form, as they will look in the official U.S. Supreme Court case reporter. Two other sites also deserve mention. The Legal Information Institute at Cornell has a great repository of Supreme Court cases, and I like the way they break up their cases by type of opinion (majority, concurrence, dissent, etc), and post them in both HTML and PDF format. Findlaw.Com is also a great resource for those who want to read these pieces of history themselves. Findlaw also has a great Constitution page that contains an annotated version of the Constitution -- in case you want to know the legal rulings behind a particular clause. So when the Supreme Court announces its decisions (and maybe retirements) today, don't take my word for it -- see for yourself. And them read them for yourself. Our society claims to live by the rule of law. I think it's a great idea for everyone to understand how the way these laws are translated into living documents by the Supreme Court. There's no better way to do that than to read the Court's decisions. Tuesday, June 24, 2003
Dick Gephardt and Harry Truman -- at odds with the Supreme Court? Eugene Volokh and Glenn Reynolds (among others) have rightfully questioned an assertion by Democratic presidential contender Richard Gephardt that he would "do executive orders to overcome any wrong thing the Supreme Court does." The statement was made, presumably, to persuade Democratic audiences that Gephardt would fight for their interests despite the conservatives appointed to the Supreme Court and lower courts over the last few decades. Eugene and Glenn were right to point out that "you can't overturn a Constitutional decision by the Supreme Court with an executive order." Today, Gephardt's campaign responded to The Note, an ABC News weblog. "The fact that this question comes from libertarian law professors should speak for itself," spokesman Erik Smith wrote in an e-mail. "Dick Gephardt knows the law. The president can not overturn a Supreme Court decision. That's not what he said. He was simply expressing his commitment to diversity and his willingness to use the tools of his office to promote affirmative action programs to the fullest extent possible. It's important to remember that Harry Truman used an executive order to integrate the military."Eugene responds, correctly I think, that Truman's executive order to desegrate the military came at a time when the Supreme Court was already moving in that direction. As a legal matter, the order also did not contravene any decisions of the Court, nor did it directly contradict anything passed by Congress. [Arguably, Congress did endorse a segregated military through its appropriations and oversight legislation, but it did not directly contradict President Truman's order once issued.] My two cents... Harry Truman makes for an interesting choice of precedent for the Gephardt campaign. It is true that he issued Executive Order 9981, effectively ending segregation in the military, when Congress and the Supreme Court did not do so. This was an act of courage and principle for a President who had lots of both. Harry Truman is also famous for another Executive Order -- one held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Executive Order No. 10340 (16 Fed. Reg. 3503) directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the Youngstown Co. steel mill after its labor force threatened a strike during the height of the Korean War. The mill owners and labor unions sued President Truman, claiming this order was an unconstitutional extension of the President's power to make laws, execute laws, and act as Commander-in-Chief under Art. II. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that President Truman did not have the power to act as he did. To this day, the "Steel Seizure Case" (especially Justice Jackson's concurrence) remains the Court's primary guidance to the Executive and Legislative branches on the boundaries of their power. The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.There is great irony in the assertion by Dick Gephardt's campaign that he would follow the example of Harry Truman with respect to Executive Orders. Harry Truman did some great things unilaterally, such as his desegregation of the military and recognition of Israel, among others. But we can also learn what presidents cannot do from Truman's experience in the White House. I hope that Mr. Gephardt learns those lessons as well. How much did the "green brief" help the Court decide Grutter? And what lessons can we learn from the military on issues of race? Yesterday's decision by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger simultaneously clarified and muddied the waters for affirmative action in the United States. The Court issued two doctrinal issues, which may be very helpful for lawyers and educators in the future: 1) The Court will look at affirmative action programs with "strict scrutiny", and that such scrutiny is not always "strict in theory, fatal in fact." This issue was somewhat clear after the Court's decision in Adarand v. Pena, but not entirely so because of the muddy way the Bakke case (the last case on affirmative action in education) applied its legal test. 2) Diversity can be a compelling interest for institutions of higher education to pursue with their admissions policies. This is very important, because it blesses one of the two main goals of affirmative action. (The other one being to remedy past disadvantage) However, the decision did not say whether colleges can use diversity as a compelling interest for the hiring of professors or other staff. That may become a battleground in lower courts on this issue. However, to pass strict scrutiny, a program must be "narrowly tailored" to a "compelling government interest." On this second prong, the Court found the U.Michigan undergraduate program unconstitutional (see Gratz v. Bollinger), and the law school's program constitutional. In her majority opinion in the law school case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor appears to have relied heavily on claims by business and military leaders that affirmative action in colleges helps them recruit a diverse work force. The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.” Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998); Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities (M. Chang, D. Witt, J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 2003).Analysis: The amicus brief cited by the Court was called the "green brief" by many because it was submitted by a number of retired military officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf and others. (military = green) The brief was written by veteran Supreme Court litigator Carter G. Phillips. I found the brief to be exceptionally well written, and quite well grounded in facts. America's military is incredibly diverse, although a schism exists between the enlisted ranks and officers when it comes to racial and ethnic diversity. This has the potential to create social problems within the ranks. Recognizing this, America's military has conscientously recruited minorities for its leadership ranks (enlisted and officer), and developed programs to retain the best minority NCOs and officers as they rise through the ranks. Those programs implicitly depend on the presence of minority college graduates who can be recruited as officers. However, I don't think Justice O'Connor's citation to the green brief in Grutter was necessarily right, for the following reasons: 1) It was odd to cite the green brief in the law school decision when the brief was clearly aimed at the undergraduate case. America's military takes some lawyers and professionals from graduate school, but not many. It recruits the vast majority of its officers from ROTC programs at public and private universities across the country. The next sizable chunk comes from the military academies. These schools, by virtue of their size, tend to rely on the sort of mechanical affirmative action programs the Court held unconstitutional in Gratz (the undergrad case). I understand that Justice O'Connor wanted to cite the most persuasive authority possible in her opinion upholding the law school's program, but the citation to the green brief seems misplaced to me. 2) The demise of U.Michigan's undergraduate program -- and all mechanical affirmative action programs like it -- will certainly create problems for the military and its recruitment of minority officers. As Eugene Volokh points out, large schools universally use such programs to sort through the thousands of applications they get each year. (I found this to be true when I wrote my thesis on affirmative action in the UC system in 1996) In the short term, colleges will have to figure out some other way to do affirmative action that looks more like the U.Michigan law school than the U.Michigan undergrad system. In the short term, that may result in less minority students being admitted to these universities, as we saw in California after the regents banned affirmative action in 1995 (and Prop. 209 passed in 1996). That, in turn, may result in less minority students for ROTC programs to recruit in colleges, particularly the top colleges like Berkeley, UCLA and Michigan. Ultimately, that's bad for the military, because such officers tend to bring a very important, liberalizing, intellectual component to the service. 3. Interestingly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held some of these programs to be unconstitutional in Saunders v. White last year because the Army had gotten so good at diversity that it no longer needed some affirmative action programs. Sociologists Charlie Moskos and John Butler wrote a great book on the military's successes in this area called All We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way. The military has come a long way since the days when then-LT Colin Powell faced discrimination while stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, in the early 1960s. Today's force has roughly reached parity, where the percentages of minority officers equals the proportion of available in the college graduate pool (with some variations by ethnic group). The senior NCO corps is an even greater success story, where minorities are significantly overrepresented in relation to their percentage of American society. In many ways, I think the Army provides a good road map for the rest of society on matters of racial and ethnic diversity. Our military has taken race into account over the last 30 years to correct imbalances at all levels, and it has worked. It may now be time to remove some of those programs, or target them more effectively at groups that remain disenfranchised from the Army leadership (Latinos and Asians, for example). The ultimate irony of the military's success is that it has done well by providing economic and educational opportunities to young Americans who would not otherwise have such opportunity in our colleges and businesses. The military has even taken fire critics who say that such opportunities disproportionately draw too many minorities into the line of fire. This was what fueled Rep. Charlie Rangel's call for a national draft earlier in the year. Maybe this decision will open more doors to minorities in education and other areas, so that they don't have to choose between a life of economic hardship and a life of soldiering -- but I doubt it. America's military still offers opportunities for adventure, training and service that our colleges do not. For the foreseeable future, I think that young men and women will join the military for things they can't get in college, and they will leave the service enriched by their experience. More to follow... Monday, June 23, 2003
