INTEL DUMP

News analysis and commentary from Phillip Carter -- now located at http://www.intel-dump.com

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Saturday, March 01, 2003
 
Another big fish in America's net

Various news outlets are reporting that Pakistani officials arrested Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a key operational planner for Al Qaeda who was central to the Sept. 11 plot, in Pakistan. U.S. officials provided "intelligence and forensic" support, but no overt assistance with Special Forces or CIA personnel. I'm not surprised by this, given what I know about Pakistan's internal security service (the ISI). In any case, this individual is being held by the Pakistanis now, and according to various sources, the U.S. have access to him while he's in Pakistani custody. In some ways, this resembles the way that Al Qaeda member Ramzi bin-al-Shibh was caught -- and how he is presently detained. Our allies have physical custody of these men, but they allow us access to them for interrogation purposes. My guess is that the U.S. is actually directing the custody and interrogation itself, but using Pakistani surrogates in order to avoid any legal issues.

Query: Who will be the first terrorist to face trial by military tribunal?

The Pentagon released its "crimes and elements" for military tribunal on Friday. It now has most of the procedural rules in place for any military tribunals. The Pentagon has been interviewing attorneys to serve as judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys according to the Wall Street Journal. And now, we have several big fish in constructive or actual custody who meet the criteria in President Bush's 13 Nov 01 order:
1. Ramzi bin-al-Shibh
2. Zacarias Moussaoui
3. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
4. 650+ foot soldiers at Guantanamo who may be plausible test candidates for tribunals
* Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi are not eligible for trial by military tribunal under the 13 Nov 01 order because they are U.S. citizens
** Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld alluded to the possibility of trying captured Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein, by military tribunal for war crimes after the conclusion of military operations against Iraq.

Prediction: We will see military tribunals held within 6 months, with Ramzi bin-al-Shibh or Zacarias Moussaoui as the first defendants. Both men have been in U.S. custody for some time, and their intelligence value is less now than it was at the time of their capture. Mohammed is a great candidate for a tribunal, but he is about to go through an exhaustive interrogation process (an Intel Dump of sorts). It's unlikely that U.S. officials would want to jeopardize the intelligence-gathering process by putting him in a military court anytime soon.

Friday, February 28, 2003
 
Weekend Break: I've got reserve duty this weekend, which means less time online and less time to update Intel Dump. If any major stories break, I'll add my notes in the evening when I get home from my unit.

 
Headline blooper: Iraq appears more flexible than the 9th Circuit

Apparently, no one at the Los Angeles Times' website is paying attention to the juxtaposition of their headlines. Or if they are, they're trying to send a very pointed message to the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit: loosen up. See for yourself.

Court Won't Bend on Pledge Ruling
UPDATE: Appeals court refuses to reconsider ruling that "under God" reference is illegal.

Iraq Bends a Bit on Missiles
Baghdad agrees "in principle" to destroy its proscribed missiles.

Who knew that the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein was more willing to bend than the judges of the 9th Circuit?

 
Update: Pentagon releases its "Crimes and Elements" for military tribunals

The Defense Department released a draft version today of the "Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission," as reported in today's Wall Street Journal by Jess Bravin. The document was drawn up by Pentagon lawyers based on legal principles in international law, federal law, and military law. It is essentially a model penal code for the conduct of warfare according to the United States. Bravin and others have speculated that this list of crimes will be used to try both members of Al Qaeda and members of the Iraqi government.

Thursday, February 27, 2003
 
WSJ: White House to announce list of 'war crimes' for military tribunals

Legal correspondent Jess Bravin reports in Friday's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) that the White House has approved a list of crimes for possible use by military tribunals in the future. President Bush signed an order in November 2001 which established the military tribunals, and the Defense Department followed that announcement with a series of procedural regulations. These trials were originally intended for members of Al Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, in the event they were captured during the war in Afghanistan. To date, no one has been brought before a tribunal. However, some have speculated that alleged "20th hijacker" Zacarias Moussaoui might be moved to a military tribunal in the near future, given evidentiary and procedural problems in his case. Regardless, this development represents a major step towards the eventual establishment of tribunals, and is another indicator that the Bush Administration does intend to use this legal tool at some time.

The "crimes and elements" rules, which could be announced as early as Friday, aren't expected to allow prosecutions based solely on membership in the al Qaeda terrorist organization. The issue had divided administration officials, some of whom were concerned they might lack proof of specific crimes by some prisoners.

The rules are expected to grant the tribunals jurisdiction over war crimes, but not broader categories such as genocide and crimes against humanity which can occur outside of an armed conflict.
* * *
The rules are expected to allow prosecution for "unlawful combatancy" -- that is, fighting against U.S. forces. President Bush has declared all al Qaeda fighters unlawful combatants. While uniformed soldiers of an enemy nation's army cannot be prosecuted for waging war, Washington contends that members of a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda have no right to take up arms.
* * *
The first trials, which are likely to take place at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, may involve lower-level prisoners accused of unlawful combatancy rather than al Qaeda commanders accused of such war crimes as targeting civilians, taking hostages or using prohibited weapons such as poison gas.

Officials want to ensure the system is working well before turning to better-known defendants. Those could include Mr. Moussaoui, should President Bush decide that continuing his civilian trial in Alexandria, Va., poses too many national-security risks.

Moreover, Washington is weighing how to deal with leaders of the Iraqi regime should they be captured in a forthcoming conflict. The al Qaeda tribunals could be a model for war-crimes prosecutions of Iraqis.


Analysis: This final paragraph is something I've been speculating about for some time. In theory, there are several options for trying Iraqi officials after the war:
1) International Criminal Court (unlikely, given the US opposition to this institution)
2) International Criminal Tribunal - Iraq (Similar to the ICT-Yugoslavia, this would be an ad hoc court set up for this conflict)
3) U.S. federal criminal court (unlikely, given the Moussaoui problems)
4) U.S. military court (legally possible, under both the laws of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but not probable)
5) U.S. military tribunal (legally possible if the President amends his original 13 Nov 01 order)

There is nothing stopping President Bush from modifying his 13 Nov 01 order to allow for the use of military tribunals for Iraqi war criminals. The original order was written with Al Qaeda in mind, and the Iraqis would not be subject to this order as written. But the President could sign a second order which broaded the jurisdiction of these tribunals to include Iraq. Ironically, such an order would enjoy better legal support than the current tribunal order. Most of the recent tribunal cases (including Application of Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin) came out of World War II, and the need to try Japanese and German war criminals after that conflict. The situation in Iraq is far more analogous to those cases than that of global terrorism. Thus, I think the President would have very strong legal precedent behind him if he pursued this course of action.

Moreover, using military tribunals seems appropriate for the trial of war criminals. It's what we did at Nuremberg, and it's seems normatively appropriate for this type of proceeding. I would not be opposed to using military courts for this purpose, but I think that military tribunals may give the U.S. more flexibility in charging offenses and dealing with evidence for which there is no provision in the current Uniform Code of Military Justice. Prediction: we will see military tribunals implemented within a year, both for for Al Qaeda terrorists like Ramzi bin-al-Shibh and for Iraqi war criminals like their general staff and possibly Saddam Hussein (if he's captured alive).

 
Pentagon: General Shinseki's estimates for post-war occupation were "wildly off the mark"

In an earlier note, I predicted that the Pentagon would begin to retract statements made by Gen. Eric Shinseki which estimated that "several hundred thousand" soldiers would be necessary to occupy and rebuild Iraq. Gen. Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, made these comments on Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee during a hearing on the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (the budget). Here's the exact comment as reported by the New York Times on Wednesday:

In response to questioning by Sen. Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record) of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the committee, Shinseki said he couldn't give specific numbers of the size of an occupation force but would rely on the recommendations of commanders in the region.

"How about a range?" said Levin.

"I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers," the general said. "Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful."


The Pentagon held a press conference on Wednesday to clarify the official U.S. position on this issue. I thought this was all the backpedaling we would see. But apparently, that wasn't nearly enough. In Friday's New York Times, Eric Schmitt reports that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has directly contradicted Gen. Shinseki's estimate.

Mr. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, opened a two-front war of words on Capitol Hill, calling the recent estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki of the Army that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, "wildly off the mark." Pentagon officials have put the figure closer to 100,000 troops.

Mr. Wolfowitz then dismissed articles in several newspapers this week asserting that Pentagon budget specialists put the cost of war and reconstruction at $60 billion to $95 billion in this fiscal year. He said it was impossible to predict accurately a war's duration, its destruction and the extent of rebuilding afterward.

"We have no idea what we will need until we get there on the ground," Mr. Wolfowitz said at a hearing of the House Budget Committee. "Every time we get a briefing on the war plan, it immediately goes down six different branches to see what the scenarios look like. If we costed each and every one, the costs would range from $10 billion to $100 billion."


Analysis: Normally, this would be a major breach of protocol and a very embarassing schism within the Pentagon. However, it's not the first time that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has come in conflict with the Army or with Gen. Shinseki personally. OSD and the Army have differed recently on the cancellation of the Crusader artillery system, purchase of the Stryker armored vehicle, deployment of artillery to Afghanistan, and various other things. Secretary Rumsfeld went so far as to appoint Gen. Shinseki's replacement a full 12 months before his retirement, in what I think is a clear show of disapproval. Clearly, there is bad blood between OSD and the Army.

This is compounded by the fact that the Army does not have an operational role in war, per the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) are responsible for training, equipping, recruiting and maintaining the force. But the "Unified Combatant Commands" do the actual fighting. Gen. Shinseki may be the top uniformed official in the Army, but he plays little to no operational role in the war planning for Iraq. This became a major issue during the Kosovo war, when then-NATO Commander Wesley Clark wanted the Army to provide Apache helicopters immediately for attack missions against Serb troops. The Army fought him every step on the way, using every manner of administrative subterfuge. (See Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War) The result has been to further remove the services from the business of warfighting, and to give more power to generals like Tommy Franks at Central Command.

 
AP: Terror alert dropped to yellow
End of Muslim hajj cited as the reason for the decrease in threat

The AP reports this morning that the Bush Administration has lowered the national terror alert level from orange to yellow (from Ernie to Bert, in Sesame Street language, as one law enforcement friend describes it). Earlier in the week, Attorney General John Ashcroft had said there were no plans to raise or lower the terror alert level in the near future. Apparently, something has changed to merit this decrease in the threat.

Is this the right thing to do? I'm obviously not privy to the intelligence that is known at the top levels of government. But I'd imagine the terror alert level might rise again with any action against Iraq. Saddam Hussein has stated on multiple occasions that he intends to open a "second front" in the United States through terrorist attacks on American civilians. Such acts are a part of Al Qaeda's operational doctrine. The U.S. military has predicted for years that we would see terrorist attacks at home in the event of any war abroad -- particularly attacks on airports, seaports, rail lines, and other infrastructure systems necessary to support the war effort. I suspect we'll see the terror alert level rise again if/when hostilities begin in Iraq.

One note about threat levels and counter-measures: it's extremely costly to maintain a high threat level over extended periods of time. You risk tremendous disruption to every day life, and you expend tremendous amounts of time, energy and resources to implement these security measures. Police departments, fire departments, and military bases are not resourced for continuous operations at Condition Red. They fill these requirements out of hide -- often forcing cops and soldiers to work 12-hour, 16-hour, or sometimes 24-hour shifts to make ends meet. You can only keep that up so long. Thus, it's possible that the Administration is lowering the threat level now because it sees a major threat level increase in the future. Lowering the level to Yellow will give security personnel a chance to catch their breath before any future increase in America's readiness posture.

 
What would happen if we went to Condition Red?

Today's Wall Street Journal (subscription required) ran a pair of articles on what might happen if the U.S. raised the terror alert level further, from orange to red (or from Ernie to Elmo, in Sesame Street language). I was impressed by the articles; I think they got the main story right. Any increase to Red would necessarily entail a major disruption of American life. This elevation would drive a number of government actions at the federal, state and local level that could include things like government-office closures, road closures, school closures, and that's just the beginning.

Schools in Boston could close or go into "lockdown" mode, with doors locked and guards summoned. At ports in Los Angeles or Long Beach, Calif., the Coast Guard could choose to stop all 15 ships entering the ports a day, searching up to 8,000 cargo containers. Highways might be blocked and buses rerouted if they run near chemical factories.

That's a hint of what America could feel like under "red alert." Red, or "severe risk" of terror attacks, is the highest possible alert in the recently created Department of Homeland Security's five-color "security advisory system." The nation has never been under this new red alert before, though some officials say it would have been on Sept. 11, 2001, if the system had existed then.

Federal officials say they won't call a red alert lightly. The current orange alert -- one step below red -- was prompted by increased, albeit vague, reports of al Qaeda plots. The government wouldn't go to red unless "we had greater specificity with regard to the location, the specific target, perhaps the means," said Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge in a recent interview on ABC-TV's "Nightline." He added: "We're not there yet."

A U.S. invasion of Iraq -- or even an Iraqi retaliation against U.S. troops -- would not automatically trigger a red alert. "I think you will only see red if we are actually being attacked" on U.S. soil, a senior Homeland Security official said in an interview this week. The official gave the example of "a terrorist sitting in a building with a bomb and a chemical-weapon dispersal device" as the kind of thing that would trigger the red alert.


Appropriately enough given its name, the Wall Street Journal also ran an article titled "What Would Wall Street Do On Red Alert? Does It Know?". Here's a brief excerpt:

Much of the financial system's response will depend on the specific details behind the government's decision to boost the threat level to "red" for the first time, as well as any geographic specificity related to the warning. The start of a war wouldn't necessarily mean a move to red alert. But with war on the horizon, more companies are focusing on what to do in a red-alert scenario.

The New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market say they will remain open in the event of a red alert and won't move to backup facilities until absolutely necessary. The two markets say they could trade each other's stocks if need be: The Nasdaq, which is owned by the National Association of Securities Dealers, says it is equipped to trade NYSE-listed stocks, and the NYSE is prepared to trade about 250 of the biggest Nasdaq companies. But some securities firms are making more elaborate plans related to any move to a red alert, citing the possible closure of government facilities and transportation systems.

* * *
After the Sept. 11 attacks, the country's major financial firms and banks beefed up their emergency plans and, in some cases, even developed new backup sites to use in the event of a disaster. The Securities Industry Association, a Wall Street trade association, has developed a "virtual command center" in case of an attack but has no specific advice for what firms should do if the country is put on red alert.
* * *
Depending on the guidance from authorities, banks' responses could conceivably stretch to closing branches, switching to backup facilities, and evacuating staff. But most commonly, the plan is to stick as close to business-as-usual as regulators permit. Already, nearly all banks have heightened their security procedures following the 2001 attacks.

"If a disruption causes a temporary problem in one of our channels -- stores, ATMs, phone banks, online banking -- customers likely will be able to do their business at another one of our channels," says a spokesman for Wells Fargo & Co., which has one of the nation's largest bank-branch networks.


Bottom Line: In addition to stockpiling duct tape, plastic wrap, food, water, flashlights, radios, and dry socks... maybe we should all stockpile some cash too? I don't think we'd see a 1929-style run on the banks if a major attack occurred, especially given the proliferation of ATMs. But it may be prudent to include a financial component in every family's personal homeland security plan. Having a little extra cash on hand in the house -- to buy essentials like food and water -- seems like a good idea if there's a viable threat to America's financial system.

 
Pentagon Briefing II: Human shields may be combatants

Early on in the Pentagon briefing I mentioned yesterday, the senior defense official postulated that the 'human shields' in Baghdad may actually become enemy combatants (and therefore lawful targets) by their voluntary actions to aid the enemy. I didn't write anything on this because I thought it was a mistake, by a defense official who admitted he didn't know the law on this area. Nonetheless, Reuters news service and the LA Times picked up this story today and ran with it. (See this Wash. Post story for General Franks' thoughts on this issue.) Here's what the defense official said in the brief:

Excerpt from "A Senior Defense Official" (Most likely a career staffer in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy)

To sum up, we are now observing an activity that has been going on for over 10 years. The Iraqis have regularly placed air defense missile systems and associated equipment in and around civilian areas, including parks, mosques, hospitals, hotels, crowded shopping districts, and even in cemeteries. They have positioned rocket launchers next to soccer stadiums that are in active use, and they've parked operational surface-to-air missile systems in civilian industrial areas.

This is a well-organized, centrally managed effort, and its objectives are patently clear: preserve Iraq's military capabilities at any price, even though it means placing innocent civilians and Iraq's cultural and religious heritage at risk, all in violation of the fundamental principle that civilians and civilian objects must be protected in wartime.

Now as you all know, there has been plenty of reporting in the press on foreign volunteers as human shields going to Iraq. And what we're going to provide you with today -- I'll just hold up a couple articles I brought from The New York Times and The Washington Post -- is an assessment by the National Intelligence Council, which goes into some detail on, again, the history since Desert Storm of how Iraq has attempted to use foreign volunteers to protect legitimate military facilities. And I think you'll find this study quite interesting.

With that, we'll open it to questions. Yes, sir?

Q: Going to that, using foreign volunteers, why do you not consider those folks to be enemy combatants since they voluntarily place themselves there?

Sr. Defense Official: I'm not a legal expert, but you certainly could argue that since they're working in the service of the Iraqi government, they may, in fact, have crossed the line between combatant and noncombatant. But I can't pass judgment on that.

Yes, sir?

Q: Two questions. One, back in 1991, Saddam also took some civilians -- held them hostage for a while, but my memory's a little fuzzy. What happened in that case? Did he eventually let them go? And did -- is it your assessment at all that he learned anything from that or may decide that this time, maybe the strategy of letting them go, which he did last time, was the way to go? Do you think --

Sr. Defense Official: Obviously, as I recall, what happened was he took a number of foreigners, including U.S. citizens who were in Iraq, as well as Kuwaitis and POWs -- and it's described in some detail in the NIC report -- and distributed them at facilities. They were -- the reporting was they were relatively well-treated; they were moved around a lot. When he decided that the international uproar and furor over it was more negative than the positive results of using the human shields, he let them go. So, I think he has a certain calculus that, you know, he will look at those options and decide at what point it would work.

Keep in mind that the 1991 incident -- most of them did not involve volunteers. These were people who were "guests" of the Iraqi government, was the way they described it -- pardon my sarcasm. But they were, in effect, prisoners. So that's slightly different than what we're seeing in terms of foreigners going to the country. That also happened in the mid-'90s, where we had, during the 1997 crisis, we did have people going to Iraq who were volunteering themselves as shields. So, I think he'll use a calculus to try and determine when is this working for me, when is it not?

Q: And just one sort of technical question. It's often stated that the use of human shields is in violation of the international law of armed conflict. When you say that, are you referring to a recognized body of law? Or, you know, where can we go look that up? Is it a series of --

Sr. Defense Official: Yeah. I'm going to refer you to the OSD general counsel, but my -- I know there are certain portions of the Geneva Convention that state that explicitly, that it is not permissible to use the civilians. I don't know if they -- I think they may even use the term "shield."

They don't say "human shield", but if you go to OSD general counsel, they have the citation from the appropriate conventions.

Yes, ma'am.

Q: It seems to me -- I want to go back to this point here. This is a really critical distinction. Are these people, once they volunteer, are they putting them -- taking themselves away from civilians and they're there now on the combatant side? This to me seems like the crux of the whole matter. And you're saying, "I don't know, I'm not a legal expert." Somebody must have figured this out at the Pentagon.

Sr. Defense Official: Again, yeah, I'm -- I'm an intelligence expert. It's not that I'm trying to dodge the question, but I think we would need OSD policy and legal affairs folks to answer your question.

Analysis: I think the "Senior Defense Official" got snookered by some smart reporters. The law of armed conflict does not convert these individuals to enemy combatants simply by their presence in Baghdad. They continue to be civilians near legitimate military targets. However, if they actively aid the enemy, then they become combatants. It's a hard case, though, because you can argue (persuasively) that the mere action of going to Baghdad with the intention of frustrating U.S.-led bombing campaigns as a human shield is an act of giving aid to the enemy. In any case, I predict we'll see some comments from Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in the near future which clarify these comments, on the advice of counsel from the Pentagon's legal shop.

Wednesday, February 26, 2003
 
AP: Iraq positions military equipment next to holy sites

The Pentagon held a press conference today to show satellite (and other) reconnaissance photographs of Iraqi military equipment being moved next to mosques and other religious sites. Ordinarily, these sites would be protected locations under the international law of armed conflict, and they could not be deliberately targeted. However, by moving military equipment to these locations, Saddam Hussein has made them into targets. This is a basic principle of international law -- the rule of necessity trumps the rule for sparing civilian targets.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon on Wednesday displayed a series of aerial photographs that it said showed Iraq is placing military equipment near mosques and other civilian sites in a bid to ward off attacks by U.S.-led forces or create an international incident if bombed.
* * *
One picture showed what he said was a large ammunition depot built around a mosque. Another showed what he said were retaining walls built for ammunition or military equipment near a warehouse used to distribute food provided by the international community for the Iraqi people.

Another showed what he said were antiaircraft weapons placed on the roof of the Iraqi government's Ministry of Media headquarters in Baghdad.

The official said Saddam hoped that positioning military equipment near such sites would dissuade coalition forces from bombing them, or if the sites were bombed, it would create an international incident leading to international condemnation of the U.S.-led invasion.
* * *
The official said the United States regards military equipment placed near such sites as legitimate targets in war, although he acknowledged that in the 1991 Gulf War the U.S.-led coalition held its fire when the Iraqis parked two MiG-21 warplanes next to a 4,000-year-old archeological treasure from ancient Mesopotamia, the ziggurat at Ur.


The paradigmatic case taught in the Army concerns an enemy sniper (or artillery observer) who hides in a church tower. U.S. commanders have the right -- indeed the duty -- to engage that enemy soldier out of military necessity. If the situation requires it, the commander can go so far as to use a heavy weapon (e.g. M1A2 main gun) to demolish the church tower. (Necessity would probably not allow the use of indirect fire, because of the risk of collateral damage, but it's a tough call). In any case, the moral and legal responsibility for the site's destruction belongs to the enemy force -- not the U.S. The enemy turned the religious site into a military target by their action, and thus the enemy bears the legal and moral blame for the destruction of the church.

This case study applies very neatly to the Iraqi case. Saddam Hussein has decided to move military equipment to positions next to holy sites, knowing that the U.S. does not deliberately target such sites because they have no intrinsic military value. However, he fails to understand that the U.S. calculus changes the minute he parks a military vehicle next to that holy site. That act transforms the once-innocent holy site into a legitimate military target, both as a matter of international law and U.S. practice. Saddam Hussein bears the legal and moral blame for that transformation, since it was his decision to move the equipment there. If civilians die in those sites because he turned them into military targets, he can be tried before a military tribunal for violation of the laws of war. In theory, so too can the senior officers who implemented this decision, since the "superior orders" defense only discharges culpability at the lowest levels of command.