U.S. government detains a third "enemy combatant" The Washington Post reports tonight (and on tomorrow's front page) that the Bush Administration has transferred another man from Justice Department custody to that of the Defense Department -- labeling him an "enemy combatant." Ali S. Marri was originally arrested in Dec. 2001 and charged with lying to the FBI about contact with known terrorists. He was transferred yesterday from a federal jail in Illinois to a military brig at an undisclosed location. Marri has been deemed an "enemy combatant" by the President, joining Yasser Hamdi and Jose Padilla as alleged terrorists who have been so labeled by the Bush Administration. Bush designated Marri an enemy combatant yesterday morning after federal prosecutors in Illinois dropped charges of false statements to the FBI and credit card fraud. Alice Fisher, deputy assistant attorney general for the Justice Department's criminal division, said prosecutors were confident they could have prevailed in court. She said they decided to forgo the charges in an effort to deter terrorist attacks.More to follow tomorrow... Time to bring home the 3rd Infantry Division The Evening Standard, a British newspaper, has a disturbing piece on the soldiers of B Company, 3-15 Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, from the sands of Iraq. This piece does not mince words about what's going on with these men in the desert. Instead, it lays out their thoughts and feelings on war and peace in the language of a soldier -- raw, coarse and honest. What they told me, in a series of extraordinary interviews, will make uncomfortable reading for US and British politicians and senior military staff desperate to prevent the liberation of Iraq turning into a quagmire of Vietnam proportions, where the behaviour of troops feeds the hatred of an occupied people.Analysis: I can't condemn these men for saying what they feel, or feeling what any honest infantryman would feel after fighting his way into a nation like Iraq. They have seen carnage I can't imagine, both in the Iraqis they killed and the Americans they watched die. After training in the desert for 9 months and fighting their way to Baghdad, it's natural that these men would feel the way they do. Those feelings can only be exacerbated by the weeks of "peace" keeping since President Bush declared an "end" to combat on 1 May. American soldiers have continued to fight a shadowy war since 1 May, chasing ghosts of Saddam and taking fire from the shadows. The armored dash across the desert may be over, but the fighting is certainly not. Arguably, the current military situation does more psychological damage to soldiers than open combat, where lines are more clearly drawn and safety can be calculated as a function of distance from the enemy. On the streets of Baghdad, there is no safe place -- no refuge for the mind or body. In time, these men's minds and bodies will probably heal, although they will never again be whole. Unfortunately, American policymakers do not have the luxury of time. Every day we let these men patrol Baghdad represents a significant operational and strategic risk for our occupation of Iraq. B/3-15 Infantry is ready to come home. Their soldiers and leaders are fatigued, and stretched to the breaking point. It's a testament to American society and our Army's training that these men have not broken yet; that they have not committed some unspeakable act against the Iraqis for the world to watch on CNN. Bottom Line: It's time to bring these men home. They've accomplished their mission, fighting what Max Boot called in the latest Foreign Affairs issue "one of the signal achievements in military history." But now they need to be relieved in place -- either by active forces, reservists, or our NATO allies. Studies of war have shown that fighting units need to be replaced after a period of days in contact -- no matter how elite, how well-trained, or how well-disciplined. (See, e.g., Acts of War by Richard Holmes and On Killing by David Grossman.) Morale, cohesion, and effectiveness simply break down after prolonged exposure to combat. This is true of low-intensity and high-intensity combat. At some point, the 3rd Infantry Division will become combat ineffective as a result of stress and prolonged exposure to war. This is the human dimension of war, and it's often neglected by policymakers who would like for war to be something sterile fought by machines. We must recognize the human reality of war and bring these men home. An American warrior Americans are not warlike by nature, but our generals have always captivated us. From Washington to Jackson to Pershing to Patton to Schwartzkopf, our military has been led by colorful characters who, in turn, have inspired public pride in the military. (Others, such as McClellan and Westmoreland, have inspired contempt, showing that Americans can also show disdain for their generals when they want to.) Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of Central Command, fits squarely in this former category. Today, the Washington Post profiles the man who has led American forces to military victory in Afghanistan and Iraq. The arc of his four-star career -- after the Army sent him back for his college degree -- took Franks to commands around the world. Those who know him have enjoyed the warm friendship of a guy who likes to give bear hugs, can shed tears over wounded soldiers, break into a country tune over a margarita, puff a cigar while strolling through one of Saddam's palaces with a pistol stuck in his belt, or pose for a snapshot after a swim in a Texas lake with fellow officers -- on horseback, and stark naked except for a Stetson.Thoughts... The American military has radically changed itself over the last 30 years since Vietnam. (See Prodigal Soldiers by James Kitfield for a great history of these changes.) It has become a more educated, professional, intellectual, and well-managed force. Its volunteer officers and senior enlisted soldiers are extremely good at what they do, and the military devotes an enormous about of resources to training/educating them to become even better. Tommy Franks had the raw material as a young lieutenant and captain to become a great leader. But he would not have become one if not for the mentoring, training and education he got along the way. When I read his profile, I was impressed by the way the Army plucked him like a diamond in the rough -- schooled and polished him -- and eventually produced a warfighter who could lead hundreds of thousands. Looking for legal commentary? The decisions handed down today by the Supreme Court are obviously what most newspapers will lead with tomorrow. I have some thoughts on the Michigan case, but I'll reserve them for later. Instead, I recommend turning to the following pages for intelligent commentary on these cases: - The Volokh Conspiracy: run by Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law expert at UCLA Law School, with guest commentary from several other law professorsAs always, copies of the decisions are available on the Supreme Court's site and the Findlaw site, in PDF form. I will read the decisions later today and offer my thoughts afterwards. More to follow... Sunday, June 22, 2003