Update: You can read the entire transcript of the Pentagon briefing here. The briefing slides are also available here, if you want to see the evidence for yourself.

 
About Face!
Pentagon clarifies Shinseki remarks about post-war reconstruction

I'm still not sure whether Gen. Eric Shinseki made a mistake of candor yesterday, or whether he was uninformed about his estimate of "several hundred thousand" soldiers for a post-war occupation of Iraq. Regardless, the Pentagon held a press conference today to clarify several of the major issues associated with the current plan to occupy and rebuild Iraq. Two major areas stood out to me from the press conference -- a discussion of civilian casualties, and of U.S. personnel commitments.

1. Discussion of civilian casualty estimates

Q: No, in terms of casualties and refugees, and what are your going-in assumptions?

Collins: In refugees, the assumption, which is not an absolute worst case but is a bad case, as was noted yesterday at the White House press conference, is a couple of million, two million. And that would include IDPs [internally displaced persons] and refugees.

Q: And casualties?

Collins: And casualties? We're not in the business of making casualty estimates. I've heard some outlandish figures yesterday. I can tell you that we're doing our absolute level best to ensure that the number of casualties from military activities will be as low as humanly possible.

Q: Got that, but you obviously have been planning for some kind of a number, so that you can have medical supplies in the works and in following in and -- (inaudible). What are you dealing with?

Collins: We have not planned on a deliberate number of casualties in the civilian population, and that's not been part of our methodology of planning.

Q: So how do you plan if you don't have a number?

Q: What metric do you use?

Q: (Inaudible.)

Collins: What metric do we use for what subject?

Q: For, say, let's say, casualties. I know this is a sticky issue for you guys, and I'm aware that you don't want a headline tomorrow coming out, saying, "Pentagon plans on 8 million Iraqi civilian casualties." But it strains belief just that you all can be planning for five months and not be thinking, "Okay, this is a worst- case scenario. What do we need to have on hand -- medically, water -- in the event that that happened?"

Collins: A lot of that's been done, but I honestly do not know that anyone has ever said that this would arise -- this war or this scenario would result in so many enemy -- so many Iraqi civilian casualties. I haven't seen that.

Most of the planning that's been done in that area has been done in using sort of multiple scenarios. There are sort of, you know -- as you know, there are all kinds of risk assessments that are made and all kinds of damage assessments that have been made. And that planning is mostly in the reconstruction end of this. But I honestly don't know a number that I could hang my hat or your hat on.


2. Discussion of the number of troops needed to occupy Iraq

Q: Do you have an estimate on the number of military -- U.S. military personnel who would be involved in a humanitarian operation in a post-conflict situation? And how many would be involved in providing security in the country in that immediate post-war period?

Collins: I don't have that number. The security business would be done by another group. I can say that by way of AID and civil affairs -- by way of civil affairs people involved with the plan, a few thousand is a good, round number. And AID will also have a large contingent, at least 60 of who will be working directly with the troops and very, very close to the front lines.

Analysis: Referring to "several hundred thousand" soldiers as "the security business" is an interesting way to euphemize a major commitment of U.S. troops. Calling them security for the aid and redevelopment effort may be conceptually accurate in one sense. But it's also a public-relations ploy to minimize the number of troops required. Saying they're going to work for US AID is another way of minimizing this mission. I can't predict how many troops will actually be required when it's all said and done. My guess: it's going to be more than a mere "security" force.

 
Rifles of Choice: Why America's military may be carrying the wrong weapon

Stop the Bleating has some really intelligent thoughts today on the differences between the M16A2 rifle and the M4 carbine. Currently, the U.S. Army appears to be providing M4s to most of its infantrymen and support troops, and the Marine Corps has decided to procure the M4 for a good portion of its infantry as well. In any case, this is a really important issue, and Stop the Bleating's note is worth reading.

I personally carried the M4 carbine as an MP lieutenant and captain during my time on active duty, and I liked it. My MP platoon (attached to an infantry brigade) had a combat mission, but it was different than that of the infantry. We focused primarily on rear-area reconnaissance, on urban warfare, and on dealing with civilians on the battlefield. Those are fundamentally different than what an infantryman might see in Afghanistan or Iraq. In that kind of theater, long-range accuracy and muzzle velocity are far more important than the ability to shoot at 50m or less. I still think the M4 is an outstanding weapon for 'close-quarters battle' of the kind you see in urban environments. But it's not the best all-purpose infantry weapon out there.

 
WP: Contracts awarded to develop new smallpox vaccine

Today's Washington Post reports that a pair of contracts have been awarded to companies developing a new smallpox vaccine -- one that avoids a number of the complications currently causing problems for the President's smallpox-inoculation campaign. This vaccine may not come to fruition for some time, but this is still money well spent. If nothing else, it shows the government cares about the health isssues with the current vaccine, and wants to develop an alternative in the future that will avoid those complications.

The vaccine will be a virus called "modified vaccinia Ankara" (MVA), a severely crippled version of the microbe used as a smallpox vaccine. MVA is unable to replicate in mammalian cells, although it does grow in chicken cells, which is where it is made.

The two companies, Acambis of Cambridge, Mass., and Bavarian Nordic of Copenhagen, will receive a total of $20 million to grow the virus and test it in animals and healthy volunteers. That work should be done by the end of this year, said Gordon Cameron, an executive of Acambis, which received a $9.2 million grant.

Studies will be done next year on people whose immune systems are compromised. Before the studies are complete, however, the government is expected to order 30 million doses of the vaccine as a stockpile for people who could not use the traditional vaccine in the unlikely event that smallpox, eradicated in the 1970s, reappears.

The traditional vaccine, which is also being made and stockpiled, produces a short-lived vaccinia infection in people receiving it. That infection can get out of control, occasionally with fatal consequences, when it occurs in people with damaged immune systems.


 
NYT: U.S. Intelligence Categorizes Iraqis to Punish, or to Deal With

Today's New York Times leads with a story about the existence of a "black/gray/white" list for Iraq. These lists are generated by the Intelligence Community for all theaters in which U.S. soldiers operate. They tell everyone -- from the top commanders to the lowest soldiers -- who is a bad guy, an in-between guy, and a good guy. The implications are obvious. You want to work with the good guys, catch the bad guys, and persuade the in-between guys to join your side. In Iraq, I suspect we'll be conducting a lot of Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations directed at turning as many of the in-between guys to our side as possible -- and rooting out the bad guys ASAP. Those two tasks will be critical for the post-war occupation effort. We need to pacify the Iraqi population and win them to our side before any serious nation-building can take place.

The officials said the computer database, whose existence was previously undisclosed, divided the Iraqi leadership into three categories: hard-core allies of Mr. Hussein; senior Iraqis whose allegiances are uncertain but who may be willing to cooperate with United States forces; and another group of people who are believed either to secretly oppose the government or whose technical expertise is deemed crucial to running a post-Hussein government.
* * *
The list was assembled by a number of government agencies and departments, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon and the Justice Department. Senior officials acknowledged that the idea of identifying the leadership of a potentially hostile country was not a new one. But they described it as the largest effort of its kind, one that dwarfs work by American intelligence to identify Taliban leaders during the war in Afghanistan or to analyze the military and political leadership in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo.

The key thing here is to disseminate this list down to the lowest level. Secretary Rumsfeld -- or General Franks -- is not going to be the guy who encounters these Iraqi officials. It's going to be PFC Joe Snuffy, securing an intersection, who happens across these individuals as he checks their papers at a checkpoint. Or it's going to be Captain (Dr.) Mary Snuffy, who's treating casualties at an aid station and recognizes the face of one of the really bad guys. (We'll still treat him, but after he heals, we'll try him as a war criminal). The use of "black/gray/white" lists in the Balkans worked well when the lists were dynamically updated and distributed down to the squad and team level, where individual soldiers could use them.

As an aside, the U.S. Army's new battlefield communications equipment will only help in this regard. I wrote an article titled 'The Force XXI Military Police' for Military Police journal in May 2001, which which I explained how this might work:

Journalists stressing the timeliness of their profession like to say that "yesterday’s news wraps today’s fish." The same could hold true of a black/gray/white list in the hands of an MP team leader. Yesterday’s list may not reflect an indictment by local officials or The Hague. To conduct effective police-intelligence operations, the MP need to have access to timely information.

In addition, the FBCB2 System has a form of tactical e-mail that ties into the Army’s higher-level tactical computer systems. This e-mail function allows the MP at the team level to send and receive information with the MP in the division provost marshal’s cell.

Just as some software programs enable a user to build an address list and send out a mass e-mail, so does the FBCB2 System. The text messaging feature of the FBCB2 System is one of the most powerful, if not the most simple. It enables soldiers and leaders to pass information up and down the chain of command, rapidly, with absolute speed and security.

If the division provost marshal received an updated black/gray/white list, it could be disseminated within minutes to every MP team in the division. Likewise, the division G5 cell could do the same, because all of the FBCB2 Systems users belong to a global address book, just like an e-mail directory.

A black/gray/white list is only one example. The MP can submit text reports on anything they observe to their leadership through the FBCB2 System. An MP team can request CID support this way, or re-port the 5 Ws of a traffic accident. Whatever the incident, the FBCB2 text message provides a vehicle for reporting it.


Sequel: FBCB2 has been fully fielded to the Army's 4th Infantry Division, and I've read reports that it has been fielded to other units including the Army's 3rd Infantry Division and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Other units -- such as the Marine Corps -- have been digitized with different hardware/software. But in general, most units in the American military have a digital feed down to the battalion level, or lower. In practice, this means information can move at the speed of light from the top (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to the bottom (infantry battalion or MP company).

Tuesday, February 25, 2003
 
Chief of Staff of the Army: Iraq occupation will take "several hundred thousand soldiers"

Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee today, U.S. Army General Eric Shinseki predicted that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be required to occupy and pacify post-war Iraq. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems," he said. Gen. Shinseki added that this was a rough estimate, and based on very pessimistic estimates of the Iraqi infrastructure. He also said that allied support would be "helpful" -- if not required -- to carry out a mission of this size.

Iraq is "a piece of geography that's fairly significant," Gen. Eric K. Shinseki said at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee (news - web sites). And he said any postwar occupying force would have to be big enough to maintain safety in a country with "ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems."

In response to questioning by Sen. Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record) of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the committee, Shinseki said he couldn't give specific numbers of the size of an occupation force but would rely on the recommendations of commanders in the region.

"How about a range?" said Levin.

"I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers," the general said. "Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful."


Analysis: This number represents a major departure from previous estimates. Until now, the Pentagon has shied away from publicizing its predictions of what an occupation would require. In other reports, I've seen estimates ranging from 100,000 to 250,000 soldiers for any occupation duty, with a substantial part of that force coming from NATO or other allies. However, Shinseki's prediction may hinge on more pessimistic assumptions than those undergirding previous public estimates.

This may have been a mistake of candor -- or it could be a mistake altogether. It's possible (though I'm speculating) that Gen. Shinseki is not "in the loop" on these matters. By law, the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) are responsible for training/recruiting/equipping the forces -- but they don't actually do the fighting. (See the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) The fighting gets done by the Unified Combatant Commands, such as Central Command or Pacific Command. This is an operational decision, not an administrative one, and it's possible that Shinseki is not part of the decision process.

Gen. Shinseki may also be trying to prepare the American public for a massive wave of reserve mobilizations tied to post-war occupation needs. America's Army does not have the active-duty force to conduct this mission; it would have to dip very deep into the reserve components to do so. Since Sept. 11, the reserves have mustered close to 150,000 soldiers for various homeland security and Iraq-related missions. The reserves -- specifically the National Guard -- have large combat brigades and divisions which have not been touched. I think it's highly likely those units will start to be called up soon. (Sooner rather than later, given the need to train them up before deployment) The reserve components have proven their mettle when it comes to peacekeeping/nation-building in the Balkans, so they may be a good choice for the post-war Iraq occupation mission. More to follow...

 
Security measures lacking at Los Alamos laboratory

Noah Shachtman has this disturbing note on the state of security at the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in New Mexico. As background, Los Alamos is the place where the Manhattan Project developed the first atomic bomb in 1945. The University of California has managed the lab since then for the Department of Energy, albeit with several problems. These revelations may be the final nail in the coffin for the UC contract, since the Energy Department has been investigating the UC's management practices for several years with an eye towards giving the contract to someone else.

There are no armed guards to knock out. No sensors to deactivate. No surveillance cameras to cripple. To sneak into Los Alamos National Laboratory, the world's most important nuclear research facility, all you do is step over a few strands of rusted, calf-high barbed wire.

I should know. On Saturday morning, I slipped into and out of a top-secret area of the lab while guards sat, unaware, less than a hundred yards away.

Despite the nation's heightened terror alert status, despite looming congressional hearings into the lab's mismanagement and slack-jawed security, an untrained person -- armed with only the vaguest sense of the facility's layout and slowed by a torn Achilles tendon -- was able to repeatedly gain access to the birthplace of the atom bomb.

For details -- and pictures -- click on over to my Wired News story here.

THERE'S MORE: Los Alamos is separated from Bandelier National Mounment by New Mexico State Road 4. Hikers frequently pull off to the side of the Route 4 to admire the snow-touched Jemez mountains, or to take a walk through the desert's multicolored stones. A Bandelier park ranger tells nature-lovers that they can "go hike on Energy Department lands" if they don't want to pay Bandelier's $10 parking fee.


"You can even bring your dog," she adds.

 
WSJ: Above and Beyond
A tale of valor in the streets of Mogadishu

Dorothy Rabinowitz's column in today's Wall Street Journal (available free at OpinionJournal.Com) should give Saddam Hussein pause. She recounts the stories of Gary Gordon and Randall Shughart, the two Delta Force soldiers who gave their lives to save their fallen comrades in the Battle of Bakara Market made famous by Mark Bowden's book Black Hawk Down. In this battle, a company of Army Rangers and platoon of Delta Force operators found themselves encircled by thousands of armed Somalis, unable to be extracted. Two Black Hawks were also shot down by Somali rocket-propelled grenades. Despite the overwhelming odds, the American soldiers persevered, fighting off human waves of armed Somali paramilitaries. (Some experts now think the Somali forces were trained and commanded by Al Qaeda operatives) Casualty estimates vary, but many think the U.S. soldiers killed more than 1,000 Somalis for the 18 dead they sustained.

After the battle, President Clinton pulled the U.S. out of Somalia. After-action reviews revealed a litany of errors, including the gradual expansion of the Army's mission from humanitarian relief to armed intervention, and the Pentagon's failure to send heavy armor support when requested. Today, American military officers are almost universally required to read Black Hawk Down -- both for its lessons of courage and leadership, and as a case-study in what the next war might look like. Ms. Rabinowitz has a message for Saddam Hussein: don't learn the wrong lessons from 3-4 Oct 93.

It has been said of Osama bin Laden that the main lesson he derived from the war in Somalia was that the infliction of heavy casualties was all that was needed to cause Americans to turn and run. Americans, he suggested, are weak that way, and soft. Undoubtedly a happy thought for those subscribing to this view, but those who do would be well advised to consider certain aspects of that war in Somalia--in particular the dogged determination of the Americans who fought the enemy in the streets of Mogadishu on Oct. 3, 1993, a battle in which two Rangers were awarded Congressional Medals of Honor.
* * *
It does not require reference to Medal of Honor recipients to certify the U.S. military's courage and tenacity. Still, now is not a bad time to remember what happened when an outnumbered, underequipped force, hamstrung by superiors more concerned with appearances than success, was sent into Somalia--and to reflect on the nature of men impelled to acts of valor and selflessness, deeds that seem, still, to shine forth from that darkness.


 
Portland case to test USA PATRIOT Act surveillance powers

The Associated Press reports on a case in Portland's federal district that has far-reaching implications for Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56). This case, involving the criminal prosecution of several men allegedly connected to Al Qaeda, uses evidence that was gathered through secret warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). That act was originally passed in 1978 to balance Cold War counter-espionage needs with the protection of civil liberties. Originally, prosecutors could generally not get FISA warrants for criminal matters; only for intelligence matters. The PATRIOT Act amended that rule, such that now foreign intelligence needs to be a "significant purpose" of the investigation -- but not the sole purpose.

U.S. District Court Judge Ancer Haggerty was expected to hear arguments Tuesday and Wednesday asking the government to reveal its justification for 36 secret warrants the FBI used to watch and listen to the suspects.
* * *
Defense attorneys plan to challenge evidence collected under the warrants issued by the ultra-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court, or "spy court," Boise said.

Law enforcement, defense lawyers and legal experts say the case in Portland is farther along than several other potential challenges to the new spying powers under a provision of the Patriot Act.

"To the best of my knowledge, it's the first," said David Sobel of the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center.
* * *
Any decision by the judge on the warrants likely will be appealed to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco and then to the Supreme Court, Boise said.
* * *
The FBI started watching the Portland suspects a few weeks after Sept. 11, when a sheriff's deputy in Skamania County, Wash., spotted some of them firing guns for target practice in a gravel pit.

Secret warrants in hand, the FBI, helped by Oregon State Police, the Portland Police Bureau and other agencies, began around-the-clock surveillance by early 2002.

Last October, the FBI arrested Ford, Jeffrey Leon Battle, his ex-wife October Martinique Lewis, and brothers Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal and Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal. A sixth suspect, Jordanian native Habis Abdu al Saoub, who is believed to be the group's leader, remains at large.


Analysis: This case, along with the Al-Arian case, are important tests of the USA PATRIOT Act and its changes to FISA surveillance power. In the old days of counter-espionage and counter-terrorism, the government would gather this intelligence and use it to expel diplomats or take other action in the foreign-policy arena. Today, with the threat of terrorism, we increasingly turn more and more to the criminal courts as a means of trying and incarcerating suspected terrorists. Generally, that's a good thing. As a normative manner, we ought to use the criminal courts as often as possible for the trial and detention of suspected terrorists. These courts give defendants due process and constitutional protections they would not ordinarily get on the field of battle -- something which is very important when dealing with terrorists who masquerade as U.S. citizens or residents.

The alternative to using FISA-gathered evidence in criminal courts is to use FISA-gathered evidence to support detention of suspected terrorists as 'enemy combatants.' (See, e.g., Padilla v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld) If the Justice Department does not win this case -- and the other FISA cases like it -- I believe the government will turn increasingly towards alternate means of justice such as military detentions and military tribunals.

Monday, February 24, 2003
 
Federal judge dismisses missile-defense lawsuit after government intervention
'State secrets' privilege asserted to pre-empt the plaintiff's discovery efforts

This morning in Los Angeles, U.S. District Judge Ronald S.W. Lew dismissed a lawsuit by Dr. Nira Schwartz against TRW and Boeing [Case Number CV 96-3065-RSWL] which was filed under the False Claims Act. This suit alleged, among other things, that TRW and Boeing had falsified test data and misled the government about the ballistic missile defense system they were designing for the U.S. Ms. Schwartz sought discovery of various scientific and technical documents to prove her case, many of which were highly classified. Some were so classified that they were known to just 3 people in the Pentagon -- Secretary Rumsfeld and two others -- according to the New York Times.

I attended this morning's hearing after reading about the case in the NY Times earlier this month. Justice Department attorney Dennis Egan made a persuasive case for the government, arguing that there was no way for Dr. Schwartz to put on her case without compromising classified information. He pointed to several places in her complaint alone where she referred to classified documents -- or even spilled their contents. Judge Lew said he read some of these documents in camera before the hearing, and agreed with Mr. Egan's arguments. He granted the government's motions to dismiss the case with prejudice.

Analysis: Academically, this case is very interesting. In the criminal context, there is a procedure for managing classified information. The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 spells out a framework for managing classified information being used in criminal prosecutions or defenses. This makes sense -- lots of criminals are netted by highly-secretive government investigatory efforts, often where the lines between crime and national security are blurred. (See, e.g., the Moussaoui and Lindh cases in U.S. District Court in Virginia) But in the civil context, there are few procedures for managing highly classified information -- especially of the kind in this case. Thus, I believe that Judge Lew was right to dismiss this case.

 
Federal court in Boston dismisses anti-war lawsuit

As I predicted when the suit was filed, U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro dismissed a civil lawsuit today which sought to enjoin President Bush from waging war on Iraq. The suit claimed, among other things, that the President was abusing his Art. II power as Commander-in-Chief by acting without an explicit declaration of war.

...U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro ruled Monday that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction against Bush.

Tauro said the lawsuit engaged "political questions in the legal sense that are beyond the jurisdiction of the court."

The judge added that, considering the October congressional resolution, he could not find evidence of any conflict between the will of the executive and legislative branches.


Update: Findlaw.Com has posted the Justice Department's well-written memorandum in this case. For anyone interested in Constitutional Law and the President's power in foreign affairs, this brief makes for an engaging read.

 
Former SCOTUS law clerk criticizes NY Times column

Howard Bashman reprints a great critique of today's column by Anthony Lewis in the New York Times. That column, titled Marbury v. Madison v. Ashcroft, argued forcefully for judicial review of the Bush Administration's actions in the war on terrorism. It used the cases of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla to broadly argue for increased judicial scrutiny of government actions with respect to 'enemy combatants.' However, I think the anonymous writer makes a better argument -- you be the judge.

Excerpt from NYT Piece:

Two American citizens are now held in solitary confinement under this asserted presidential power. One, Yasser Hamdi, was found under unexplained circumstances on a battlefield in Afghanistan. . . .

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va., made the first appellate ruling against Mr. Hamdi. It held that the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel 'in all criminal prosecutions' did not apply because Mr. Hamdi was not being prosecuted. That reasoning reduced constitutional law to sleight of hand: The government can impose solitary confinement, perhaps for life, if it simply avoids giving the prisoner a trial.


Law Clerk Response:

But that is not at all what the Fourth Circuit held. The facts dismissed by Lewis as "unexplained circumstances" are that Hamdi was captured on a battlefield, traveling with a Taliban platoon, and carrying an AK-47. The Fourth Circuit's opinion is carefully limited to these facts, saying:

"One who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such. . . . At least where it is undisputed that he was present in a zone of active combat operations, we are satisfied that the Constitution does not entitle him to a searching review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure there."

The opinion concludes by emphasizing this important qualifier, saying:

"It is important to emphasize that we are not placing our imprimatur upon a new day of executive detentions. . . . But, Hamdi is not 'any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant' by the government; he is an American citizen captured and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war during active hostilities and determined by the United States military to have been indeed allied with enemy forces."

For a columnist with a worldwide audience to pretend that such an eminently reasonable opinion permits the government to secretly detain any American citizen in lieu of prosecution (and threatens Marbury v. Madison to boot!) does a disservice to what is at bottom one of the most important constitutional debates of our time.

Mr. Lewis should read the careful opinions that this debate is generating, not rely on press releases from the ACLU or People for the American Way. His column today is embarrassing.


 
WP: Bush Smallpox Inoculation Plan Near Standstill
Medical Professionals Cite Possible Side Effects, Uncertainty of Threat

Today's Washington Post reports that the plan to inoculate health-care workers and first responders against smallpox has hit a brick wall: opposition from the doctors, nurses, EMTs, and other workers themselves. Across the county, these workers have refused the shot in large numbers. To date, the U.S. has inoculated less than 1% of the 500,000 workers it wants to protect against smallpox.

Although the federal government has shipped 274,000 doses of vaccine to states since the program began Jan. 24, hundreds of hospitals, a half-dozen major unions and even some public health departments have refused to participate. Even the states that are vaccinating volunteers report that they have drastically scaled back their original plans.

Aside from a few pockets of enthusiasm, the vast majority of medical professionals remain unconvinced that the threat of a smallpox attack is serious enough to administer a vaccine known for its serious side effects, especially when federal officials have refused to create a compensation fund for people sickened by the vaccine.

"At this point I'm more concerned about seeing a vaccine complication than a case of smallpox," said Steven Gordon, hospital epidemiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, where fewer than 100 of thousands of eligible employees will be inoculated next month.
* * *
Much of the debate centers on the definition of "prepared." Many infectious-disease experts said stockpiling vaccine in regional locations, training staff and practicing emergency drills would adequately position them to handle an outbreak. But others said the panic likely to ensue with even a rumored case makes that unrealistic.

"Frankly, the more of these workers, along with police and fire personnel, who are vaccinated before an event occurs, the greater will be our ability to maintain essential services in the crisis situation of a deliberate smallpox release," said Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota.


In my opinion, this may have disastrous consequences for our readiness to deal with any smallpox attack. For this effort to be successful, we must build a 'critical mass' of inoculated health-care professionals who have immunity and can work with smallpox victims. The L.A. County guidelines specify that each hospital should have the capability to treat one smallpox victim 24/7. This means that at least enough people have to be vaccinated to do every health-related function for one part of the hospital. I think this is a sensible minimum... but that health care workers really ought to do more. They are putting their hysteria and personal concerns over the needs of the community, something I think is irresponsible for someone entrusted with our health.

Sunday, February 23, 2003
 
NYT: U.S. fires first (digital) shots of war against Iraq

Monday's New York Times leads with an interesting article on "information warfare," and the American tactics being used already against Iraq. These range from the old-fashioned (leaflet drops) to the tried-and-true (radar jamming) to the innovative (hacking into air-defense computer systems). Ultimately, the aim of all these methods is to win the first stage of the war before the first shot is fired. This is called "setting the conditions" for success. If you can, through information warfare, throw your enemy off balance and cripple his senses, you stand a very good chance of winning when the first shots are fired.

Military planners at the United States Central Command expect to rely on many kinds of information warfare — including electronic attacks on power grids, communications systems and computer networks, as well as deception and psychological operations — to break the Iraqi military's will to fight and sway Iraqi public opinion.

Commanders may use supersecret weapons that could flash millions of watts of electricity to cripple Iraqi computers and equipment, and literally turn off the lights in Baghdad if the campaign escalates to full-fledged combat.

"The goal of information warfare is to win without ever firing a shot," said James R. Wilkinson, a spokesman for the Central Command in Tampa, Fla. "If action does begin, information warfare is used to make the conflict as short as possible."
* * *
Deception and psychological operations have been a part of warfare for centuries, and American commanders carried out limited information attacks — both psychological operations, or "psyops," and more traditional electronic warfare like jamming or crippling the enemy's equipment — in the Persian Gulf war in 1991 and the air campaign over Kosovo in 1999, as well as in Afghanistan. But commanders looking back on those campaigns say their current planning is much broader and more tightly integrated into the main war plan than ever before.
* * *
In a war against Iraq, military commanders say new technology will probably allow those electronic combat planes to plant false targets in Iraqi radars and spoof the air defense systems.

In an interview, Gen. John P. Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, declined to discuss the highly classified technical advances, except to say, "We're approaching the point where we can tell the SA-10 radar it is a Maytag washer and not a radar, and put it in the rinse cycle instead of the firing cycle."


 
Los Angeles anti-terrorism readiness lags
Funding, bureaucracy, political inaction to blame

Today's Los Angeles Times has a well-reported article on the failures in L.A. to establish a viable anti-terrorism apparatus. In general, the article focuses on federal failures to provide grant money, city failure to allocate resources, and agencies' failure to take certain actions. City Councilman Jack Weiss sums up the problem well: "L.A. seemed to believe that it couldn't happen here. The sorry political reality is that politicians can see no upside in spending their limited resources and time on antiterrorism."

Given my background and work in this area, I have some thoughts on this subject.

1. The problem's not as bad as it seems. L.A. and California have some of the best "disaster response" systems of any city/state in the nation. These translate very well into "consequences management" capabilities in the event of a terrorist attack. And it's not just that the assets are there (though they are). California and L.A. have exercises these assets on a regular basis for at least the last three decades. Local police, fire, public-health, EMS, FEMA, OES, and other agencies respond to every wildfire, every earthquake, and every other event in the Southland. They have developed deep resevoirs of 'lessons learned' and practical experience in responding to any event -- no matter how complex. I am very confident that they could respond to a terrorist event.

2. L.A. and California have new capabilities that the article does not mention. It is true that the federal government has not come through with everything that it's promised since Sept. 11. No big surprise there. But the federal government has provided some critical assets to the Southern California area over the last two years. Foremost among these are the Civil Support Teams. These are 22-soldier rapid response teams trained to deal with any Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or High-Yield Explosive event. The Defense Department trains/equips/funds them, and they report to the state National Guard and the Governor. To date, these teams have conducted many training exercises and several operational missions in California -- including the Super Bowl and World Series. They add a substantial component to California's AT readiness. There are other examples of where the federal govt. has provided stuff to the area, but this is the most salient.

3. L.A. and California have better intelligence today. There is a paradigm of anti-terrorism operations that I subscribe to, developed by Ian Lesser and others at the RAND Corporation. It divides anti-terrorism work into three categories -- shaping, decisive operations, and hedging operations -- which roughly correspond to before, during and after an attack. In the shaping category, L.A. has substantially better capabilities today than the article lets on. Specifically, the L.A. County Terrorism Early Warning Group, L.A. area Joint Terrorism Task Force, and California Anti-Terrorism Information Center, have combined to increase the amount of information sharing and intelligence analysis going on here. They're looking at indicators of near-term activity, and also of long-term activity in the future. This capability helps political leaders make better decisions, armed with good intelligence.

Bottom line: L.A.'s not the best out there when it comes to anti-terrorism preparedness. But this alarmist article distorts the story. It fails to paint an accurate picture of how prepared L.A. is. I blame the political leaders quoted in the story for distorting the truth in order to send a particular message. That may have short-term positive gains if it pressures the federal government to respond. But that benefit is substantially outweighed by the fear and panic this article will create in the public's mind.

Saturday, February 22, 2003
 
California "High Value Asset" list leaked to LA Times
Document contains prioritized list of potential terrorist targets

In a staggering breach of operational security, someone leaked California's master list of potential terrorist target to the Los Angeles Times. While the Times reporter did a good job of explaining what this list represents, local news stations and other papers have negligently reported the details of this story. Most of those media stories mischaracterize the list, its importance, or its reasons for existence.

This list was prepared by the California National Guard and the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC), two agencies that play important roles in securing California from terrorism. It does not represent the most likely terrorist targets. It does not represent the most dangerous targets, or the targets that would cause the most civilian casualties. It does not have much predictive value at all. All this list does is assess the destructive/disruptive impact of terrorist events and attempt to rank sites by the political/economic/social/infrastructural impact an attack on those sites would have. This is significant, because it then enables the Governor (or other elected official) to understand what risk he has assumed by leaving certain areas unprotected. But it's not the only way to make the list, or the only way to present that risk to the decision maker. Predictive analysis of the threat must also be done, in order to give the decision maker an idea of how likely a particular attack or risk is.

In anti-terrorism planning, a common assumption is that you cannot protect everything. Instead, you must instead choose a methodology to rank those things that you intend to protect. This list represents just one methodology for doing so -- it ranks sites by the disruptive and destructive effect of an attack on those sites. Other methodologies include a calculation of attack probability, calculations of probable casualties, and other formulae. In any situation, the estimates are based on a series of assumptions which may or may not be true. As the threat becomes more likely or imminent, planners update these lists. Decision makers then allocate additional resources to high-risk/high-threat targets. It's a flexible, adaptive, dynamic system that never stops -- it continually adjusts to the threat.

Bottom Line: Without seeing the entire report here, I can't really comment on its veracity or value. I can only qualify its release by saying it's not the end-all/be-all list for the state of California. This report does not tell us anything we don't already know. It simply quantifies the effects of attacks on known targets, like L.A. airport and the Golden Gate Bridge, in order to aid decision makers like Gov. Gray Davis. This report should be understood for what it is, and should not generate more panic or concern than it warrants (which is not much.)

 
'Human shields' place themselves and Iraq in harm's way

Chris Baker has some good comments at Half Baked on the legality and wisdom of the civilian "human shields" now migrating to Iraq for the imminent U.S. offensive. Among other things, Chris explores the hypothetical possibilities of these civilians being used as human shields for forward-deployed forces (instead of Baghdad's critical infrastructure) -- and the possibility of them becoming actual Iraqi combatants.

Ultimately, customary and positive international law are clear: Iraq is on the blame line for anything that happens to these civilians. The deliberate positioning of civilians near legitimate military targets is clearly illegal, and Iraqi officials may be tried by international tribunals following the war and any regime change. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated as much. In light of how we dealt with various Serb and Bosnian war criminals, I think this is a pretty likely outcome for most of the Iraqi government after the war.

Moreover, these civilians' actions may not affect U.S. targeting decisions at all. The U.S. takes extraordinary measures to minimize collateral damage in war. In Kosovo, the U.S. vetted every target with lawyers at multiple levels of command and cleared them with Washington, London and Paris. (See Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War) The Pentagon has some new technology to help it in this war, including more precision munitions than ever before and a new targeting system designed to make it easier for field commanders to avoid collateral damage. All of these measures are designed to avoid accidental civilian casualties -- killing Iraqi civilians whose only crime is proximity to a military target. These measures won't do much, however, to safeguard those misguided individuals (like the 'human shields') who voluntarily/intentionally sit on such sites.

 
U.S. sends additional troops to Colombia to fight terrorism
Deployment comes in response to cold-blooded execution of American personnel

The Washington Post reports that President Bush has ordered an additional 150 military personnel to Colombia to provide intelligence and operational support. Specifically, these additional troops will support the search for 3 of the 5 passengers on an American intelligence plane that crashed in Colombia. (The other two passengers were summarily executed by FARC on the ground) This deployment pushes the number of U.S. soldiers in Colombia over the Congressional limit, but so far Congress has not raised that as an issue.

For the moment, officials said, the troops' mission is to provide additional intelligence and guidance to Colombian military forces trying to locate and rescue the Americans and their captors in a mountainous jungle region about 220 miles southwest of Bogota. Asked whether U.S. forces would attempt a rescue themselves, an official said, "We would have the capacity to do that."

Officials declined to specify the units of the newly deployed troops. U.S. Special Forces trainers previously assigned to Colombia have also been assisting in the search for the men, who have been described as Defense Department contractors working on counterdrug operations.
* * *
U.S.-obtained intelligence has indicated that the three remaining Americans, whose names have not been released, are traveling with a group of rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC. Officials said the Colombian military was trying to keep the guerrilla group in a relatively confined area of about 37 square miles and to prevent their traveling deeper into rebel territory. But their exact location is said to be unknown, and officials said they were constantly on the move.

Colombian Defense Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez said yesterday that Colombian troops would attempt to rescue them only if the risk of their being killed was "practically nothing," the Associated Press reported from Bogota. Ramirez said Colombia was working closely with the United States "to identify the place where these citizens are and hopefully be able to conduct a rescue operation."


The U.S. won't say who these troops are... but the Washington Post speculates that they come from the U.S. Special Operations Community. I think the Post is right. The Army's Special Forces (and its Delta Force subsidiary) have extensive operational experience in Colombia, including the recent hunt for Pablo Escobar and other missions that have yet to hit the newspapers. The Colombian Defense Minister's statement about only attempting a rescue if the risk is "practically nothing" seems a little tepid. I don't think our President is willing to give up so easily on the Americans held by FARC. Consequently, he's sending these special ops troops to bolster the Colombian effort -- or take over it if necessary. Bottom line: I wouldn't want to be the FARC guys holding these Americans right now. U.S. special operations soldiers are very good at what they do.

Friday, February 21, 2003
 
NATO agrees to safeguard Turkey;
Turkey and U.S. agree to deployment of troops


In a pair of stories, the Associated Press reports that Turkey and the U.S. have agreed on the details of an American military package to deploy to that country, and NATO has begun to send AWACS planes and other assets to defend Turkey from Iraq. These are fairly significant milestones on the road to war with Iraq.

1. The deployment of U.S. forces (most likely my former unit the 4th Infantry Division) to Turkey is a key task for the American war plan. This sets the conditions for a U.S. attack from the north. Furthermore, the mere presence of these troops will have a stabilizing effect on Iraq's northern border. It's very likely the U.S. agreed to pacfiy the local Kurdish population and establish liaison with them to protect Turkey's southern border from this influence. Similarly, the presence of U.S. troops in Turkey preempts any Iraqi incursions there.

2. The deployment of NATO forces to Turkey may mark the turning of the tide in Europe. Until now, obstructionist nations like France, Germany and Belgium have kept such support from going through. In fact, they have done so in contravention of the NATO charter, which provides explicitly for such pro-active self-defense measures. This is a positive step for NATO in signaling that it is ready to support at least the defensive measures necessary for a Gulf War II. It's not a big leap from these measures to NATO providing post-war reconstruction and nation-building troops. Moreover, this decision represents the first major setback for French and German obstructionist efforts. I hope we see more.

 
Navy Seabees and the Legacy of John Wayne

In the Army, we used to say that God had a special place for combat engineers. Of all the units I worked with as an MP, I liked the engineers the most. They were tough, hard soldiers who could fight as infantry if necessary. Their leaders were hardened experts who knew how to accomplish any task -- and would get it done no matter what. And they were pretty smart, too -- you could always expect innovative solutions to come from the 299th Engineer Battalion.

Today's Los Angeles Times has a colorful story about the Navy's "Seabees" (from "CB" for "Construction Battalion"), the equivalent of our combat engineers. Seabees made their legacy in World War II and built on it in Korea and Vietnam. They built runways, fire bases, command posts -- and did their share of fighting along the way. The Seabees even inspired a John Wayne movie ("The Fighting Seabees"). The article details that part of their legacy.

CAMP 93, Kuwait -- Gone these 23 years, John Wayne still inspires Navy Seabees.

The Seabees were the heroes of one of the most famous war movies: 1944's "The Fighting Seabees," starring Wayne and Susan Hayward. It is the story of how the military, after the fall of Wake Island, formed a construction battalion (hence the name Seabees, from CB) that could fight as well as build.

The film illustrates the unit's motto: Can do. Now the real Seabees have come here to play their role if there is a war with Iraq.


Thursday, February 20, 2003
 
Big News Day:
North Korean fighter crosses into South Korean airspace;
U.S. deploys combat troops to Philippines


The Associated Press reports that a North Korean fighter jet crossed into South Korean airspace this morning over a disputed portion of the Yellow Sea. South Korea scrambled its defense system. Ultimately, cool heads prevailed and the incident did not escalate. However, given my experience on the peninsula during some spy-sub incidents, I think the entire Korean peninsula remains tense right now. My gut instincts tell me this was a navigational error or mistake on the North Korean pilot's part. But it could have also been a probe by the North.

The North Korean MiG-19 jet fighter crossed a western maritime boundary over the Yellow Sea at 10:03 a.m. Thursday. The warplane flew nearly 8 miles into South Korea's airspace — all over water — before heading back into communist territory two minutes later.

A South Korea anti-aircraft missile unit based near the port of Incheon was given the order to be ready to fire. At the same time, two South Korean F-5E jets flew to intercept the intruder, the Defense Ministry said. Later, four more South Korean F-5E jets were deployed.

The first South Korean jets were 19 miles, or a two-minute flight, from the enemy fighter when it began retreating, said air force Col. Oh Sung-dae.


On this side of the globe, the New York Times reports that the Pentagon has decided to send 3,000 military personnel to conduct anti-terrorist operations in the Philippines. This is a significant development in America's war on terrorism, and I will be watching for more developments here. [I imagine Chris Baker at Half Baked will have some good analysis too, given his Marine Corps infantry experience.]

Unlike a six-month training mission that involved 1,300 American forces on Basilan Island last year, this will be a joint operation with the Philippine military that has no fixed deadline. It marks a significant escalation in the war against terror even as the United States builds up for a possible war against Iraq and continues to hunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

The plan calls for 750 American ground troops, including about 350 Special Operations forces, to conduct combat patrols in the jungles of Sulu Province with Philippine forces. In addition, 2,200 marines armed with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier AV-8B attack planes will stand ready on ships offshore to act as a quick-response force, provide logistics and medical support.

A military assessment team, the vanguard of the larger combat force, is expected to arrive in the Philippines in the next few days, and the full American force could be conducting combat operations against the Islamic militant group Abu Sayyaf within a month, a Pentagon official said. The American forces will be led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Webber, the commander of marines in the Pacific.


 
John Walker Lindh begins sentence in California prison
American Talib's transfer raises questions for the cases of other 'enemy combatants'

After pleading guilty to charges of helping the Taliban in July 2002, John Walker Lindh began his prison sentence last month at the federal prison in Victorville, California. News of Lindh's imprisonment broke in a local California paper after federal officials tried (purportedly for Lindh's own safety) to keep his transfer and lock-up a secret. According to his plea bargain, Lindh will serve 20 years in federal prison for the two counts he pled guilty to. In return, he agreed to spill his guts to American defense and intelligence officials seeking to learn more about the Taliban and Al Qaeda organizations.

I was present in July 2002 for Mr. Lindh's plea bargain. While working in Washington last summer, I took off that Monday morning from work to attend what I thought was going to be an interesting 5th Amendment skirmish between Lindh's attorneys and the Assistant U.S. Attorneys on the case. The issue was a motion to suppress Lindh's statements made in military custody as a battlefield prisoner. After about 40 minutes of haggling over procedural details, James Brosnahan announced for his client "Your honor, we have a change in plea." The scene could have been lifted straight from a movie. Several reporters dashed out of the room to phone their editors with the story. And you could've heard a pin drop as Judge T.S. Ellis III interrogated Lindh about his plea and the underlying facts.

After the event, I wrote a short commentary for The Washington Times titled "The Seam Between Law and War" which analyzed this plea agreement. I felt then -- and still believe today -- that the government decided to cut its losses in the Lindh case to get what they could in the face of overwhelming legal opposition from Lindh’s crack defense team.

Weary from his months in combat and confinement, John Walker Lindh stood before U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III in green prison scrubs on Monday and pled guilty to two felony counts relating to his sojourn as a Taliban soldier in Afghanistan.

By pleading guilty, Lindh secured his own fate of 20 years behind bars – a light sentence given the possibility under his indictment. But more importantly, Lindh also contributed to the American war on terrorism in two very important ways.

First, Lindh agreed to cooperate fully with American law enforcement and intelligence agencies without the possibility that his sentence may be reduced. Though Lindh was a foot soldier, he did see much of the organization and leadership of the Taliban and al Qaeda. His knowledge of those organizations will be invaluable in building a sketch of those two organizations. This basic sketch will aid intelligence officers and prosecutors as they decide the fate of the detainees we now house at Guantanamo Bay.
* * *
Second, this plea bargain serves as damage control for the federal government. It ends a case that could have easily shattered its entire legal strategy in the war on terrorism. Lindh's defense team was very good. They objected to virtually every piece of evidence and made it very difficult for the federal prosecutors to build their case. Defense Attorney James Brosnahan was not about to roll over when the government cried "exigencies of war" or allow Lindh's initial treatment to go unnoticed. Whether these things happened in the fog of war or not was irrelevant – they were objections which could be made in the court of law.

Mr. Brosnahan and his legal team exploited the fact that Lindh's case fell on the seam between law and war. They highlighted the ways that American soldiers do not capture enemy combatants for the purpose of trying them in civilian courts. Lindh's legal team made great use of photos which showed him lying supine on a stretcher. This treatment would not be aberrational in war, but it shocked the conscience of many observers because it was such a departure from our norms of criminal justice. Mr. Brosnahan also objected to evidence gathered in the conduct of war, such as Lindh's weaponry, because they could not satisfy the peacetime standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence. All these objections made it abundantly clear that though Lindh may be guilty of crimes in war, he may not be convicted in a court of peace because of our high constitutional standards.

Indeed, if there were ever a case which screamed for a military commission, it was that of Lindh. His case exemplified the reasons why civilian courts are ill-equipped to deal with the exigencies of war. Instead of allowing for the realities of battlefield capture, the federal courts punished the prosecution for it. Similarly, the federal rules punished the prosecution for the need to immediately interrogate Lindh on the battlefield, and almost quashed his statements altogether. Military courts, designed by soldiers for soldiers, better understand the exigencies of war.


Sequel: Lindh's transfer to Victorville raises an interesting question: has the intelligence community exhausted his intelligence value? Presumably, they would not commit him to this facility until they had gotten all they could from him. Does this mean that he has no further intelligence value? If this conclusion is right, does that mean the same could eventually be true for Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who are being held as Taliban and Al Qaeda members by the Defense Department? A major part of the government's argument for keeping these men in DoD custody is that they have continuing intelligence value, and any contact with counsel, fellow inmates, the legal system, or the outside world might disturb their interrogations. (See Mobbs Declaration and Woolfolk Declaration) Is there some future point where these two men will also exhaust their intelligence value, and thus be released back to the criminal-justice system (or released entirely)?

 
WSJ: Marines prepare for chemical warfare

The Wall Street Journal has a great front-page article today on the ways the 7th Marine Regiment are training for chemical warfare in the Kuwaiti desert. The article describes the different drills the Marines go through, including their unmasking drill. For the uninitiated, most ground forces still employ a final fail-safe method for testing the air before giving the "all clear" message to soldiers wearing their gas masks. After getting a clean reading from all their chemical-surveillance gear, the Marines choose 2-3 men in a platoon and take away their weapons. While the platoon medic watches (with nerve-agent antidote in hand), the Marines gradually breathe in the outside air, testing it for contamination. In essence, these Marines become human "canaries", testing the air for their buddies the way canaries do for coal miners.

The harsh reality of chemical and biological warfare is that, despite all the sophisticated testing equipment the Pentagon has deployed to defend its troops, the only way to be sure the air is fit to breathe is for some brave -- and possibly unlucky -- soul to take his mask off.

And the harsh reality of military life is that the guy would have to be someone relatively expendable.