Foreign fighters complicate the mix in Iraq The New York Times reported on Sunday about a very ominous development in Iraq -- the presence of foreign guerillas in the midst of American forces. This is an extremely significant development, because the presence of foreigners tends to signify two possibilities. First, it signals that a transnational movement of young armed men is taking place -- and that they're migrating towards Iraq. Second, it may indicate a resurgence of Al Qaeda in Iraq. After all, Al Qaeda began as a transnational guerilla force of "Afghan Arabs" who successfully fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. The influx of foreign Arab guerillas to Iraq seems eerily familiar, given the institutional history of Al Qaeda. Military officials say that American troops in Iraq have had to contend with Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis, Algerians, Lebanese and even Chechens.Analysis: This is going to become a major issue for America in the coming weeks and months. We must quarantine Iraq from the outside influences that may seek to push it down a particular path -- whether it's Shiite or Sunni fundamentalism, or some other plan. If nothing else, we must do so because these foreigners bring with them weapons and training that subsequently get used against our own soldiers. Given a finite amount of men and materiel inside Iraq, we will eventually root out the guerillas now harassing our forces. But as we saw in Vietnam, it's impossible to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign when the insurgents continue to multiply and resupply. These outsiders appear to be fulfilling that function inside Iraq, and it must be stopped. Al Qaeda operative pleads guilty to charges But what did the U.S. use as leverage to get the guilty plea? By now, most have heard about the plea bargain by Al Qaeda operative Iyman Faris, a 34-year-old naturalized citizen from Ohio who was planning to bomb the Brooklyn Bridge. Apparently, detained-Al Qaeda leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed fingered Mr. Faris for his inchoate plan to destroy the landmark bridge. (Mohammed is being held at an undisclosed location by American intelligence officers who, presumably, are interrogating him for every detail he knows about Al Qaeda.) Prosecutors said Mr. Faris traveled in Afghanistan and Pakistan beginning in 2000, meeting with Osama bin Laden and working with one of his top lieutenants, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, to help organize and finance jihad causes. After returning to the United States in late 2002, officials said, he began casing the Brooklyn Bridge and discussing via coded messages with Qaeda leaders ways of using blowtorches to sever the suspension cables.Analysis: I was not surprised to see this news story hit the press. Our security agencies (CIA, FBI, DoD, et al) have done a lot to take down Al Qaeda and its ability to operate as a global terror network. However, I was surprised to see the method used by federal prosecutors to obtain this plea bargain: The allegations against Mr. Faris bear similarities to the case against José Padilla, a Chicago man who last year was accused of plotting with Al Qaeda to plant a "dirty bomb" and who has been imprisoned in a military brig as an enemy combatant.Now, I'm no softie when it comes to dealing with terrorists, criminals, or enemy combatants -- however you may categorize these men. But this looks to me like an abuse of the government's power to designate someone as an "enemy combatant." Presumably, such a label should only apply in the obvious cases. An enemy combatant should be like obscenity as defined by the Supreme Court -- I'll know it when I see it. There shouldn't be a case where someone can be both a criminal and a combatant. If that's the case, then we ought to apply the presumptions in favor of the defendant and give them the constitutional process they're due. In this case, we appear to have held this label out there as a very big stick -- in order to induce Mr. Faris to take the measly carrot of criminal justice instead of the justice that Mr. Padilla now faces. On the whole, I think this move delegitimizes most of the arguments made by the government to keep men like Yasser Hamdi and Jose Padilla in government custody as enemy combatants -- without communication to counsel or the outside world. These men are probably dangerous; I think they probably did what the government thinks they did. The government argues that enemy combatants like Hamdi and Padilla are unequivocal enemies of the United States. Their conduct has made them so, and we should give them no quarter (legally speaking). Most importantly, the government argues that it cannot get intelligence out of people that are given constitutional rights, because there are practical difficulties associated with interrogating someone who has assistance of counsel. (I can certainly see this point) Yet, if that's true, why would we have accepted the plea bargains from Mr. Faris and from the "Lackawanna Six"? As Al Qaeda operatives inside the United States, these men may have some of the most actionable, critical intelligence available to our security community. Yet, we have accepted their plea bargains, given them counsel, and sent them to federal prison -- quite unlike Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla. |