"You're basically the Marine who has to unmask first to make sure everyone else lives," says Cpl. Jose Valadez, a 23-year-old rifleman from Albuquerque, N.M. "You're the guinea pig."


This is an unpleasant but necessary reality of modern warfare, as the article says. However, the Marines have every possible safeguard to ensure the air is actually clean when the young Marines go through their "selective unmasking" drill. In fact, the Pentagon has gone so far as to buy chickens for the front-line units in Kuwait, the latter-day equivalent of the coal miners' canaries.

Meanwhile, the military has come up with an additional chemical-detection plan, this one more akin to the canaries miners once took into shafts to detect toxic air. Wednesday, division headquarters delivered to the regiment 43 chickens and a supply of feed. The chickens will be in cages in armored and other military vehicles. If any should drop dead crossing into Iraq, the Marines will know there might be something foul in the air. The division has even come up with a military designation for them: Poultry Chemical Confirmation Detectors, or PCCDs.

The 7th Marine Regiment's chem-bio specialists prefer Kuwaiti Field Chickens: KFC.


 
"E-Bombs" May Be Deployed in Gulf War II
But experts disagree on the legality and efficacy of these devices

The New York Times Technology Section carries a long and well-written piece today on the Pentagon's newest weapon: the "e-bomb." This is a euphemism to describe a "directed energy" weapon, which uses some kind of electromagnetic wave to target electronic gear, natural resources, or even human beings. Long predicted by military affairs experts, these electronic weapons bring a tremendous promise: the ability to neutralize enemy communcations & equipment without killing enemy soldiers or civilians.

Think invisible lasers, using high-powered microwaves and other sorts of radiation rather than the pulses of visible light common in science fiction. These new systems, which have been under development in countries including Britain, China, Russia and the United States for at least a decade, are not designed to kill people. Conventional bombs, guns and artillery can take care of that.

Rather, most of the directed-energy systems are meant to kill electronics, to disrupt or destroy the digital devices that control the information lifeblood of modern societies and modern military forces. By contrast, traditional jamming equipment blocks communications gear from functioning but does not actually damage the device.

"If there is a war in Iraq, there is no question in my mind that we will see the use of both directed-energy and radio-frequency weaponry,'' said John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., referring to both the new sorts of weapons and traditional jamming technology. "Over the last several years, a great deal of research has been undertaken in this area both by the United States but also by other countries, not all of them allied with us."

That is why, like the genie escaping its bottle, directed energy may harbor danger for the United States itself, not just for its adversaries. With its increasing reliance on digital communications and information systems, the United States is perhaps the most vulnerable potential target for directed-energy devices, military experts say.


Indeed, this risk is great enough that the Wall Street Journal reports today that the Pentagon has decided not to use e-bombs at all.

Top Pentagon and military-service officials are leaning against using the e-bomb, though. They are concerned its use could alienate the Iraqi populace by crippling Baghdad's phone and electrical systems and, hence, the city's hospital and emergency-services infrastructure. Because of the permanent nature of the damage it causes, it would significantly raise the financial cost of rebuilding Iraq's economy once a conflict is over.

There are other practical considerations as well. Military and industry officials say the use of the experimental weapon could burn out electronics on U.S. military equipment in the vicinity. Electronic circuitry on most Air Force systems hasn't yet been redesigned to survive a concentrated onslaught of electromagnetic pulses, according to a February 2000 report by Air Force Col. Eileen Walling. The Air Force declines to comment on the weapon or its potential uses.


More importantly, the Pentagon is worried about blowback from this device's first use. After all, no military uses digitization and electronics to the extent that the U.S. military does. From hand-held GPS receives to Apache helicopters, our military depends heavily on sometimes-delicate electronics to get the job done.

"The U.S. doesn't want the rest of the world to get their hands on something that we're highly vulnerable to," says Loren Thompson, executive director of the Lexington Institute think tank based in Washington, which is set to issue a 64-page report on the topic in coming days. Traditionally, new weapons often spur the development of similar systems and countermeasures to render them less harmful. Some who have studied the use of electromagnetic pulses in warfare say that a cheap version of the weapon could be made for as little as $400.

 
College professor arrested in Florida for alleged ties to terrorism

The Associated Press reports that the Justice Department has taken Professor Sami Al-Arian and two others into custody for their ties to terrorist networks. Attorney General John Ashcroft is going to detail the charges this afternoon in a press conference. Al-Arian, a professor of computer engineering at the University of South Florida, had been under fire from both his university and federal officials for some time as a result of pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli activities and other concerns.

The tenured computer engineering professor was placed on forced leave and banned from campus shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and his subsequent appearance on Fox News Channel. The school also is trying to dismiss him.

He was quizzed about links to known terrorists, and asked about tapes from the late 1980s and early 1990s in which he said ``Death to Israel'' in Arabic.

Al-Arian has said that he has never advocated violence against others and that his words were a statement against Israeli occupation. He also has consistently denied any connection to terrorists.

The university says that hurt the school's fund-raising efforts and resulted in threats being made against the school.

The university also claimed the professor raised money for terrorist groups, brought terrorists into the United States, and founded organizations that support terrorism.

Al-Arian and his brother-in-law, Mazen Al-Najjar, founded the World and Islam Studies Enterprises, a now-defunct Islamic think tank at USF that was raided by the FBI in 1995. Al-Arian also founded the Islamic Concern Project Inc. in 1988.

Al-Arian has lived in the United States since 1975 and had taught at the university since 1986.

Last month, the faculty union at the University of South Florida filed a grievance on Al-Arian's behalf, saying that banning him from campus violated the union's contract, Al-Arian's right to academic freedom and its own policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religious affiliation.

His brother-in-law, who also had taught at the university, spent more than 3 1/2 years in jail on secret evidence linking him to terrorists. He was released in 2000 but arrested again in November 2001 and deported last August.


I'm not sure what's really happening here; we'll know a lot more when the AG makes his announcement this afternoon. I suspect this is linked to the Arnaout plea bargain in Chicago from last week, but have little confidence in that guess. More to follow...

UPDATE: Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the indictment of eight people for their financial, material and other support to terrorist organizations.

The indictment, returned by a federal grand jury in Tampa, Fla., was unsealed Thursday. It charges that the men are members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. Among them are a Palestinian professor at the University of South Florida, 45-year-old Sami Amin Al-Arian, who is described as the group's U.S. leader and secretary of its worldwide council.
* * *
In announcing the indictment, Attorney General John Ashcroft said the eight supported numerous violent terrorist activities.

"Our message to them and to others like them is clear: We make no distinction between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who knowingly finance, manage or supervise terrorist organizations," he said.


Wednesday, February 19, 2003
 
Ridge takes message of preparedness to the American public

Welding anti-terrorism expertise with American common sense, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge today told Americans Wednesday that they should prepare for terrorism in much the same way they would prepare for any other natural disaster. "We can be afraid, or we can be ready," Mr. Ridge said. "Today America's families declare, we will not be afraid and we will be ready." The core of Secretary Ridge's recommendations were three recommendations for every American:

1. Have a communications plan so the family can get in touch during an emergency
2. Put together a disaster kit with a few days of critical supplies
3. Know where to turn for information during a crisis

This is sound advice. It's also nothing new for Californians and other Americans who have lived with the threat of natural disaster for their whole lives. That's not accidental. Many of the "consequences management" functions for terrorism are exactly the same as those for disaster relief. I've been telling my friends for some time that there's little you can do if you're unfortunate enough to be at the epicenter of a terrorist attack. But by taking measures like these, you can prepare for the secondary and tertiary effects of a terrorist attack. A major incident here in L.A. could shut down public infrastructure, power grids, food distribution networks, transportation arteries, and the phone lines -- just to name a few. A little bit of planning & preparation can make your family ready for these events, if they occur.

 
Naming the Operation

Until WWII, the naming of military operations typically had something to do with operational security ("OPSEC"). Operation Overlord, for example, was used to describe the D-Day operation because they didn't want officers to casually refer to the invasion of France while walking around London. Same with Operation Torch, the allied invasion of North Africa in 1942. Although these names took on significance later in military history, they started as innocuous words for describing/disguising the content of an operational plan.

Today, things are different. As Gregory Sieminski writes in the Autumn 1995 issue of Parameters (the U.S. Army War College journal), naming operations today has more to do with Madison Avenue and advertising than with OPSEC:

"Since 1989, major US military operations have been nicknamed with an eye toward shaping domestic and international perceptions about the activities they describe. Operation Just Cause is only the most obvious example of this phenomenon. From names that stress an operation's humanitarian focus, like Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey, to ones that stress an operation's restoration of democratic authority, like Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, it is evident that the military has begun to recognize the power of names in waging a public relations campaign, and the significance of winning that campaign to the overall effort. As Major General Charles McClain, Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, has recently written, "the perception of an operation can be as important to success as the execution of that operation." Professor Ray Eldon Hiebert, in a piece titled, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern War," elaborates on that view: "The effective use of words and media today . . . is just as important as the effective use of bullets and bombs. In the end, it is no longer enough just to be strong. Now it is necessary to communicate. To win a war today government not only has to win on the battlefield, it must also win the minds of its public."

Some recently named operations include:
Operation Desert Shield - The initial deployment of forces in 1990 to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq
Operation Desert Storm - The air/ground campaign conducted to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991
Operation Desert Spring - The continuing, quarterly exercises conducted by the Army in Kuwait to rotate battalions through the country
Operation Joint Endeavor - The initial peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, initiated in 1995 with NATO support
Operation Infinite Justice - The original name for Operation Enduring Freedom (see below), which was scrubbed after people claimed it had religious overtones
Operation Noble Eagle - The military homeland-security effort since Sept. 11; includes guarding of airports, bridges, depots, etc.
Operation Enduring Freedom - The military campaign against terrorism around the world, including Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Officially, the current deployments of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia (Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Diego Garcia, etc) are part of Operation Enduring Freedom. (This according to the APO postal addresses of my friends who I've sent packages to over there) That's significant, because it means these operations are officially part of the global war on terrorism -- not a separate operation to prosecute Iraq for violations of UNSC Res. 1441. However, I don't think that's entirely accurate. More importantly, it's depriving us of the chance to name this operation, and add another phrase to the pantheon of American military history.

So what should President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld name the current operation? A few light-hearted suggestions:
- Operation Stomp Out (we're stomping out the fires of aggression, weapons of mass destruction, etc)
- Operation Clean Up (as in, we're cleaning up our mess from 12 years ago)
- Operation Unfinished Business (same theme, but more explicit)
- Operation Desert Redevelopment (in keeping with this Administration's pro-business theme)
- Operation Desert Inferno (psychological operations to tell the other side what they're about to face)
- Operation Everlasting Endeavor (let's be honest -- the occupation of Iraq will take some time)

I'm sure the Pentagon and State Department are consulting their high-priced Madison Avenue ad agencies now for the answer. Stay tuned.

Tuesday, February 18, 2003
 
Book Update - The Mission

I finished Dana Priest's new book The Mission late last night, fueled by a pot of Peet's coffee. Great read -- I highly recommend the book.

However, I'm not sure I agree with the author's major arguments. Ms. Priest argues, among other things:

1. The U.S. military has gradually squeezed out diplomatic efforts abroad. This has occurred because military funding has remained constant while funding for diplomatic agencies (State Dept, USAID, Commerce, etc) has declined. I agree with the author's argument here, and think this is a dangerous trend. We ought to be engaging foreign governments, economies, and societies -- not just their militaries.

2. In this vacuum, military commanders (the "CinCs") have initiated a number of "military diplomacy" programs. These include the use of Special Forces to train foreign soldiers, sharing of intelligence, promotion of foreign military sales, etc. In the absence of diplomatic workers from traditional agencies like State and USAID, these soldiers have become the biggest group of American government personnel operating abroad. I agree with the author here too; the soldiers have filled a diplomatic vacuum created by tremendous funding disparities. Ironically, this occurred even in the Clinton Administration, where human rights and international engagement had a kindred spirit in the White House.

3. Soldiers are ill-trained and ill-equipped to do this job on behalf of America. Using soldiers abroad has led to a number of breakdowns in American foreign policy, such as the failure to establish a lasting and self-sustaining peace in the Balkans. Moreover, soldiers have contributed to conflict and human-rights problems in various ways, especially through the training of foreign troops. Here, I strongly disagree with Ms. Priest. U.S. soldiers have left a powerful and lasting legacy in places like Bosnia. They may remain there for some time. But the mission is a success story. 10 years ago, snipers dueled over the streets of Sarajevo, killing civilians with impunity. Today, civilians can walk through Sarajevo without fear. A similar, if not-yet-perfect, situation exists in Kosovo, where U.S. soldiers secure the future of Serbs and Albanians alike.

Bottom Line: Soldiers don't make the best diplomats in the world. They should not replace political, social and economic diplomacy, as they have done because of funding disparities between the Pentagon and other federal agencies. But soldiers do a pretty good job at policing the peace. And while the American infantry isn't automatically ready to assume such missions, it can be trained to do so. With good training and leadership, American soldiers can make and keep peace in some of the world's worst places -- just as they have done in Bosnia and Kosovo. On occasion, mistakes will be made. However, American soldiers have proven their ability to stop the killing -- a goal that thousands of diplomats could never attain in the Balkans.

 
Muslim U.S. Army National Guard soldiers says he won't go
Case raises issues of religious freedom; soldier will lose if he fights this one

Sunday's New York Daily News reports that a New York-based reservist named Ghanim Khalil has said "Hell no, I won't go." It's more complicated than that. Basically, he has stated that he will not go if called to fight in Iraq, because he does not believe in the cause for which he would be fighting. Khalil, who is a supply specialist in the New York National Guard, has no mobilization orders -- but he's been told "it's only a matter of time."

"If I'm asked to go to the Middle East, I will not," Khalil, of Staten Island, said at a news conference yesterday before he headed over to the anti-war rally near the United Nations.

"I believe if this war occurs, it is a violation of human rights," added Khalil, a Muslim with Pakistani roots.

"As a Muslim, I have objections" to the war, he said. But he called his protests universal, saying people of all faiths have spoken out against Persian Gulf War II.
* * *
National Guard spokesman Col. Dan Stoneking wouldn't comment on Khalil specifically, saying, "All Americans have First Amendment rights," but that reservists who won't serve would be sanctioned.


Analysis: This is a ridiculous case on so many levels.

1. I think Mr. Khalil has been influenced by some people close to him to make this stand, probably because it will bolster the alleged moral credibility of the anti-war movement if they have a few martyrs. I go to law school with such an individual, who "made his bones" in the peace movement by encouraging Marines to go AWOL during the first Gulf War. If that's the case, Mr. Khalil ought to think carefully about what he is doing. It is technically possible that he could be court-martialed for his conduct. He will serve the jail time; not them.

2. As a matter of religious freedom, Mr. Khalil is on very shaky ground. The First Amendment has been tested by conscientious objectors who sought to avoid Vietnam service, and they were instead drafted as medics and other types of soldiers. More recently, in the all-volunteer force, the First Amendment was tested by an Air Force rabbi who wanted to wear his yarmulke in uniform. The Court held that the Air Force was not infringing his religious freedom by ordering him to conform to uniform regulations. In general, the Supreme Court defers to military judgment on matters like this. (See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 US 503, Decided on March 25, 1986) And in this case, religion or not, the Court would probably uphold Mr. Khalil's conviction for failing to report for duty.

3. I'm not sure there's a legitimate religious issue here. First, Saddam Hussein's no Islamist -- he runs a secular regime in Baghdad with little if any tie to the Muslim religion. If America were about to wage war on Saudi Arabia -- or even Iran -- things might be different. Second, Islam itself contains no proscriptions on warfare in its entirety, the way the Quaker religion does for example. Islam embraces "just war" just as Christianity and Judaism do. Thus if our ends are morally just, then Mr. Khalil ought to have no religious objection to them. Personally, I consider the goal of liberating the oppressed Iraqi people to be a pretty just end.

4. This isn't a conscription Army -- Mr. Khalil voluntarily joined the National Guard. He's probably gotten some benefits, like the GI Bill or tuition assistance, and has at least enjoyed the pay from the National Guard since joining. It's not like America's problems with Iraq are new. He should've seen the writing on the wall before and never joind the military if he thought it was so bad.

5. It's not like Mr. Khalil is an infantryman -- he's a supply specialist. If he sees any fighting at all, it will be by accident. If his Guard unit hasn't been called up yet, it may not be called. If his unit was called, it's just as likely to be called for some homeland-defense mission as an overseas deployment. I might cede him some credibility if he were a high-speed Airborne Ranger in the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, or something like that. But then again, I doubt someone with convictions like Mr. Khalil could make it through that kind of selection and training process.

Post Script: As a U.S. Army officer and Jew, I dealt with this issue several times in my military career. A number of fellow soldiers -- from sergeant to colonel -- asked me in a variety of contexts how I would act if American went to war against or on the side of Israel. A related quesiton was whether I would desert the U.S. Army for the Israeli Defense Force should Israel be attacked. (American military personnel have done this, so it's not a baseless question) My answer was always that I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, and that I would remain true to that oath. The questions usually went away as I got to know these individuals. But I think they reflected a larger insecurity in America's uniformed ranks towards Jews and Muslims, and unease over each faith's true allegiances. Thus, I sympathize with Mr. Khalil -- but I cannot support his position in any way.

 
Lawyers at War

International law professor Ruth Wedgwood has something to say to the American Bar Association in this morning's Wall Street Journal: stop impeding America's war on terrorism. Ms. Wedgwood, who is often consulted by the Bush Administration on dicey matters of international law (such as the treatment of enemy combatants), knows what she's talking about. I read the ABA report, and think for the most part it's a flawed document. The ABA, like many lawyers, cannot break with their paradigm that everything is a problem of law; that terrorism must be dealt with by courts and attorneys. Nearly every recommendation in the ABA report hinges on that assumption.

The American Bar Association has entered the fray over the president's detention of enemy combatants in the war on terrorism. At its recent meeting in Seattle, ABA delegates helpfully urged the administration to do what it is already doing -- namely, allowing Americans captured with the Taliban or al Qaeda to seek "meaningful judicial review" of their legal status. In addition, suggested the ABA, any U.S. citizens or residents captured as combatants should be granted access to defense counsel in a way that "accommodates the needs of the detainee and the requirements of national security."

Unfortunately for the rest of us, this second step involves a balancing act that isn't so easy. Americans hold liberty dear, but they also are acutely aware that the need for intelligence on anticipated attacks by al Qaeda is urgent, and the supply is scarce. The prime source of intelligence will be captured combatants; and lawyers, alas, will inevitably turn off that flow of time-critical information.
* * *
The president has employed his constitutional power as commander-in-chief to treat al Qaeda and Taliban fighters as combatants, to keep them from returning to the battlefield. Under the established law of armed conflict, he can civilly intern a captured combatant until the end of active hostilities. Military commanders are entitled to interrogate all combatants at length, to learn as much as possible about al Qaeda's cells, weapons and future plans for attack.

In a conventional war, a habeas corpus petition by enemy soldiers would likely be dismissed out-of-hand. With an enemy who does not wear any distinctive insignia or uniform (contrary to the laws of war) and who makes the world a 24/7 battlefield, the inquiry can be more delicate. But not always. Consider the situation in Virginia, where the federal appeals court cut the Gordian knot after three rounds of appeals related to Yaser Hamdi, a Saudi-American found on the Afghan battlefield carrying an AK-47.

Hamdi, now in the Norfolk naval brig, was born in Baton Rouge and raised in Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan to take weapons training with the Taliban and was captured by the Northern Alliance "in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict." Hamdi admitted to military intelligence teams that he'd trained and deployed with the Taliban, and carried an automatic weapon until his capture.

The Fourth Circuit found no reason to reject the factual or legal basis of the president's decision to detain Hamdi as a combatant, in light of his out-of-court admissions and the recorded circumstances of his capture. The appellate court rebuffed the district judge's hunting-call for more battlefield details, including whether Hamdi had actually fired his gun in battle or was merely held in ready reserve.

The proposed "excavation" of battlefield scenes from a half-world away might be characteristic of a criminal investigation, but wasn't adapted to the "rubble of war," ruled Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson and his colleagues. There are, after all, no crime-lab investigators on an Afghan battlefield ready to record whether a combatant's clothing has powder residue. So, too, the demand for review of all classified screening criteria for the transfer of combatants, all raw intelligence interviews of Hamdi, and the names and addresses of all interviewers, was held to be an unwarranted excursion into the president's domain.

The principle of separation of powers unavoidably has a large footprint in wartime. It is the president who is constitutionally charged with successfully prosecuting a war and protecting the American people against renewed attacks.
* * *
Al Qaeda has learned quickly. Its planners are smart enough to use American "mules" once they realize that stateside recruits are immune from effective interrogation. The government could create an expeditious surrogate procedure, using military commissions and counsel to establish the status of any citizen combatants, thus simplifying the federal courts' task of habeas review. But in the meantime, the dilemma remains. We have stationed anti-aircraft batteries around government buildings. We have tasked environmental clean-air sampling stations around the country to watch for biological reagents. Yet intelligence remains a key to citizen safety.

The federal courts will take this issue case-by-case and may vary their procedure according to the clarity of the government's affidavit. But journeys to Afghanistan and planning sessions with al Qaeda leave little room for doubt that someone has signed up with the bad guys.


Analysis: Terrorism is a round peg that cannot easily be pounded easily into the square holes of law or war. It requires innovative solutions, sometimes from the war paradigm and sometimes from the criminal-law paradigm. Forcing the President to choose all his options from the law paradigm will tie his hands in a way we can't afford. America cannot afford to let terrorists have a tactical advantage like that the criminal courts or 4th Amendment would confer -- we must have the ability to gather intelligence and pro-actively stop terrorism.

Monday, February 17, 2003
 
Firefighters' masks fail to stop chemical agents

This disturbing report from Noah Shachtman at Defense Tech:

FIREFIGHTERS' MASKS CAN'T STOP GAS
The gas masks used by almost every fire department in the country can't keep chemical agents like sarin and mustard gas from getting in. Many firefighters have no idea their equipment is deficient, according to CBS News.

When he received the report (of the masks' shortcomings), the chief of the Arlington Virginia Fire Department, Ed Plaugher, says he was, "devastated - literally devastated."

Plaugher led the Sept. 11 response at the Pentagon. Even though his rescue teams presumed there might be poison gas, they rushed in anyway, certain their gear would protect them. That confidence is gone.

"The failure of the test is a very, very big deal for us, because it means we have to re-evaluate and re-ramp the way that we attack an incident like this," says Plaugher.

What he means is delay. Today, if the alarm rings and a gas attack is suspected, the Arlington teams will not rush in.


Sequel: Want to know another not-too-secret fact? Standard-issue military gear won't protect against many of the industrial chemical hazards that firefighter's gear is designed to protect against. Military protective masks are designed to protect against battlefield chemical/biological weapons, but not against industrial/urban hazards like what might happen if you accidentally blew up a chemical factory in Baghdad. Are there suits that will protect you against everything? Yes, but they're expensive, hard to use, and delicate. (If you saw the movie Outbreak, you know what I mean)

 
Women Warriors

Sunday's New York Times Magazine ran a great photo essay on female warriors who may lead the way to Baghdad if we go to war with Iraq. In many ways, the article reprises the cover article I wrote in December for the Washington Monthly on women in combat. I encourage you to check both out.

Since the Gulf victory in 1991, a series of largely unnoticed policy changes have opened new opportunities for women to fight alongside, and even to lead, front-line troops. The Navy and Air Force, with some fanfare, allowed women into the cockpits of fighters and bombers. But less well known is how vastly the Army has expanded the role of women in ground-combat operations. Today, women command combat military police companies, fly Apache helicopters, work as tactical intelligence analysts, and even serve in certain artillery units--jobs that would have been unthinkable for them a decade ago. In any war in Iraq, these changes could put thousands of women in the midst of battle, far more than at any time in American history.

This new role for female U.S. troops is the product of three different forces. One is congressional pressure to integrate the military by gender as it previously had been integrated by race. Another is the ongoing enlistment shortage; the military remains reluctant to admit women yet is unable to recruit enough competent men to staff an all-volunteer Army. But the most important reason has been pressure from women within the Army who need combat experience to advance their careers, nearly all of them in the officer corps. And yet this experiment has been conducted largely below the threshold of public awareness.

The wisdom of this integration is sure to be tested in any sizable ground war with Iraq. If female soldiers perform poorly, they could put their comrades' lives at risk, strengthen the hand of conservatives who oppose women serving as soldiers, and provoke a backlash from the American public. But if, in the heat of battle, women fight bravely and effectively, it could spark a different sort of debate among the military and the public at large over why regulations and military culture still conspire to keep women from many prime assignments in the nation's service.


 

Some thoughts on duct tape and plastic wrap

Knowing my background in anti-terrorism and force protection, some friends and family members have asked for my opinion on whether they should buy a stockage of duct tape and plastic wrap -- and whether they should build a safe room in their house. I usually qualify my advice by saying I was an MP, not a Chemical Corps officer. I know the general details of biological and chemical warfare, but not the intimate details that make these deadly things work. That said, I think this is good advice, and I wish there was more of it out there.

1. Will duct tape and plastic wrap protect my house? Maybe. If you can use these materials to make an air-tight box in your house, then in theory, you can keep out any biological or chemical agent. Try it on a small scale -- take a decidedly non-airtight cardboard box and use these materials to seal it. Then put that box into a tank of water and see if any air bubbles escape. Do this again until you get it right. It's not easy work. Though very strong, duct tape is still somewhat porous; you need to layer these materials to achieve a complete seal. Plastic wrap is notoriously weak too; it rips and tears quite easily. If you can do this well enough to build an air-tight box that withstands the water-tank test, you're better than me. In any case, it's theoretically possible to build an air-tight container in your house to protect yourself against chemical or biological agents. It just takes a lot of effort -- and the type of engineering skill that usually comes with an MIT degree and lots of experience.

But there are a myriad of issues to be resolved next.

2. How will you get fresh air in/out of this safe room? Without some filter mechanism, it will be impossible to refresh the air in your safe house. You can deal with this in several ways. One might stock oxygen tanks inside, though that may cause interesting overpressure issues if you release those pressurized tanks within your sealed room. (The overpressure may blow the seals on your tape) With some engineering expertise, you could add an air-filtration system with a HEPA filter and a carbon filter to screen out all chemical and biological agents (much like a gas mask does). But this would be difficult and costly.

3. How do you eat? Assuming you have a perfectly sealed box and you can recirculate the air, you'll also have to eat and drink at some point. In theory, you can just stock some canned goods and bottled water and you're good to go. But how much do you stock? This is manageable, but it must be planned ahead of time. If the threat is real and your house is contaminated, you can't expect to step out of the box for a quick trip to the fridge. (Theoretically, you also have to plan for the removal of human waste, but I'll leave that to you)

4. How do you know when to get in/out of the box? The answer here is far from clear -- this is the hardest question of all. Except for certain high-threat locations like the Pentagon and White House, we have no national chem/bio surveillance system which would tell us there's been a nerve-gas or anthrax attack. Scary, huh? Chemical weapons would be detected by large numbers of casualties, and possibly through the signature of the delivery device. Police, fire and specialized National Guard units would outline the contaminated area and attempt to seal it off as best they could. But that would take time. If you're in that area, you may or may not get any warning of the chemical agent. You simply aren't going to get the real-time warning you need to get into the box fast enough to make a difference, unless you happen to have your own personal M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm.
- Biological agents are even trickier -- no one may know they're there until they start killing people in many cases. Until recently, the military didn't have a system for real-time detection and warning of biological agent. It does not -- the so-called BIDS system. But it's not perfect, and it's not fielded all that widely. If news helicopters flew over Los Angeles and sprayed anthrax spores or some other nasty bug, we would not get the warning in time to hop into our sealed boxes. Indeed, we may not learn of this incident until the first casualties start walking into local emergency rooms.

5. How would you know it's 'all clear'? Again, you wouldn't. No system exists today to go around to every neighborhood and decontaminate it after an attack. Even if such a system existed, how would you know your neighborhood had been decontaminated? In theory, TV or radio stations might broadcast such information, but would you be willing to trust the local news station with your life? In the military, we train to decontaminate personnel and critical equipment. But some areas themselves may stay contaminated until the agent dissipates naturally. This is especially true of so-called "persistent nerve agents" like VX, which occurs as a gelatin-like substance and is one of the most lethal substances in existence. In the right weather, this stuff can persist for days or weeks. Luckily, however, this stuff is fairly static. If we know where the device was blown and we know the wind, we can predict where the agent will go. If you stay out of this hazardous area, you'll live. But if you're in the contaminated area and you're in your box, you may be stuck in a really bad place for some time.

Recommendation: Save your money and avoid the long lines at Home Depot -- don't buy the duct tape or plastic wrap. Even if you could solve all of these problems, it's still unlikely you'd get enough advance warning from the government to get into your "safe" house in time. Instead, your best bet is to listen to the news. If an attack happens, look for information about where it hit and where it's predicted to spread. Then do everything you can to avoid that area. I know it sounds simple. But often times, the simplest plans are the best ones.

 
Reserve call-ups strain city/county public safety departments

Today's Los Angeles Times carries a front-page article on the strain that extensive call-ups of American military reservists puts on police, fire, and civic agencies at the state and local level around the country. Here in California, more than 8,000 reservists (including me) have been called to active duty since Sept. 11, 2001. Many of these tours have lasted for a few months; some have lasted a year or longer. With war looming in Iraq and occupation duty on the horizon after that, it's not clear when these callups will end. Conceivably, many soldiers will be called a second time if this trend continues.

For a number of complex reasons, a disproportionate number of these reservists work in the public sector -- especially in local police and fire departments. Police and fire departments like to hire military veterans because of their physical aptitude, military training, education, experience, and professional maturity. Many departments, like the LAPD, award extra points to veterans in the hiring process. These agencies also have generous reserve-duty policies, sometimes paying their personnel for the time they serve in the reserves (on top of their reserve salaries). Police officers and firefighters often rely on reserve service for much-needed extra money in the early years of their careers. For their part, police/fire departments encourage reserve service because the military provides leadership training/experience their personnel can't get as easily in the civilian world.

However, there's a basic tension here -- the public-safety needs of the state/local community vs. the military personnel needs of the U.S. government.

"Are these people better off guarding prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, or can they do more service to the country as police officers back in their communities?" asked Lynchburg Police Chief C.W. Bennett, who is struggling to make do with three of his most experienced officers gone or about to go. "We have to make some tough decisions about where these people can do the most good."

The Chief is right -- someone needs to be thinking about why we're calling up so many reservists, and whether these men/women can do more good if they're left in the departments they work in. Current Army mobilization policies (FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3) do not allow for the exemption of reservists from mobilization for external work reasons, i.e. "the city needs me." Compelling personal reasons can sometimes exempt a soldier, but that's about it. I know a lot of people who do important public-sector work in the anti-terrorism community who don't serve in the military reserves for this reason.

There's a second issue: why does the Pentagon need to call up so many reservists in the first place? The answer is that after Vietnam, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Creighton Abrams decided to restructure America's military to require a massive reserve callup in any future war. The theory was that a reserve callup would test the political resolve of America's leaders, and force them to account for the war to America's people. (Vietnam was fought largely by conscripts and the existing Army -- with little reserve mobilization at all.) Consequently, critical support units like military police, logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, etc., were moved to the reserve component. The Air Force pushed a number of its tactical fighter wings to the Air National Guard and Air Force reserve.

Today, this has come around to bite the Pentagon in the backside. With our current commitments to Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Egypt, and a dozen other places, America barely has the forces it needs to fight the war in Afghanistan and the buildup in Kuwait. Moreover, the active force structure relies on critical support units (see above) that exist only in the reserves . Consequently, the President must call up a substantial number of reservists to fight the war on terrorism, and any subsequent/related war on Iraq.

Friday, February 14, 2003
 
Signing off until Monday

I'm going camping north of Santa Barbara this weekend, and will be taking a break from 'blogging for the next three days. Despite the current sophisticated state of cellular telephony, laptops, and high-speed Internet service, I've made a conscious choice to leave my laptop behind and get away for a few days. I may take a book, but that's about it.

I promise to do a full Intel Dump on the weekend's events when I return. I'm sifting through materials on the new "Terrorist Threat Integration Center" and will have some thoughts on that (and more) when I return.

 
Book Recommendation: The Mission
Washington Post reporter Dana Priest’s new book on the American military

I just picked up Dana Priest’s new book The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military. (W.W. Norton & Co., 2003) This book is the latest of its popular/political/journalistic genre to hit the racks on America’s military. By my count, we’ve had David Halberstam’s War in a Time of Peace, Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, Max Boot’s Savage Wars of Peace, Wes Clark's Waging Modern War, and several others in the past 1-2 years. Ms. Priest is an outstanding reporter for the Washington Post; she now covers the White House. I will withhold judgment on the book itself, having just finished the first chapter. However, I already sense an argument against many of the ways that Presidents Clinton and Bush used the military during the last five years. It’s a very provocative argument, and a book that I look forward to reading.

Here are a couple of sample passages from the Prologue:

Long before September 11, the U.S. government had grown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs. The shift was incremental, little noticed, de facto. It did not even qualify as an “approach.” The military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress. After September 11, however, the trend accelerated dramatically with the war in Afghanistan and the likelihood of U.S. military operations elsewhere. Without a doubt, U.S.-sponsored political reform abroad is being eclipsed by new military pacts focusing on anti-terrorism and intelligence-sharing.

All this comes at a time when decision-makers understand less and less about their military. Our elected leaders often treat men and women in uniform with either suspicion or excessive reference, failing to ask probing questions or push hard enough for reform. Yet it is the responsibility of those civilians to set the military’s direction, to use it as a tool when appropriate and otherwise to refrain from using it. At a minimum, Americans should understand the consequences of substituting generals and Green Berets for diplomats, and nineteen-year-old paratroopers for police and aid workers on nation-building missions.
* * *
The heightened reliance on generals, grunts and Green Berets arose when the prospect of big, direct confrontation and smaller unconventional wars between the superpowers ended. For a while, U.S. political and military leaders flailed about trying to redefine the country’s national interests. Military budgets and force sizes shrank, but even so, the Defense Department had more money and more people than any other foreign-focused government agency. With fewer threats, strategic-level commanders also had time and resources to worry about other things. More important, they had the inclination. Many officers, connoisseurs of history, viewed peacetime as an intermission between big wars. They wanted to use this intermission to prevent the next big conflict, which their think tanks predicted would be fought asymmetrically with low-tech weapons: suicide bombers, toxic chemicals, and deadly viruses wielded by worldwide terrorist cells funded by drugs, diamonds and dirty money. The key to prevention, many came to believe, was to create multinational “neighborhood watch” groups – regional coalitions of nations – that would discourage the bad guys in the ‘hood from straying too far and that would stop them if they tried something stupid.

No figures were more convinced of this approach than the generals who led the U.S. military’s regionally focused unified commands. With discretionary money and time, these commanders-in-chief, or “CinCs” (pronounced “sinks”), set out on their own parallel course to “shape” the world, as instructed by the president and the secretary of defense. Fairly soon, the CinCs grew into a powerful force in U.S. foreign policy because of the disproportionate weight of their resources and organization in relation to the assets and influence of other parts of America’s foreign policy structure – in particular, the State Department, which was shriveling in size, stature, and spirit even as the military’s role expanded.
* * *
Although the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was clear in purpose, we are now seeing that the hardest, longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes. As the U.S. Army’s experience in Kosovo shows, the mind-set, decision-making, and training of infantry soldiers rarely mixes well with the disorder inherent in civil society. The mismatch of culture and mission can distort the goal of rebuilding a country. In the hands of poorly-formed, misguided troops, it can create disaster.

Such a mismatch was evident even to Pfc. Ian Smith, a nineteen-year-old from Ventura, California, who sat at the computer stall next to mine one evening in Vitina (Kosovo). Downloading music to his laptop, he leaned back in his yellow plastic chair and offered an unsolicited assessment of his Kosovo mission: “If you want to put a country back on its feet, you can’t send the military. You have to send reformers,” he said, meaning the civilians he imagined do these sorts of repairs.
Smith, however, had already lowered his expectations about the “reformers.” “This year all the NGOs (humanitarian organizations) are gone. So we take firewood from the people who need it,” meaning the majority Albanians, “and give it to people who need it,” meaning the minority Serbs. He rolled his eyes. “The only way to make a difference is when there’s a TV in every house, a phone in every house. Make it a first-world country and they’ll feel advanced. If they see a difference, that’s the key.”
Smith’s infantry brethren are now in Afghanistan. They, too, believe they are on an unnamed, open-ended mission on behalf of the United States – even if the rest of America hasn’t yet figured it out.


 
Army passes on its 'lessons learned' from smallpox vaccinations
Some side effects, but all can be managed

Today's Los Angeles Times reports on a particularly candid press briefing by the Army on its recent campaign to inoculate 500,000 soldiers against smallpox. Though well planned/executed, the military vaccination effort has run into predictable problems with medical logistics and medical effects. Most of these were anticipated (e.g. side effects), and the military planned for their occurrence. But some were not. It's important to note that the military enjoys several advantages over the civilian population in this effort -- it's more healthy (on average), younger, and more tightly controlled than civilian society. In theory, these problems will be magnified in any civilian vaccination effort.

"The risks [of the vaccine] are still pretty darn low," Col. John D. Grabenstein, deputy director for military vaccines, told a scientific panel created to advise the government's smallpox vaccination program. "Sick leave is rare and short ... and just about everything is occurring at rates lower than historically predicted," he added.
* * *
Even the military, with all its built-in efficiencies, has had some problems with its vaccination program. Tens of thousands of military personnel have experienced fever, malaise and swollen lymph nodes after being vaccinated, and "there has been a rash of rashes," Grabenstein said, about 12 for every 1,000 people inoculated. Almost all are harmless, but as many as seven people have developed what may be generalized vaccinia, a systemic spread of the vaccine's live vaccinia virus in lesions over the body, he said.

In addition, two soldiers were hospitalized with encephalitis, a serious inflammation of the brain, and an airman developed myocarditis, an inflammation of the heart.

But even these severe cases "have had a full recovery and are not slowing down the military vaccination program," Grabenstein said.


 
'Lessons learned' from an old soldier
Air war architect from Gulf War I suggests path for Gulf War II

Few airmen earn the right to call themselves a "soldier" or "warrior". Among the services, the Air Force is regarded as the most corporate and least martial. However, some airmen stand out, like Colonel John Boyd and General Charles "Chuck" Horner. These men, through their actions in combat and peace, earned the title of warrior. With help from a brilliant plans staff, Chuck Horner conceived and directed the air war over Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-91. This campaign is understood today to have revolutionized warfare, and to have set the conditions for the massively successful ground assault. When Chuck Horner speaks, I listen.

Today, he writes an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times with a few lessons for military planners engaged in the current campaign:

We knew how Iraq operated its air defenses in 1991, and we attacked vital communication and command nodes. Once they were isolated, individual surface-to-air missiles and aircraft were destroyed so viciously that surviving Iraqi SAM operators and fighter pilots were debilitated by shock and awe, incapable of employing their weapons effectively. Then, we flew at altitudes beyond the range of the Iraqi guns and short-range SAMs and used precision weapons to destroy many targets.

Although we ultimately forced Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait, our approach was not an effective one for changing leadership.
* * *
Another lesson from the Gulf War is to integrate modern air power with ground forces. In 1991, air power destroyed artillery and armor, limiting Iraq's capacity to repel our ground forces. More than 40 Iraqi divisions were defeated with the loss of about 150 Americans, half of whom were killed by our own weapons. Recent action in Afghanistan -- when air and land forces again were closely integrated -- reaffirms the effectiveness of this approach.

In order not to leave Iraq worse off than it is today, we should use our forces efficiently: Don't engage those elements of the Iraqi military that do not resist. In 1991, 88,000 Iraqis chose to surrender. Allow them to do so again. For our own security, advanced surveillance aircraft can monitor the movement of bypassed Iraqi units. If they move to threaten our forces, they would be put down by precision weapons.
* * *
We must keep the Iraqi people informed and reassure them that we will return their country to their control. People who have fled Iraq can communicate with the folks at home to tell them what to expect. Television, radio and leaflet messages will also be important.

Any strategy must recognize the important and difficult issues that will exist after a war. Our land forces will play a major role in areas such as providing food, water and medical care until relief agencies can take over.

There will also be an immediate need to maintain law and order to prevent criminal acts and retribution.

Air power will have the lead role in winning the conflict, but land power will have the more critical role of helping Iraq rebuild itself.


Thursday, February 13, 2003
 
Can the President wage war on Iraq?
The latest skirmish: a civil lawsuit to enjoin the Bush Administration from war

In Massachusetts, 12 plaintiffs filed suit today in federal court seeking to enjoin President George Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from waging war on Iraq without an explicit declaration of war from Congress. The plaintiffs include members of Congress (John Conyers, Jesse Jackson Jr., Dennis Kucinich, Jim McDermott, Jose Serrano), as well as ordinary citizens affected by the war -- including active and reserve military personnel.

"A coalition of plaintiffs... hereby bring this action challenging, under Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution, the authority of Defendant President George W. Bush and Defendant Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (hereinafter “Defendants”) to wage war against Iraq, absent a clear declaration of war by the United States Congress."

The parties have also requested an expedited hearing for their case, given that the President has said it will be "weeks not months" before he conducts decisive action against Iraq.

"... Each of the Plaintiffs faces imminent harm from the war threatened by the Defendants. The Plaintiff service people have the most to lose – their lives and limbs – in an illegal war. The Plaintiff parents risk the loss or injury of their children in the service when an undeclared war commences. The Plaintiff Congressional Representatives are threatened with losing their constitutional right and authority to be the decision makers, representing their constituencies, as to whether the United States will enter a war with Iraq. The Plaintiffs meet the standards for issuance of a preliminary injunction, as the accompanying memorandum of law demonstrates."

Analysis: Of course, this is a political tactic. It's an ironic twist on Clausewitz, who wrote that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Here, you have a situation where law is a continuation of politics by other means. (This begs the question: is law really a form of warfare?) Congress has taken up this issue, and to the chagrin of these anti-war activists, passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq to enforce UN Security Council resolutions. Congress has also passed a resolution to authorize the use of force in America's war on terrorism.

The courts have never -- and probably will never -- hold that the President needs an explicit declaration of war before committing US troops abroad. That would unconstitutionally infringe on his power as Commander in Chief of the military. In several wartime cases, the Supreme Court has held that Presidential decisions to commit troops to combat without such a declaration have been lawful. There's no reason why they would change that holding in this case. (But see, plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their arguments) Unless this suit finds a very receptive federal judge, it will die in U.S. District Court. And even if it proceeds, it will not succeed.

Update: The AP reports that "There has been no response yet from the Bush administration. The lawsuit seeks a preliminary injunction and an expedited hearing. An expedited hearing was granted, and a federal judge will hear the case next Thursday."

 
Human shields cling to bridge in Baghdad
If the U.S. bombs the bridge and kills them, is it a war crime?

The Associated Press reports that 14 peace activists from several different nations have reached Baghdad after a lengthy tour of Europe via double-decker bus. The group almost didn't make it, and their leader (former US marine Ken Nichols) was deported by Turkey before reaching Iraq. After days of speculation over whether the U.S. would stop this traveling circus, the peaceniks have reached their destination. Now that they're there, they have "wrapped their arms around posts on a bridge over the Tigris River on Thursday, symbolizing their intent to act as human shields in any U.S. war on Iraq."

The 14 activists, mostly from Italy, were one of the first groups here using the "shield" title, which suggests they might place their bodies at potential targets to deter bombing. But they acknowledged their mission is only a gesture meant to try to deter an invasion to topple Saddam Hussein. "I have no intention of being a martyr," Canadian Roberta Taman said. "I'm here because I believe that the world wants peace and that we can achieve peace."

The campaigners, organized as the Iraq Peace Team, have been draping banners over public facilities in Baghdad this week - an electricity station, a water treatment plant and, on Thursday, the Martyrs Bridge over the Tigris. "Bombing This site Is A War Crime," the banners read.


Is that right? Would it be a war crime for the U.S. to hit the bridge over the Tigris?

The answer is not as clear cut as either the activists -- or the Pentagon -- would like.

1. The first issue is whether the larger war itself would be lawful. Lawful acts of combat in the context of an unlawful war would obviously not be lawful. The U.S. reads existing UN Security Council resolutions to already give the U.S. the authority to attack Iraq, notwithstanding the Security Council's current hesitation to authorize any action. These resolutions, including several passed in 1990-91 in the First Gulf War, are so-called "Chapter VII" resolutions of the UN Security Council which authorize military force for implementation. However, the French and German view is that these resolutions do not suffice to create international authorization for a war, and that a US-led war without explicit (and new) UN authorization would be unlawful. This is a dramatic oversimplication, but you get the idea. The very lawfulness of any US action in Iraq might be questioned.

2. Commanders have a duty to observe two principles of the law of war which are relevant here. The first is "distinction", which means the distinction between military and civilian targets. Commanders are required to take all practical measures to hit military targets and to not hit civilian targets. Deliberately targeting civilians is illegal under the laws of war, and intentional (or negligent) collateral damage may be as well. The second principle is "proportionality." Military commanders should use the amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission and defend friendly forces -- but not more.

- Is the bridge a lawful military target? If Iraqi troops or military/strategic assets use it, the answer is pretty easily yes. If it's used for logistical or infrastructural supply of Iraqi troops, the answer could still be yes. If yes, then the bridge can be hit.

- If the bridge can be hit, what about the known existence of civilians at that site? Here it becomes tricky. In theory, commanders are to avoid intentionally or negligently causing civilian casualties. However, "human shields" would create an easy way for despots to make their adversaries commit war crimes. So international law deals with this by putting the blame to the side that uses human shields. If Iraq condones or allows these persons to be human shields, then Iraq accepts the blame (and legal liability in a war-crimes tribunal) for their deaths. In the first Gulf War, Iraq used human shields quite extensively. The U.S. knew about them, and bombed some of those sites anyway because the military value of those targets outweighed the collateral damage. Nonetheless, the legal and moral responsibility for those deaths lay with Saddam Hussein.

- Are there any 'proportionality' issues here? Probably not. Assuming the bridge is a lawful military target (and critical infrastructure usually is), the U.S. can use the appropriate bomb to bring it down. I'm no expert on air-dropped munitions, but I suspect that means a precision-guided munition of some kind that can hit the bridge and bring it down with one or two bombs. Such a weapon would kill whoever was on the bridge, and probably hurt/kill anyone with their arms wrapped around it too. There isn't a way to accomplish this legitimate military end (blowing the bridge) without causing casualties in the immediate vicinity. The absence of any viable/practical alternative means to cause that end means this would almost certainly be a proportional strike.

3. The peace activists themselves may be relieving both the Americans and the Iraqis here of any legal liability by their actions. In American law, this doctrine is called "assumption of risk." It requires two elements: 1) that the victim know about the risk and 2) that the victim voluntarily assume that risk as an act of free will. The actions of these activists argue strongly that they have assumed the risk of being killed by American ordnance. Such an event would be tragic. But the U.S. cannot be held liable for this, and military lawyers advising Gen. Tommy Franks know this. It's unlikely this human-shield effort will have any effect whatsoever -- except to cause more suffering for the families of these activists if they are hurt or killed.

 
Bush Administration sends war plan back to planners for revision
Plan failed to minimize civilian casualties; set conditions for American occupation

Today's Washington Times reports that the White House has turned down an initial plan for the air war in Iraq. Why? As written, the plan would have targeted parts of the Iraqi civilian infrastructure and other things which would inflict too much harm on the Iraqi people. This, in turn, would cause tremendous civil-military problems for the U.S. in the post-war occupation phase, giving Iraqi civilians more reason to resent the U.S. instead of seeing the U.S. as its liberator.

The Bush administration's desire to spare dual military-civilian targets in Iraq has produced an air war plan that is too timid and does not properly prepare the battle space for ground troops, according to interviews with military officers.
* * *
The officers said the plan, as of a few weeks ago, would largely spare infrastructure targets, such as bridges, and most, if not all, telephone communications.

The officers said the plan deviates in significant ways from the 1991 38-day air campaign during Operation Desert Storm, in which telephone communications, power systems and bridges were targeted from the first day to isolate Saddam Hussein and his military forces.

The reason for the change: The Bush administration wants to spare hardships to Iraqi civilians and to show that the real target of the bombing campaign is Saddam.

It hopes that Iraqi citizens, in return, accept U.S. military rule during an interim period leading to the establishment of a democratic government. Bush officials also want, to the extent possible, to avoid civilian casualties.


Analysis: This story illustrates just how far the U.S. is willing to go to scrupulously observe the laws of war, and to minimize civilian death and suffering in war. No nation in history does more than the United States to observe the laws of war in combat. Our military fights under strict rules of engagement, in extremely focused way. We attach lawyers to every level of command down to the regiment/brigade -- these attorneys advise commanders on how to fight lawfully. We train our soldiers in detail on the laws of war before deployment so they'll know the right thing to do. Our military has the technology to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and to focus our combat power very tightly on those military targets. Finally, we have CNN to keep us honest; any mistakes will be instantly and graphically reported to the world, and our civilian/military leaders will be held accountable for those acts.

 
WP: U.S. special operations forces enter Iraq

Tom Ricks, perhaps the best military reporter around, reports in this morning's Washington Post that American Special Forces teams have entered Iraq to conduct long-range reconnaissance and direct action in preparation for a U.S. led campaign.

The troops, comprising two Special Operations Task Forces with an undetermined number of personnel, have been in and out of Iraq for well over a month, said two military officials with direct knowledge of their activities. They are laying the groundwork for conventional U.S. forces that could quickly seize large portions of Iraq if President Bush gives a formal order to go to war, the officials said.

The ground operation points to a Pentagon war plan that is shaping up to be dramatically different than the one carried out by the United States and its allies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Instead of beginning with a massive aerial bombardment, the plan envisions a series of preliminary ground actions to seize Iraqi territory and effectively encircle Baghdad before a large-scale air campaign hits the capital, defense officials and analysts said.

"It's possible that ground movements could come in and occupy large portions of Iraq almost unimpeded," said one person familiar with Pentagon planning. In northern Iraq, the source said, "we might get to the outskirts of Tikrit without firing a shot." Tikrit, a city north of Baghdad, is Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's ancestral home and a major base of his power.


Analysis: Ricks has extremely good sources, and I can't think of a reason why he got this story wrong. This strategy also matches U.S. doctrine, which makes it more likely that it's true. Before any war, you want to do as much as possible to get accurate, on-the-ground, eyes-on intelligence about the enemy. Special Forces teams are uniquely suited to do this mission, given their extensive training, experience and maturity from multiple deployments, language skills, ability to be covert, and skill with using sophisticated electronic surveillance and communications gear.

What does this mean for the larger question -- are we going to war? I think the answer has always been yes, but now that war is more imminent. The Pentagon would not commit these American soldiers if it did not see action in a relatively short amount of time. Committing any ground troops entails substantial risk, and my gut insticts tell me the U.S. would not do this unless it planned a war within months.

Wednesday, February 12, 2003
 
More on smallpox vaccine controversy

UCLA Professor Mark Kleiman has some interesting thoughts today on this weblog regarding the smallpox-vaccine controversy. Mark's one of the smartest policy guys I've met in my (short) lifetime, and he's especially good at assessing the cost/benefit calculus of a particular policy to decide whether it's rational or not. One of his arguments really struck a chord with me:

Part of the problem seems to be that workers who have reactions to the shots severe enough to keep them out of work for a while would have to rely on the notoriously inadequate worker's compensation system to cover their health care costs and lost earnings. (Perhaps if their lobbyists had been somewhat more generous to Republican campaign funds, someone in the Administration would have considered their interests before proposing a plan affecting their interests.) Now you might say -- the editors of the Wall Street Journal do say, in an editorial dated (11 Feb 03) -- that the country needs to have these people vaccinated, and that they ought to be patriotic enough to do the right thing. But on the other hand you might say that if the country needs them vaccinated, then the country damned well ought to pay the full cost of the vaccination, rather than leaving the risk on people few of whom are rich enough to benefit from a cut in dividend taxation.
* * *
Even that won't do the job entirely. The California Nurses' Association, for example, is resisting the vaccinations at least in part because it opposes the Administration's plan to invade Iraq. That strikes me as an intolerable mixing of roles; the CNA ought to defend its members' interests, and is free to express its political opinions, but nobody put them in charge of foreign policy. But I doubt that ideological nonsense of that sort is a major problem here. The problem is a plan that may be poorly conceived and has certainly been poorly explained, combined with a failure to consult the opinions, or consider the interests, of the heath care workers that they and their representatives could reasonably interpret as an expression of contempt."


Agreed. This is a problem I detect in a lot of the anti-war/anti-Bush/anti-vaccine/anti-whatever groups. They meld the causes when the causes don’t exactly lend themselves to it. The California Nurses Assoc. and California Medical Assoc. are on solid ground if they oppose the vaccines on medical grounds, on workers-comp grounds, and possibly even on personal-autonomy grounds. But when the CMA and CNA oppose such policies on illogical grounds, or patently political grounds, they spend their political capital in a way that does nothing for their constituency or the people of California. They have a good argument -- the Bush Administration needs to do more to justify mass smallpox vaccinations. That may entail scaring people with scenarios like that from Dark Winter. But that's what policy leadership means -- explaining to people the why behind what they're being asked to do.

 
Bloomberg.com: Units Headed to Gulf Lack Proper Chemical-Warfare Training

Tony Capaccio reported on yesterday's Bloomberg news wire that U.S. Army units headed towards the Gulf had not completed all of their required "NBC" training. (NBC = nuclear, biological and chemical) In an internal audit of training records, the Army Audit Agency found that several units, including the Army's 4th Infantry Division (in which I served from 1999-2001) failed to train on a number of critical NBC tasks with the required frequency and intensity, including:
- Wear, maintenance and exchange of "Mission Oriented Protective Posture" chemical-protective gear
- Maintenance of various pieces of chemical-warfare equipment, such as nerve-agent detectors
- Firing the M4 and M16 rifle while wearing the MOPP suit and protective mask
- Use of chemical-defense equipment like the M8 alarm and CAM (Chemical Agent Monitor)

Army auditors randomly examined 25 units at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Hood, Texas, headquarters of the U.S. I Corps and III Corps, respectively. The Fort Hood units included the 4th Infantry Division and 13th Corps Support Command, which are deploying to the Gulf region.

"Units generally did not have effective chemical defense programs," the Army Audit Agency said in a 50-page report obtained by Bloomberg News. "Our review showed that unit commanders aren't making nuclear, biological and chemical training a priority," the audit said.

* * *
The audit found that soldiers in 18 of the 25 units reviewed at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis "weren't proficient in operating chemical and biological defense equipment."

"With the exception of masks, soldiers couldn't effectively operate basic chemical defense equipment," the report found.

That's in part because chemical specialists assigned to combat units "didn't have the level of expertise necessary to train other soldiers in the proper operation of chemical and biological defense equipment," the audit said.

Nearly one-fourth of 380 standard-issue gas masks, chemical agent alarms and decontamination devices had defects or were otherwise not unusable because specialists "didn't make sure soldiers either performed operator preventive maintenance checks and services or properly completed the services," it said.

Some Fort Hood and Fort Lewis units that were graded as having a high readiness level "didn't ensure solders received chemical and biological defense training" to make them capable of firing weapons while in protective gear, the audit said.

Soldiers in 18 of the 25 units "didn't meet the weapons qualification standard," it said.


Analysis: This is very disturbing news, though it's not surprising to me as an officer who served in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood. NBC training is tough, messy, difficult training, and it's not the kind of thing you want to do in the Texas heat. That said, it was our job as leaders to train our soldiers to standards. Good leadership isn't about pandering to your troops and going easy on them -- it's about training them to standard so they come alive from combat. Sadly, many Army units suffer from weak leadership. At Fort Hood, this came from the top down. The Fort Hood commander created a general climate of coddling for soldiers. In trying to strike a balance between quality of life and combat readiness, he erred way too far on the side of quality of life. Junior leaders had to seek a general's permission to train at nights or on weekends; training resources were tightly managed so leaders had difficulty getting bullets, fuel, spare parts, etc., to train.

That said, some units overcome those obstacles to do the right thing and train their soldiers. In the 4th Military Police Company, we trained often on this task and embedded NBC training into every training event -- even gunnery. I vividly remember shooting Scout Gunnery in August 1999 while wearing my full MOPP suit and ProMask, and losing 10 pounds in one week. (That was a hot week) As MPs, we would play a key role in working with Chemical units to mark and seal off contaminated areas, and also to direct contaminated units to decontamination sites. So we trained hard on this, because we knew it meant our lives in combat. And as leaders, we enforced standards ruthlessly. For me personally, a lot of that owed to my experience in Korea with the 2nd Infantry Division, where I lived for a year with the constant threat of chemical-tipped artillery.

However, the 4th Infantry Division faced two further challenges:
1) 4ID was in the process of digitization during this time period, and consumed by several major exercises at the same time. There is a finite amount of training time available to any commander -- even those who push the envelope. We pushed as much training in as possible, but we were never really able to train on anything 100%. Instead, we would multi-task a lot, such as embedding NBC training in our convoy-defense training.
2) Fort Hood and the Army had an extreme shortage of chemical officers and sergeants to manage this training in their units. Much of this owed to a failure to recruit/train/retain quality junior officers, with an acute shortage in the Chemical Corps branch. The same problem existed for enlisted personnel. This meant that a lot of units had no "subject matter expert" they could use to plan/manage/supervise this training.

 
House-Senate Conference Committee Agrees to Limit Pentagon TIA Project

Today's New York Times reports that a House-Senate conference committee agreed to a legislative amendment that would forbid the Pentagon from pursuing its Total Information Awareness project without further consultation with Congress. News of this project leaked late last year, and stirred great controversy on both sides of the aisle among those who feared it might lead to constant/total surveillance of the American population by the Department of Defense.

The negotiators' decision meant almost complete failure for a last-minute Pentagon effort, begun Friday, to protect the program from the Wyden amendment by establishing advisory committees to oversee the program.

The total information concept would enable a team of intelligence analysts to gather and view information from databases, pursue links between individuals and groups, respond to automatic alerts, and share information, all from their individual computers. It could link such different electronic sources as video feeds from airport surveillance cameras, credit card transactions, airline reservations and records of telephone calls. The data would be filtered through software that would constantly seek suspicious patterns. The Defense Department had already begun to discuss the use of the system with the F.B.I. and perhaps other agencies. Now, without a new law specifically authorizing its use and a new, specific appropriation to pay for it, the program could not be used against United States citizens. But it could be employed in support of lawful military operations outside the United States and lawful foreign intelligence operations conducted wholly against non-United States citizens.

The negotiators did agree to extend from 60 to 90 days the time the Defense Department would have to provide a detailed report to Congress, including its costs, goals, impact on privacy and civil liberties and prospects for successes against terrorists. Unless that report was filed, all further research on the project would have to stop immediately. But President Bush could keep the research alive by certifying to Congress that a halt "would endanger the national security of the United States."


Analysis: Adam Clymer's a very experienced reporter, and one of the NY Times' all-stars. But in this case, I think he's completely misreading the legislation. I'm very familiar with "reporting requirements," as these things are known. Title 10 of the U.S. Code is full of them. The Pentagon is required to report to Congress on a wide variety of things, from progress on hiring minorities to the details of military research. In many cases, those requirements are worded to say that the Pentagon may not do something until it reports to Congress, like this TIA reporting requirement. Ultimately, that does not prevent the Pentagon from acting. It merely adds a layer of legislative oversight to the process -- something our Constitution explicitly delegates to Congress in Art. I.

This reporting requirement will not stop TIA from moving forward, nor will it stop the Pentagon and other federal agencies from pursuing similar policies. What it will require is for them to 1) develop mitigation plans for managing the programs' effects on civil liberities, and 2) report to Congress in detail on those plans.

Tuesday, February 11, 2003
 
Has the Gulf War ever really ended?
America has been continuously conducting combat missions over Iraq for 12 years

The Associated Press reports that American aircraft have bombed a surface-to-surface missile site near Basra in Southern Iraq. This system had the potential to launch Ababil missiles over the border into Kuwait, where thousands of U.S. troops now mass in preparation for war.

The U.S. pilots attacked the Iraqi missile system near the southern city of Basra at about 1700 GMT Tuesday, according to a statement from the U.S. Central Command. The statement said the Iraqis had moved the missile system into the southern no-fly zone.
* * *
Eight U.S. warplanes dropped a total of 16 bombs on the Iraqi missile system near Basra Tuesday, Pentagon officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The U.S. bombs struck an Iraqi Ababil-100 missile launcher, a command van and resupply vehicles, senior defense officials said.

The Ababil is a solid-fueled missile developed after the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq says it doesn't fly farther than the 93-mile limit on Iraqi missiles imposed by U.N. sanctions. The U.S. and the U.K. say the Ababil probably either has a longer range or could easily be modified to fly farther. U.S. officials say the Ababil also can be used to carry chemical or biological warheads.


All of this begs the question: have we ever stopped bombing Iraq? The answer is no. Since 1991, American aircraft have continuously flown combat missions over Iraq. These include Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch, which enforced no-fly zones in the south and north respectively. U.S. aircraft have also flown other missions over Iraq, including surveillance and other flights. We have bombed Iraq steadily over the last 12 years. Arguably, we have remained in a steady (albeit low) state of war with Iraq for 12 years.

This raises another question: how will we know when we start the second Gulf War? In theory, we should see a marked increase in the number of sorties and the amount of ordnance dropped, or perhaps in the type of targets which are hit. But that may or may not happen. It's conceivable that we will slowly ratchet up the U.S. air campaign from its current state to catch the Iraqis off guard, and to destroy certain critical sites (e.g. air-defense assets) before the "real" air campaign starts. It's also conceivable that we might use the cover of these current missions to insert Special Forces and other forces on the ground.

 
Congress is the Culprit: Why USAA cares about the USA PATRIOT Act

I did some quick research into why USAA gave me an alarming message (see below) after I submitted my application for a Roth IRA. It appears that Sec. 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56) directs the Secretary of the Treasury develop regulations requiring ID verification for anyone opening any bank account in the US. Presumably, this is to prevent people from opening sham accounts for illicit purposes, such as to funnel money to terrorist organizations.

SEC. 326. VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATION.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 5318 of title 31, United States Code, as amended by this title, is amended by adding at the end the following:

(l) IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF ACCOUNTHOLDERS-

(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to the requirements of this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations setting forth the minimum standards for financial institutions and their customers regarding the identity of the customer that shall apply in connection with the opening of an account at a financial institution.

(2) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS- The regulations shall, at a minimum, require financial institutions to implement, and customers (after being given adequate notice) to comply with, reasonable procedures for--
`(A) verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account to the extent reasonable and practicable;
`(B) maintaining records of the information used to verify a person's identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and
`(C) consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial institution by any government agency to determine whether a person seeking to open an account appears on any such list.
* * *

 
FBI/CIA: Al Qaeda still a major threat

Testifying before Congress today, FBI Director Robert Mueller and CIA Director George Tenet told the nation that Al Qaeda still represented a viable and dangerous threat to American citizens at home and abroad. Together, they painted a devastating series of pictures of possible terrorist action in the United States. Both predicted that terrorists would use weapons of mass destruction in their future attacks, and that they would attack "soft targets" in addition to traditional "hard targets" like political buildings.

"The network is extensive and adaptable,"Tenet said. "It will take years of determined effort to unravel this and other terrorist networks and stamp them out."

"The enemies we face are resourceful, merciless and fanatically committed to inflicting massive damage on our homeland, which they regard as a bastion of evil," Mueller said. "In this war, there can be no compromise or negotiated settlement."

 
USA PATRIOT Act and Roth IRAs???

I'm opening a Roth IRA this morning so that I can start squirreling away money for my old age. While opening this account online with USAA (who I use for all my financial business), I got the following notice:

The USA PATRIOT Act requires verification of identity. Therefore, please provide the information requested. Omissions or an inability to verify this information may cause a processing delay.

Now I'm really, really curious. I know the USA PATRIOT Act contained some provisions related to financial crime and terrorism, but I'm extremely curious as to how that requires verification from persons opening a Roth IRA account. More to follow...

 
NYT: US Military Ready to Provide Aid to Iraqi Civilians

Defense reporters Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker report today that the Pentagon has a plan for pushing large amounts of humanitarian aid, medical aid, and relief supplies to Iraqi civilians in the event of a war. This news comes out of an exclusive interview with CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks, in which the general indicated the U.S. had prepared a plan for dealing with Iraqi humanitarian needs. Franks and others say this plan includes several million meals which would be delivered to Iraqi civilians in the event of any armed conflict.

"Humanitarian supplies are being positioned in order to address this sort of an issue," General Franks said, noting that one of the factors driving the shape and size of his forces was the need to deal with aid to the Iraqi people. In some cases, the military will provide leadership and some suggestions, and in other cases the military will offer its help coordinating the work of other organizations. General Franks made clear that his command had not convened any type of general session involving the major aid groups.

This is an extremely important play by the United States. I think this is part of the US plan to mitigate the risks of civilian casualties and humanitarian disaster, which would have an enormous impact on popular (domestic and international) support for the war. In war, it's always important to seize the moral high ground as well as the tactical high ground.

One way this could play out is in any urban campaign. If the U.S. were planning to enter Baghdad, they might use such a strategy to lure as many civilians as possible out of the city with humanitarian aid first. You just couldn't find through a populated Baghdad; it'd be enormously difficult and costly in blood. But if you could use humanitarian aid to lure civilians out of cities - or even out of Iraq - you could have a much freer hand when it came to targeting Iraqi forces. This would also have the tangential benefit of reducing the will to fight among Iraqi forces. I think it's likely such a move would provoke mass desertions among the rank and file of the Iraqi army. Once these soldiers learned that their families had fled Baghdad, and that there was food/water/medical aid available, they might desert in large numbers like in the first Gulf War.

The U.S. military does more than any other nation in history to protect the lives of civilians and distinguish between civilian and military targets. It attaches lawyers down to the lowest levels of command to advise leaders on the law of war; it employs sophisticated technology and tactics to minimize collateral damage with all weapons systems. This another development in that tradition, and I'm not surprised by it. Civil-military operations are integrated into plans at every level, and considering how vital the Iraqi population is to this campaign's success/failure, it's only natural that our Iraq plans would include such a robust plan for addressing the needs of Iraqi civilians.

 
ABA Adopts Report on Enemy Combatants

Yesterday, the members of the American Bar Association voted 368-76 to approve a panel report on the Treatment of Enemy Combatants. This is the latest in a long line of reports, white papers and recommendations from the ABA to give Constitutional protections to the U.S. citizens and non-citizens captured in America's war on terrorism. Predictably, this report criticizes the Administration for its decisions so far in the Hamdi and Padilla cases, as well as in the treatment of the 600+ prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.

I've scanned the report and will dissect it later as I have time. But I have some initial thoughts on this latest statement from the ABA:

1. The ABA has convinced itself that this is a problem of law -- not war. That may not be the right answer. Everything in the ABA report is predicated on the assumption that this is a problem for America's legal system -- with its Constitutional safeguards -- to respond to. But if you question those assumptions, and look at terrorism as a problem of war, many of these arguments don't hold water. If terrorists are criminals, then they ought to be tried in court. But if terrorists are combatants, seeking to wage war on the United States and its allies through unconventional means, then you have an entirely different matter. It may well be that terrorism exists both as a matter of law and war -- or that it exists on the seam of law and war. In any case, I think the ABA is assuming too much here.

2. In several places, the ABA report refers to "international law" as if it was some coherent body that could produce a magical answer. That's not entirely true. International law is typically divided into positive international law (treaties, charters, etc), and customary international law (literally the customs practiced by the collective body of nations). Divining the meaning of international law is really difficult. In this case, it's not entirely clear how international law would treat terrorists. The 3rd Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War contains a definition of combatants in Art. 4, however that definition is anachronistic today. It was written after WWII for a style of warfare practiced in WWII, and it does not apply to the 4th Generation Warfare practitioners we face today. The Geneva Convention is the most definitive document in international law for defining combatant status, and even it does not fit this situation clearly. I think it's hard to say exactly what "international law" commands us to do here, and the ABA ought not essentialize this body of law down to a soundbite the way it has.

3. For obvious reasons, the ABA report emphasizes the right of counsel for detained enemy combatants. However, the government has compelling reasons not to allow access to counsel in many cases. In declarations submitted to the Hamdi and Padilla courts, the government argues persuasively that allowing access to counsel would upset the interrogation environment which is so critical for pulling information out of these dangerous men. This information is vital human intelligence which may help prevent future terrorist attacks. If the government were just holding these men without access to counsel for no reason, I think matters might be different. But that's not the case. The government has a legitimate, compelling interest in secluding these men and denying them access to the outside world. That may change at some point, perhaps when the government deems these men to have no further intelligence value. But until then, we owe it to the American citizenry to learn all we can from these terrorists while they are in custody. Allowing access to counsel would only frustrate that goal.

Bottom Line: The ABA is making a political issue out of the treatment of enemy combatants. But in doing so, they are making some extremely shaky arguments that rest on faulty assumptions about international law and 21st Century warfare.

 
Wall Street Journal: Dark Winter and Smallpox

If you've been reading this 'blog for a while, you might remember in December when I wrote about "Dark Winter". This was an exercise carried out in 2001 to wargame what would happen if terrorists hit the U.S. with smallpox. The results were devastating. Among the lessons learned:

- Leaders are unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist attacks, available policy options, and their consequences.
- After a bioterrorist attack, leaders' decisions would depend on data and expertise from the medical and public health sectors.
- The lack of sufficient vaccine or drugs to prevent the spread of disease severely limited management options.
- The US health care system lacks the surge capacity to deal with mass casualties.
- To end a disease outbreak after a bioterrorist attack, decision makers will require ongoing expert advice from senior public health and medical leaders.
- Federal and state priorities may be unclear, differ, or conflict; authorities may be uncertain; and constitutional issues may arise.
- The individual actions of US citizens will be critical to ending the spread of contagious disease; leaders must gain the trust and sustained cooperation of the American people.


The Wall Street Journal's editorial board has read these notes, and taken them to heart. Today, the paper's lead editorial argues that exercises like Dark Winter make a compelling case for mass vaccination -- especially of recalcitrant health-care workers who are putting their own personal worries over the larger public good.

The point here isn't to scare people . . . well, maybe it is; 15 months after the anthrax attacks, bioterror is a real threat. Protecting against smallpox in advance may make it less likely that an enemy would resort to its use. Dark Winter also underscores how vulnerable U.S. society will remain even with precautions, meaning that the best homeland defense continues to be taking the battle to terrorists abroad and to the states that harbor them.

As for union objections, the Bush Administration is preparing a compensation fund for anyone injured by the vaccine. But keep in mind that emergency workers already have insurance and worker's comp, and that health-care workers are already exposed to unusual risk of germs and illness as part of their daily lives.

No homeland defense plan will work without the cooperation of all Americans, especially its leading institutions. The unions and public-health officials resisting smallpox vaccination will have a lot to answer for if there is an attack and Americans remain unprepared.


Monday, February 10, 2003
 
Justice Department wins another round in the fight against terrorism

The Associated Press reports today that Enaam Arnaout pled guilty today in Chicago to one count of giving material support to a terrorist organization in violation of federal law. Aranout was charged with providing various forms of financial, logistical and other support through his charity, Benevolence International Foundation, to terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda.

Arnaout, 41, admitted in court papers that his Benevolence International Foundation had furnished funds to buy boots and uniforms for the Muslim fighting forces while claiming to aid only widows, orphans and the poor.

He did not acknowledge any relationship with bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist network. But federal prosecutors said ample evidence remains that Arnaout helped al-Qaida in several ways -- including transferring funds around the world to finance its operations.

He faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, and federal prosecutors said they might ask the judge to give Arnaout a break if he follows through on his promise to cooperate.


Analysis: This is a success story. To stop terrorists like Al Qaeda, we must deny them the ability to fund themselves, move money around the world, and use their financial network to support their terrorist activities. The financial effort is as important as the combat in Afghanistan -- or luggage screening in airports. A friend asked me a few months ago why the U.S. expends so much effort going after men like Mr. Arnaout for supporting terrorism -- financially or otherwise -- instead of going after the actual terrorists like Osama Bin Laden or Ayman Zawahiri. The answer is that these men represent the vulnerable underbelly of international terrorism. Networked, cellular organizations like Al Qaeda cannot exist without their financial and logistical infrastructure. If you destroy their financial infrastructure, you deny Al Qaeda the ability to operate abroad. That operationally neutralizes Al Qaeda.

 
Predicting casualties in war -- art, science, or guesswork?

Victor David Hanson, a historian whose books I really liked, has an interesting piece in the National Review on war pessimism. In it, Hanson cautions us to be wary of large casualty estimates, even those produced by the Pentagon. Furthermore, Iraq's military has never fought well, especially against well-equipped and well-trained opponents like the U.S. Indeed, the most viable threat we face is from Saddam's irrational acts like loosing a Scud missile on Saudi Arabia, not from any of his front-line forces.

What can we expect from the possible invasion of Iraq? Everything in war is of course uncertain — an awful time when the lives of thousands of soldiers hang in the balance, and brutal, dirty events can spiral out of control the moment the shooting starts. Yet we should be careful in once more believing the pessimistic commentators in newspaper ads and on television who are now warning of several "hundred thousands" of dead, of chaos, of mass starvation, and of internecine killing.

Oxford student Josh Chafetz notes that short, low-casualty wars have been the norm for the U.S. since Grenada and he doesn't think things are likely to change this time around in Iraq. He goes on to make a larger argument about military planning and casualty estimates that I strongly disagree with:

"The military always tries to figure out the worst case scenario casualty figures, and then opponents of military action jump all over those figures. But that's really stupid -- no one should ever plan anything based simply on the worst case scenario. The only sensible way to plan is based on a calculus: consider each potential outcome, weight it by the likelihood of its actually occurring, and add them. Then do the same on the other side of the balance. If the weighted calculus of casualties is worse than the weighted calculus of not fighting, then don't fight. If vice-versa, then do. Obviously, no one knows what the numbers or weights are -- we can only make guesses, and we can argue about the assumptions underlying those guesses. But it's just plain foolish to pretend that only the worst case scenario should be taken into account. And yet, when people go on TV and say that "tens of thousands of Americans will die in an invasion of Iraq" -- just like they said about Afghanistan and Gulf War I and ... -- that's exactly what they're doing."

I agree there’s a political blowback problem here. But I’m not sure many understand the reason why military planners like to consider the worst-case scenario. It’s not a prediction of what will happen; it’s a prediction of what might happen if everything goes wrong. The intent here is not to scare the commander (or President), but to enable him to assume the risk of the operation knowing the worst-case consequences. When the initial estimates are too risky, the doctrinal response is for a commander to direct certain risk-mitigation measures, such as having all troops wear their chemical gear continuously instead of just upon attack. Thus, the high-risk estimates do serve a purpose in redflagging operations which might be too risky to execute as planned.

It is true that they are seized on by anti-war activists who are looking for one more reason to oppose the war. But there’s another reason why you might want these estimates known. If and when actual casualties exceed expectations, the bubble of public support for any military operation will almost certainly burst. We saw this clearly in Somalia. President Bush initially dispatched those troops as humanitarian workers, with promises of zero/few casualties. That held true until President Clinton changed the mission to something more aggressive. When he did that, he never went to the American people to explain this risk, or even inform them of the risk. Thus, when we suffered 18 casualties on 3 Oct 1993, the American public was shocked. Public support for the Somalia mission evaporated, and we redeployed from there without accomplishing our mission.

Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as a cost/benefit calculation the way Josh describes it. For one thing, you cannot calculate likelihood with any certainty in war, as you acknowledge. I served as an operational planner in the 4th Infantry Division, with the most sophisticated modeling and planning software you can imagine. Our guesses were only slightly better than a SWAG (sophisticated wild ass guess). The worst-case scenario is not the only estimate driving planning – in fact, it’s usually not the main assumption in any plan. But these worst-case estimates remain important for commanders and civilian decision-makers to see. Without knowing the risks, commanders cannot make informed decisions, and may send America's sons and daughters into harm's way without fully acknowledging and accepting the risk of that decision.

Sunday, February 09, 2003
 
'Prof Quotes'

As a young reporter for the UCLA Daily Bruin, I often had to scramble around at the last minute for a "prof quote". You know 'em -- these are the 1-2 sentences of analysis that most major news stories have about any technical subject, from anthropology to women's rights, to try and explain the subject and make the article seem more informed. Often times, I talked to professors who were experts in only a related field, like a law professor on crime or a medical doctor on a biology topic, because those were the experts who answered the phone. Some professors actually make their careers by being accessible to reporters who need 'prof quotes' -- I know a few who pass their personal cell phone numbers to big-time journalists so they get the call when news breaks. I wish I could say this was a college reporters' practice and that real reporters don't do it, but I can't. Chances are, if you pick up the New York Times, Washington Post or Los Angeles Times on any given day, you'll find dozens of "prof quotes".

You can find some of the most absurd, amusing and bemusing of these at a site called Profquotes.com. This site contains a wide variety of outtakes from the classroom. Here's a few I liked:

"There are two things you need to be a really good English major. First, a good, working knowledge of the Bible. And second, a really dirty mind."
Prof. Condren, English 10A, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA

"That Y chromosome screws you up, the X chromosome is better -- I can put you in touch with several doctors... "
Mary Lindemann, World History, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA

"If we want to get a consistent answer out of a psycho, then we only ask them once."
Dr. Walters, Complex Analysis, University of Northern British Columbia

"This assumption is actually wrong. It's the basis of everything you learn in this subject. It's wrong, but it makes the math easier."
G. Archer, Structural Analysis, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA

Saturday, February 08, 2003
 
USA Patriot Act - Part II
Draft of "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003" Leaked to Public

A draft version of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act was obtained by the Center for Public Integrity and leaked to several media outlets on Friday. (I learned of this from Orin Kerr at the Volokh Conspiracy) This act essentially cleans up a lot of messy areas of the original USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56), signed into law on 26 Oct 01 by President Bush. This Act goes much further though, taking a number of steps to limit private remedies for anti-terrorism police abuses, and increasing the surveillance authority of government agents. It also contains some pro-civil liberties provisions, such a change to the FISA Court appellate-review process that would add a lawyer to represent the FISA Court in government appeals.

I haven't had time to read the full bill; it's a 12-megabyte file. But my initial reaction is the same as Orin Kerr's -- the press will have a field day with this one. They will focus on the "sexy" provisions like:

Section 301-306, “Terrorist Identification Database”: These sections would authorize creation of a DNA database on “suspected terrorists,” expansively defined to include association with suspected terrorist groups, and noncitizens suspected of certain crimes or of having supported any group designated as terrorist.

Section 405, “Presumption for Pretrial Detention in Cases Involving Terrorism”: While many people charged with drug offenses punishable by prison terms of 10 years or more are held before their trial without bail, this provision would create a comparable statute for those suspected of terrorist activity.


By focusing on these provisions, the press will obscure the real issues at play here. One of the key failures identified by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in its post-9/11 report was the lack of cooperation and information flow between the FBI and CIA -- or more broadly, between the law enforcement and national security establishments. Breaking down that "wall of separation" is absolutely essential for combatting terrorism. Groups like Al Qaeda will seek to exploit the seam between law and war for their own advantage if we let them. The majority of this act appears targeted at that problem, and increasing the authority of government officials on both sides of this wall to do their jobs. More to follow...

Friday, February 07, 2003
 
Justice Department requests delay of Moussaoui trial

The Washington Post reports that lawyers for the Justice Department have asked U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema to delay the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui (the '20th hijacker') while they appeal a recent ruling to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Brinkema had ordered the U.S. government to allow Moussaoui's lawyers to interview Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a high-ranking member of Al Qaeda currently held by the U.S. government. The Justice Department (along with the White House and Pentagon) contend that such an interview would significantly harm the interrogation of bin al-Shibh currently underway at an undisclosed location. To date, those interrogations have yielded various valuable pieces of intelligence.

Some court-watchers speculate that the Justice Department will transfer Mr. Moussaoui to the Defense Department for trial by military commission. However, I stand by my earlier prediction that they will not try Mr. Moussaoui -- or anyone else -- by military tribunal because of the political blowback that would entail. Instead, I think the government will transfer Mr. Moussaoui to Guantanamo Bay or some other location for indefinite detention as an enemy combatant.

 
Does an increase in Threat Condition help the enemy?

Fellow law student Chris Baker raises a thorny problem with America's system for broadcasting terrorist threat levels to the population. (The threat was raised today by Attorney General John Ashcroft from 'elevated' to 'high').

DHS does an admirable job of highlighting the System's utility in advising citizens of individual protective measures they may take in response to elevating threat levels, but I think they have missed capturing what I consider to be an equally important effect. In elevating the threat condition, we give notice to terrorists planning imminent attacks that our integrated intelligence assets have "clued in" to their intentions; as such, we cause terrorist cells to perhaps take additional precautions to ensure their own force protection, and may actually either deter or delay an attack outright, or cause such a disruption in the terrorists' planned course of action so as to make them more vulnerable or more easily detectable by our enforcement agencies.

I think Chris' analysis is on target. The main goal of this warning system is to synchronize U.S. defensive postures, that is, to tell all of our agencies at the federal/state/local level that they need to implement the appropriate measures for the level we're at. However, we assume risk by broadcasting our defensive posture to the enemy. I think the synchronization benefits may outweigh that risk, but it's something that decision-makers ought to think about. Additionally, we need to be circumspect about the measures we take to implement this defensive posture, like putting more guards around high-value targets. Our enemy has prying eyes, and we need to deny him the information he needs to be successful. The element of surprise can be important. If a terrorist stumbles into a situation he wasn't prepared for, like something that's more protected than he thought, it could ruin his whole day. Generally speaking, it's always good to ruin a terrorist's day with that kind of surprise.

 
BREAKING NEWS: U.S. raises terrorism threat level from "elevated" to "high"

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The federal government on Friday raised the national terrorism threat level to "orange," indicating a "high risk of terrorist attacks."
The move is only the second time since the September 11 terror attacks that the level has risen above "yellow," or elevated risk.

* * *
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge outlined how the public might be affected by the heightened security level.
"...increased security personnel at points of entry," Ridge said. "In fact, limited points of entry and exit, enhanced identification checks, restrictions to travel around federal facilities and airports ... will be implemented."
Ashcroft described the threat. "Recent intelligence reports suggests that al Qaeda leaders have emphasized planning for attacks on apartment buildings, hotels and other soft or lightly secured targets in the United States," he said.


Analysis: This is big news. The U.S. would not raise the threat condition, something which triggers a number of control measures around the country, without some credible intelligence that an attack was going to happen. It's especially troubling that we have intelligence indicating an Al Qaeda attack on "soft targets". The paradox of anti-terrorism planning is that the more you protect the hard targets (e.g. the White House, Pentagon, airports, nuclear sites, etc), the more you make the soft targets (Mall of America, schools, large apartment buildings, etc) into targets. The best way to combat terrorism against soft targets is through aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance of the area of operations. Most of that gets done at the local level by local cops, working with intelligence feeds from the federal level (FBI and CIA).

There may be a significant tie-in here between the looming war with Iraq and the threats we're picking up in intelligence intercepts. Al Qaeda's operational doctrine calls for the opening of a "second front" on American civilians in the event of an attack on an Arab state like the one we're currently planning. Specifically, we have predicted two terrorist courses of action for this scenario. 1) Terrorists will attack the deployment infrastructure of the military to stem the flow of troops, such as seaports that are loading military equipment bound for the Persian Gulf. I guarantee you: these are well protected right now. 2) Terrorists will strike American civilian targets to undermine our will to fight; to raise the blood cost of war in Iraq. I still think that we must disarm Iraq by force if necessary. But we also must take pro-active measures at home to safeguard the American population against this threat, which is logically tied to our campaign in the desert.

 
Total Information Awarness Update
Pentagon announces an oversight panel of legal scholars to safeguard civil liberties

The Defense Department announced today that it would form an advisory board to monitor the Total Information Awareness project. "The TIA internal oversight board will oversee and monitor the manner in which terrorist tracking tools are transitioned for real world use. ... A primary focus of the board will be to ensure that the TIA-developed tools to track terrorists will be used only in accordance with existing privacy protection laws and policies." (DoD Announcement) Presumably, this advisory board is a response to heavy criticism of TIA from all over the political spectrum, including legislative proposals in Congress which would sharply limit the funding for TIA until the Pentagon reported to Congress on the way it would protect civil liberties in the development of this program.

I was impressed by the membership of the panel. Indeed, I think the membership of this panel exceeds even the Sept. 11 Commission for star value -- these are the all stars of Constitutional Law and civil liberties:
- Newton Minow (chairman), director of the Annenberg Washington Program and the Annenberg Professor of Communications Law and Policy at Northwestern University
- Floyd Abrams, renowned 1st Amendment civil rights attorney
- Zoe Baird, director Markel Foundation (and Clinton Administration nominee for Attorney General)
- Griffin Bell, former U.S. Attorney General and Court of Appeals judge
- Gerhard Casper, president emeritus for Stanford University and Professor of Law (a very eminent Constitutional Law scholar)
- William T. Coleman, former chairman and CEO of BEA (world's leading application and infrastructure company) and now Chief Customer Advocate
- Lloyd Cutler, former White House Counsel
Not only is this an all-star panel, but it's a balanced panel. At least three of the members are Democrats, and all are on the record as having strong views on the protection of civil rights and civil liberties. This move can only bolster the credibility of the Bush Administration on this issue.

Notwithstanding this announcement, the Pentagon maintains that TIA is 1) not a threat to civil liberties, 2) not a tool for collecting information on all US citizens, and 3) not going to result in the creation of a massive database for spying on US citizens.

"Development of these anti-terrorism tracking tools would allow the agencies to better execute their missions. TIA does not plan to create a gigantic database. Further, TIA has not ever collected or gathered and is not now collecting or gathering any intelligence information. This is and will continue to be the responsibility of the US foreign intelligence/counterintelligence agencies, which operate under various legal and policy restrictions with congressional oversight. This technology development program in no way alters the authority or responsibility of the intelligence community. Furthermore, TIA has never collected, and has no plan or intent to collect privately held consumer data on U.S. citizens. It is a research program designed to catch terrorists before they strike."

Bottom Line: I've gone on the record as a TIA supporter because I believe in the need to gather information and analyze it to produce actionable intelligence. TIA has the potential to be a valuable tool for law enforcement and intelligence officials. The bio-medical component also has tremendous potential for the prevention of terrorism -- as well as American public-health efforts in general. I agree with the critics that TIA needs to be monitored for any risk to civil liberties, and I think this Pentagon plan is exactly the right prescription.

 
WSJ: Soldiers' Gear Improves With 'Lessons Learned' in Afghanistan

Today's Wall Street Journal ran a pair of articles on a subject I've cared about for a long time -- soldier equipment. I'm not talking about high-tech stuff like helicopters, tanks, and HMMWVs. I'm talking about low-tech stuff that every soldier -- and especially every infantryman -- needs to survive and win in combat. Boots, rifles, rifle scopes, field rations, CamelBak canteens, night-vision goggles -- these are the items that can make the difference between life and death in combat. I wrote an article for the Los Angeles Times in February 2002 that criticized the Pentagon and Congress for building a budget that failed to provide these basic items. As an Army officer, I often had to buy my own AA batteries to run my night-vision goggles and GPS receivers. And my unit fought with our headquarters to fund such items as CamelBak water carriers and extra bullets for training.

The articles today focus on how the Army dealt with gear problems in Afghanistan. It's a success story, largely due to the initiative of Army Master Sgt. Rudy Romero. This NCO wrote a 3-page e-mail to an old boss asking him to lunch, and sharing some 'lessons learned' from his recent combat tour in Afghanistan. MSG Romero's e-mail contained no BS; no equivocation -- it spelled out the truth about Army gear, Army tactics, and Army leadership. It got noticed. MSG Romero's e-mail was forwarded around the Army several times, and eventually wound up in the Pentagon. There, it found an audience with the Sergeant Major of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, who directed the Army to fix these problems as fast as possible.

Last July, a few weeks after he got back from Afghanistan, Master Sgt. Rudy Romero wrote a quick e-mail to one of his old commanding officers. "How's everything going sir? Let's get together for lunch. I know a pretty good place if you like Mexican," he began.

He followed that with three pages of advice from his tour in Afghanistan with the Army's 101st Airborne division -- everything from the best gloves to take (fleece from AutoZone) to the best socks (Gore-Tex, available in camping stores). He also told his former boss to ditch the Army-issue ammunition sacks and instead buy bags from London Bridge Trading Co.

The 37-year-old soldier figured that sooner or later his former commander would be deployed to Afghanistan and that sharing his experience might make the tour easier. Little did he know that his military version of "Hints from Heloise" would make its way to the Pentagon's top brass and inspire significant changes in the way the Army is equipping its troops for possible future battles, including Iraq.
* * *
A month after he hit the "send" button, Sgt. Romero got a call from Sgt. Major Tilley telling him that the Army wanted him to go to its U.S. Soldier Systems Center in Natick, Mass., where engineers were busily at work developing the gear that soldiers take into battle. Sgt. Romero grabbed two of his buddies at Fort Campbell, Ky., and headed out a few days later.
* * *
Sgt. Romero had lots of advice for the people who design the Army's tan desert boots, which troops wore in Afghanistan.

Although the boots worked just fine on the soft sands of Iraq, they fell to pieces after a couple of months in Afghanistan, where the ground is rocky. The engineers took note, and the Army is buying new boots with special composite soles that should stand up better in Central Asia.

His biggest complaint was that Army gear weighs too much. "We were easily carrying 80 lbs. Throw on the ruck [Army backpack] and you're sucking," he wrote.

To make their point, the three men explained how soldiers in Afghanistan consumed their Meals Ready to Eat, the plastic-wrapped all-in-one food packets that weigh about two pounds and last around three years. Before going into battle they "field stripped" the meals to cut down on their carrying weight. "We kept the high carb stuff for energy and threw out everything else," Sgt. Romero told the nutritionist responsible for developing the meals.

Based in part on his suggestions, the Army is designing a lightweight Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Ration.

The three raised another practical concern: Too many of the Army's new gadgets use different kinds of batteries, further increasing the load. Some soldiers, Sgt. Romero explained, buy commercial GPS locators from camping stores and discard their military-issue devices simply because the civilian ones use the same batteries as their night-vision goggles. The engineers, who had heard similar complaints before, said they would keep that in mind but made no promises.

Today Sgt. Romero's e-mail is still posted on several military Web sites and in a half-dozen or so Internet chat rooms.


I received MSG Romero's e-mail through a military list-serv I belong to. It struck me as the kind of no-nonsense review we ought to be doing after every engagement, to learn vital lessons and fix things for next time. Soldiers like MSG Romero are truly America's greatest asset -- they are the heart and soul of our combat power. I've excerpted his last paragraph:

"SOLDIERS DID GREAT YOU CAN ALWAYS DEPEND ON THEM. THEY ARE EXTREMELY BRAVE AND WANT TO FIGHT. GOTTA DO REALISTIC TRAINING, THEYLL DO IT JUST LIKE WE TEACH THEM, THEY'LL PATCH A BULLET HOLE JUST LIKE YOU TAUGHT THEM IN EIB, BUT THEY WONT TAKE OFF THE SOLDIERS VEST TO CHECK FOR MORE BULLET HOLES ETC."

 
Justice Department mulls transfer of Moussaoui case to military tribunal
Constitutional tension between 6th Amendment and President prerogative to wage war

Today's New York Times reports that the Justice Department has started to seriously consider transferring the Zacarias Moussaoui "20th hijacker" case to the Defense Department, for prosecution under the President's 13 Nov 01 military commissions order. Last week, Judge Leonie Brinkema ordered the government to allow defense questioning of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a high-ranking Al Qaeda official currently in U.S. custody and under interrogation. This gets more complicated because Moussaoui is defending himself (with some legal assistance), and thus could be the one questioning a former colleague-in-arms (or intimately involved with the communications).

Moreover, the government has a strong interest in continuing to isolate bin al-Shibh:
A federal law enforcement official said the Defense Department and intelligence agencies also did not want to interrupt the "psychological games that are being played" with Mr. bin al-Shibh, who is reported to be undergoing intensive interrogations overseas.

Unfortunately, Judge Brinkema's hands were tied. The Constitutional jurisprudence in this area is fairly clear -- the 6th Amendment rights of criminal defendants trumps any other considerations the government may have. That's the way our system is built: it stands for the rights of the accused above all else, nearly all of the time.
Mr. Moussaoui's lawyers have argued that the Constitution's fair-trial protections entitle them to access to Mr. bin al-Shibh, because he could have information that might bolster Mr. Moussaoui's defense. In her ruling, officials said, Judge Brinkema made clear she agreed.

This creates obvious tension between the 6th Amendment rights of Moussaoui and the Art. II duties of the President to prosecute this war as he judges necessary. I'm not sure how the case will be resolved. Moussaoui fits the President's 13 Nov 01 order well. He is a non-citizen; he has admitted his association with Al Qaeda; he was involved with the Sept. 11 conspiracy. Out of all the men in custody now (Lindh, Reid, Padilla, Moussaoui, Hamdi), Moussaoui is the best fit for a military commission. Ironically, the next best candidate is probably Ramzi bin al-Shibh.

That said, I'm not sure the Administration can afford the political blowback from implementing the military commissions system. The mere suggestion has stirred more controversy than the Administration was ready for, and I think its implementation would solidify a lot of opposition to the Bush Administration's war on terrorism in general. Lots of critics draw a connection between the USA PATRIOT Act, the recent FISA Court decisions, targeted killings, and now this possible military tribunal. (I don't agree with that connection, but that's the argument) Given the heat they've taken for this, I'm not sure the Bush Administration is willing to expend more political capital and potentially jeopardize the momentum they've developed on homeland security and Iraq.

Prediction: The Administration will remove Mr. Moussaoui to Guantanamo Bay and hold him indefinitely as an enemy combatant there, without trial. This avoids the political blowback of a commission, and accomplishes the goals of the Administration.

Thursday, February 06, 2003
 
One More Tea Leaf Saying War is Imminent

The LA Times and other papers report that Turkey has decided to allow U.S. troops on its soil, and to invade Iraq from Turkey, and to improve U.S. bases in Turkey towards that end. That's a pretty significant set of diplomatic permission, and I think it's one more critical piece of support the U.S. needs to start the ground campaign against Iraq.

The United States is planning to spend several hundred million dollars to modernize Turkish bases. The renovations could start quickly after today's vote.

Turkey fears that a war in Iraq could reverse its fragile economic recovery and has agreed with the United States on a package that would cushion the country from the effects of war. The package would range between $4 billion and $15 billion, depending on the length of the war and its economic impact.

The separate vote at the end of the holiday would allow U.S. soldiers to be based in Turkey and would allow Turkish soldiers to move into Iraq if there was a war.


 
Screaming Eagles Get Deployment Orders

The Pentagon announced today that it was deploying the Army's 101st Airborne Division. If the 4th Infantry Division represents the Army's high-tech fist, then the 101st represents its legs. The 101st division is airmobile; its infantry move by helicopter and are capable of hopping around the battlefield in lightning-quick strikes to secure key objectives. In the first Gulf War, the 101st leaped ahead of armored forces to secure critical intersections, terrain and Iraqi sites. Military officials today would not discuss specifics; they only hinted the 101st was headed to war.

"The president of the United States has made no decision about any future military operations," said Maj. Carl Purvis, reading from a prepared statement. "These deployments are prudent steps to increase military capabilities and enhance flexibility."

The 101st "will provide Central Command substantial operational flexibility and combat power, as well as the ability to conduct long-range helicopter attacks and air assault operations should those capabilities be required to successfully prosecute the global war on terrorism," the statement said.


I see the 101st being used in two major ways -- both of which are absolutely critical. The first 101st mission would be to secure critical/dangerous WMD (weapon of mass destruction) sites in Iraq, faster than any ground force could get there. The 101st could theoretically fly in from Turkey or Kuwait, seize such sites, and secure them until armored forces could arrive to reinforce them. If the U.S. intends to fight in a non-linear manner, without fighting its way deep into Iraq, this scenario becomes more likely. And since disarmament is our raison d'etre in Iraq, this mission makes a lot of sense.

The second major mission is to deal with 'civilians on the battlefield.' As light infantry, the 101st troops train at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana and they get extensive training in dealing with complex humanitarian situations. If there's a bunch of Iraqi refugees in the way of a major U.S. operation, the 101st could be airlifted quickly into the situation to isolate and safeguard the civilians. The 101st would then secure the civilians until ground forces caught up with humanitarian aid and transportation capability to move the civilians out of the way.

 
North Korean Spies in Santa Monica?

News broke yesterday that the FBI had arrested John Joungwoong Yai and his wife Susan Youngja Yai in Santa Monica on charges of spying for the North Korean government. The Justice Department's complaints have not spelled out the details yet -- largely to keep the North Koreans in the dark about what we know about their intelligence efforts. Indeed, one unnamed official said the Yai's were not successful in obtaining classified documents, for which they received $18,179 in cash from the North Koreans before contractual performance. Still, it's a disturbing turn of events -- especially since it's literally in my backyard.

One can speculate about what kinds of classified documents they could've been after. The RAND Corporation has its headquarters in Santa Monica. As a federally-funded research center for defense issues, RAND has a ton of classified stuff that a North Korean might want to see. Just south of Santa Monica in the area around Los Angeles International Airport, you have a high concentration of defense contractors such as Raytheon, TRW, and others. He might have been angling for a job with one of those contractors, to sell the North Koreans information on new U.S. satellite designs or something else in one of those firms.

Wednesday, February 05, 2003
 
Pop Quiz -- Iraq and Terrorism

1. Does an American attack on Iraq make a major terrorist attack against the United States:
(A) Less likely than risk of an attack today.
(B) As likely as the risk of an attack today.
(C) More likely than the risk of an attack today.

There is compelling evidence (derived from analysis of intelligence reports) to suggest the answer is (C).
An American-led campaign against Iraq would significantly raise the probability of a terrorist attack on the U.S. It would also aid Al Qaeda in the logistical and infrastructural tasks (like recruiting and retention) it needs to do to rebound from the American campaign in Afghanistan. Desert Storm II would probably aggravate Islamists more than they are today, and broaden the anti-American sentiment that already lies dormant throughout the Middle East. CNN reports that the FBI is on guard for such a threat, ratching up its intelligence activities and ordering its agents to be prepared for rapid deployment.

 
Is Iraq hiding weapons of mass destruction? See the evidence for yourself...

Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a convincing case to the UN today on why America and the world must disarm Iraq. Unfortunately, I fear this evidence will not convince many recalcitrant members of the UN Security Council -- particular France and Germany. But you can decide for yourself. Sec. Powell's slides are available here on the Washington Post website.

 
MILITARY PROCUREMENT MAY WORK SLOWLY, BUT IT WORKS. SORT OF.
Check out Stop the Bleating for an interesting discussion of the Line Of Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) missile. This would put an amazing capability into the hands of our infantrymen, and it's a project that absolutely must be funded. In simple bang-for-buck terms, it allows you to kill lots of enemy vehicles with a lot less money than Apache Helicopters or M1A2 tanks would require.

 
WSJ: American Prisons Provide Fertile Ground for Islamic Terrorists

Today's Wall Street Journal leads with an article about Imam Warith Deen Umar, who teaches and preaches Islam in New York's state-prison system. The article details how this practice, coupled with the natural inclination of prisoners towards criminal enterprise, has turned the American prison population into a fertile recruiting ground for Islamic terrorists like Al Qaeda. This isn't just conjecture -- it's actually happening. Alleged 'dirty bomber' Jose Padilla was such a case. He was a disenchanted American citizen, who through his experience in prison, converted to Islam and decided to become a terrorist.

Ordinarily, religious fervor in prison is no big deal. Indeed, prisons often co-opt religion as a means of social control, to help prisoners take responsibility for their actions and add order to their lives. However, the Islamic penetration of American prisons has tapped into something that could pose great danger to America's safety. Prisoners have natural advantages over terrorists from other countries:
1) They're American citizens, which confers legal advantages in dealing with America's legal system
2) They know the streets and the operational environment, and are less likely to be detected for making a stupid mistake that owes to cross-cultural difficulties (no Middle East accented English, for example)
3) They are already inclined towards dangerous, criminal activity, and likely have the means/tools/connections to conduct more of it.
4) They often have little to lose in the way of social standing or connections, and possibly stand to gain great stature through terrorism.

Imam Umar doesn't just accept terrorism as a distant cousin of the Islam he preaches; he embraces terrorism as a meaningful weapon against the West:
"Even Muslims who say they are against terrorism secretly admire and applaud" the hijackers, he wrote in an unpublished memoir. The Quran, he said, does not condemn terrorism against oppressors of Muslims, even if innocent people die. "This is the sort of teaching they don't want in prison," he said. "But this is what I'm doing."

The greatest irony of all is that New York -- a state terribly ravaged by terrorism -- is inviting this man into its prisons and paying him to spread the message of fundamentalist Islam. California and many other states are doing the same thing, co-opting Islam and other faiths as a way of promoting social control within their prisons' walls.

Prison officials in New York and many other states long have welcomed Muslim imams and clergy of other faiths. Religion provides structured activity that reduces security problems in prison, they say. It encourages inmates to accept responsibility for their actions and turn their backs on crime upon their release.

But there is another side to Islam behind bars. While Imam Umar says the focus of his preaching usually "is on work, family and getting an education," he also says that prison "is the perfect recruitment and training grounds for radicalism and the Islamic religion."

A prison chaplain since 1975, he has seen Islam grow among inmates, mirroring the vast increase in the incarceration of African-Americans, some of whom adopt the religion as inmates. As the most influential Muslim prison chaplain in New York, which has the fourth-largest state system in the nation, he and some of his trainees adopted the fundamentalist offshoot of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism. Rooted in Saudi Arabia, it stresses a literal reading of the Quran and intolerance for people and sects that don't follow its absolutist teaching.


Ready for the kicker? The U.S. Constitution forbids prisons from exercising more than general oversight over Imam Umar's activities -- or those of any other religious fundamentalist (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or other) who preaches behind prison walls:

The chaplains have operated with little supervision from state prison officials, who say the constitutional protection of religious freedom prevents them from closely monitoring religious services.

Tuesday, February 04, 2003
 
We're going to Baghdad -- but when?

William Saletan's Slate column estimates that the probability of war with Iraq has jumped to 91 percent. Judge for yourself whether he's read the tea leaves right; I think he has. The only question now is when.

Today's Chance of Invasion: 91 percent

Turkish leader tells his party 1) Iraq "isn't taking the necessary steps" for peace; and 2) "The decisions we make for war are not because we want a war, but so we can contribute to peace" by taking part in and influencing "the operation" in Iraq. Translation: U.S. will get its northern front. Despite Blair's lobbying, Chirac reiterates inspectors should get to decide how long they need. Iraq says it will "explore" proposal by European Parliament members to let non-Iraqis (rather than Iraqi agents) serve as witnesses to scientists' interviews. Britain says Iraq has thoroughly bugged inspectors but gives no documentation.

Yesterday: 88 percent

 
DoD budget aims for careful balance between current operations and future transformation

The Pentagon unveiled its massive FY2004 budget yesterday with great fanfare. (Some have called this budget 'Reagan-esque'.) This budget attempts to deal with an extraordinarily complex world situation, apportioning resources between recapitalization of old facilities/equipment, personnel costs, current operations (buying ammo for the current fight), and investments in transformation. Achieving just the right mix between these funding priorities is very difficult. And for the Army, I think the mix may have dangerous consequences over the next several years. The Pentagon appears to be taking significant risk with certain fleets (M1 tanks and M2/M3 fighting vehicles) in order to fund transformation.

“The Army has terminated 24 systems including the Crusader artillery system, the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle upgrades, and multiple launch rocket system conversions. The service also restructured its medium tactical vehicle program, battle command systems and Javelin missile system.”

If I’m reading this right, the Army has essentially scrapped the Interim Force concept of recapitalizing its current fleet of M1s and M2/M3s in order to fully fund transformation. We’re accepting a significant near-term risk in order to do that. I think it’s the right decision, but it will present problems for operational commanders now in the hotseat. As their fleets age, maintenance will become more of a distracter, and that may take money away from current operations.

Also, the decision to not recapitalize means that many parts of the Army will jump from Legacy to Objective Force without any interim step. The nice thing about interim steps is that they make transition easier and less turbulent. For instance, soldiers can get used to digitized vehicles with retrofitted M1s before they get the high-speed M1A2 or M1A1D. This makes it easier to train once the new vehicles show up down the road.

 
When the US tells you to leave, something's about to happen

Today's Washington Times reports that the State Department has quasi-ordered diplomats and citizens to leave the Persian Gulf region in preparation for a war with Iraq. This is one of the last steps before imminent miltiary action. In general, the pulling out of "NEOs" (short for non-combatant evacuation operations, but used as a noun in the military for civilians stuck in harm's way) signifies an escalation in the chances of war.

Foreign diplomats in Iraq have begun leaving the country, and the United States has urged its citizens in other Persian Gulf states to consider departing amid a war looming in the region.

The State Department issued travel warnings for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia late last week, cautioning about "increased security concerns" and authorizing "the departure of family members and non-emergency personnel" at the U.S. embassies "on a voluntary basis."

"Private American citizens ... should evaluate rigorously their own security situations and are strongly urged to consider departing," the department said.


Monday, February 03, 2003
 
U.S. plans deployment of additional forces to Korea

Today's Wall Street Journal broke the story that the Pentagon was making plans to redeploy an aircraft carrier battle group and US Air Force bomber forces to the vicinity of Korea within the next two weeks. This story was picked up by the Associated Press and will probably hit local news tomorrow.

WSJ: The Pentagon has decided to send additional forces to Asia as part of an effort to send a clear message to North Korea that even though the U.S. is focused on a pending war with Iraq it still can muster significant firepower in Asia.

The decision comes after U.S. aerial surveillance detected suspicious activity at North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility. Some analysts fear the North is moving 8,000 spent but previously sealed fuel rods to a site where they can be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium, something the North has threatened to do. Whether the activity is aimed at removing the rods or merely alarming the U.S., it's the latest of several provocations by Pyongyang that analysts say could backfire on the communist regime by driving neighbors China and South Korea to adopt the U.S.'s hard-line stance toward the North.

It wasn't immediately clear how much firepower the U.S. is dispatching to the region. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's decision to send additional forces came after a request from Adm. Thomas Fargo, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, for two dozen bombers and fewer than 10 Air Force attack jets. Adm. Fargo also requested that the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier move into the region if the USS Kitty Hawk, which is based in Japan, moves to the Gulf.


This story is a big deal. First, it should be seen for what it is: an economy of force measure to hold North Korea in place with a visible and credible threat of force. But the "economy of force" part is critical. We're putting a big stop sign in front of North Korea, essentially freezing things in place in that part of the world with as much combat power as we can spare. In the meantime, our military will focus on the main tasks at hand: the 'hot' wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is significant that we have decided not to deploy more ground troops to Korea. But for Iraq, we might have sent a brigade of infantry to reinforce the Army's 2nd Infantry Division there, or a brigade of armor to fall in on prepositioned equipment sitting in Pusan. However, the reports say otherwise. The U.S. is sending just enough force to communicate the threat, while not taking away from the missions in Southwest Asia.

I'm no Korea expert; I only spent a year there as part of the 2nd Infantry Division. But knowing the little I do, I still think it's the most dangerous place on Earth. Saddam's trying to get weapons of mass destruction; North Korea already has them. Saddam is fortifying his units in hasty defensive position; North Korea is dug in harder than the Germans at Normandy. The situation is also infinitely more complex there, given the close proximity of China, Russia and Japan. This is a reasonably prudent measure to ensure things don't heat up anymore on the Korean peninsula.

 
One more reason to dislike the French --
Major French newspaper says the Columbia disaster should teach America humility

The International Papers roundup at Slate has this to report about our French "allies":

France's Libération provided a coda to Columbia's fate in an op-ed titled "Humility": The shuttle disaster, coupled with the Sept. 11 attacks, showed that the Bush years could not be considered happy ones. "While everywhere in the world public opinion worries about the consequences of war in Iraq, some think they see a bad omen in this latest drama." The disaster should be a lesson in humility and show the United States "that whatever its financial might, its scientific know-how, its technological prowess, its training of men, it cannot control all, dominate all, foresee all, parry all."

 
U.S. Govt Reneges on Promises to Combat Vets;
Vets now appealing to Supreme Court after lower court refuses claim

In the early days of the Korean War, things did not look good for the United States or United Nations forces. They were beaten back all the way south to Pusan, confined to a small footprint and almost forced to retreat to Japan. America's military had a draft, but it also looked to volunteers to rapidly build a force that would be capable of fighting the hardened North Korean (and later Chinese) armies. In doing so, military recruiters made a number of promises to new enlistees -- such as the promise of free lifetime medical care. Many years later, with the danger and exigency of war gone, the U.S. government reneged on its promise. The veterans sued, and were told last year by the U.S. Court of Appeals that their case was compelling -- but not good enough to win benefits from the government.

Until the mid-1950s, recruits were enticed to join the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force by recruiters' pitches that included oral and written promises of free lifetime medical care — promises that turned out to lack congressional approval. Government lawyers say repaying just out-of-pocket payments for the retirees would cost $15 billion.

Lower courts heard that and turned down the pleas, but said it was hard to reject aging officers laden with medals for valor, and represented by a national hero who wore his Medal of Honor while arguing that retirees deserved free military-hospital care.

"We cannot readily imagine more sympathetic plaintiffs than the retired officers of the World War II and Korean War era involved in this case. They served their country for at least 20 years with the understanding that when they retired they and their dependents would receive full free health care for life," said the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in ruling against them.

The trial court and the Federal Circuit both decided that Congress cannot be forced to pay for the military recruiting incentive it had not authorized in advance. Judges noted that the military did provide medical care for many years despite the absence of a law but cut back when military hospitals closed and resources grew tight. A three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit early last year ruled unanimously for the veterans but the full court overturned that decision Nov. 18.

"The government concedes such promises were made in good faith and relied upon," the Federal Circuit noted in an 8-4 refusal to order the back payments Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson estimated at $15 billion.


This is one of the worst instances of bureaucratic and legal doublespeak I've seen. These veterans served their nation in combat and they deserve to have those promises upheld, despite whatever legal or bureaucratic red tape stands in the way. Today's Washington Times reports that the vets are taking their case to the Supreme Court. I sincerely hope the Court will find the decency and justice to do the right thing in this case.

Not all 1.9 million current military retirees would be covered if the Supreme Court ordered the government to make good on the promise. By one theory, it would apply solely to the 23,435 now living who retired before 1956, when Congress clamped a "space available" caveat on military health care. More than 500,000 other current retirees joined the services before the limit was imposed and were among those included in the Justice Department estimate of up to 1.5 million.
* * *
The appeals court advised retirees to seek help from Congress, a recommendation seconded by major veterans organizations, which predict the courts won't fix the problem. As updated in 2002, federal law provides retirees a combined plan called Tricare, with an emphasis on Medicare. Retirees in the court case consider that less than equal to military hospital care.
* * *
It is not known if the Supreme Court will review what has come to be known as "the Day case," but in the meantime Col. Day and his nationwide troop will take to the streets and to three colorful billboards recently posted in the Maryland suburbs.

They plan to demonstrate at the Capitol on Feb. 12, and last week introduced the billboards at 6100 Central Ave. in Capitol Heights, on U.S. Route 1 a mile north of Beltsville, and on Kenilworth Avenue south of U.S. Route 50.

"This battle is not over," Col. Day said. "We were all aware that whichever way the Court of Appeals ruled, that the case would be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Much to my surprise, it is G.I. Joe that is appealing."


Sunday, February 02, 2003
 
CNN: Advances in Battlefield Medicine

Military casualties -- like civilians unfortunate enough to be shot or wounded on America's streets -- have just minutes/hours to get medical attention in order to survive. Soldiers will go to extraordinary lengths to evacuate their buddies, and military medics/docs will do everything in their power to treat/save them. Often, field medics make the difference between life and death. Few who have seen (or read) Black Hawk Down can how SFC Kurt Schmid tried to suture CPL Jamie Smith's femoral artery in the middle of combat. (See Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, p. 210-214) Indeed, this tradition of perseverance and innovation in military medicine has bled over into the civilian sector, leading to major improvements in American trauma care since WWII.

Combat medics do everything they can to save the lives of American soldiers wounded in combat; we can't give them enough when it comes to research & development funding. Recently, the Pentagon has developed new tools for combat medics to pack in their rucksacks as they go into combat in Iraq. These include:

- One new tool in medic's bag is a fast-working bandage. The new bandage contains the agent that makes blood clot. Laboratory animal tests show that when the bandage is applied for just two minutes, the clotting agent stops the bleeding.
- Another tool special forces will be bringing to Iraq is a one-handed tourniquet, enabling soldiers to quickly stop blood flow from a wound while still keeping one hand free.
- The military is also working on personal digital assistant which can help track medical information on soldiers in the field.






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